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THE IMPERIAL TEMPTATION

THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND AMERICA'S PURPOSE

ROBERT W. TUCKER

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—from the Introduction

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The West and the Rest

Kishore Mahbubani

THE WEST won the Cold War, the conventional wisdom holds, not because of its military superiority but because of the strength of its social, economic, and political institutions. Hence, it is not surprising that a new consensus has quickly developed that the West merely has to hold a steady course in the post-Cold War era. Francis Fukuyama, with his celebration of the triumph of Western values, captured the spirit of the moment. The rest of the world, if it is to free itself from the "mire" of history, will have to adjust and accommodate to the ways of the West. Having already got things basically right and facing no imminent threat, the West has no need to make major adjustments of its own.

This essay will challenge these widely held assumptions. It will argue that "steady as she goes" is not a viable option for the West; that while it may not face any immediate military threat, the West faces serious and growing dangers of other kinds; that it cannot afford to turn its back on the Third World because the Cold War is over; that in a shrinking and increasingly overcrowded world, in which the population of the West constitutes an ever smaller percentage, a comprehensive new strategy is needed; and that an aggressive effort to export Western values to the non-West does not constitute such a strategy, but will only serve to aggravate already serious problems.

Arriving at a sound strategy, a difficult enough task in the best of circumstances, will be harder because of the deeply ingrained habits acquired during the long years of the Cold War. There is a real danger that problems will be wrongly identified and defined, and that consequently the West's strategic sights will be pointed the wrong way. For someone of my background, this danger recalls the famous British guns of Singapore in December 1941. The guns of that supposedly impregnable fortress were confidently pointed seaward, as the Japanese came quietly over land on bicycles and on foot to conquer the island with embarrassing ease. This analogy is particularly apt because one of the most serious challenges that will confront the West in the new era will also arrive on bicycles and on foot, or their equivalents: the challenge posed by mass immigration from Third World countries. Superior Western military technology will be useless against these invading armies because they will arrive as poor and defenseless individuals and families, moving without commanders or orders, and seeping slowly through porous borders.

If and when this happens, it will be only one dimension of a multiple crisis, a crisis

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resulting from the combination of a fundamentally changed Western attitude toward the Third World, and some well-known but inadequately understood secular trends.

The Retreat of the West

FOR THE four decades of the Cold War, both sides attached great importance to the Third World. Seeing themselves as engaged in a global struggle for the highest stakes, neither felt able to treat any country, however small, poor, or distant, as unimportant. Everything counted, nothing was irrelevant. Even as the West shed its colonial empires, the Third World successor states became more rather than less strategically relevant, especially for the United States. Because everyone else was already committed to one camp or the other, these countries constituted the main arena of competition, the contested hearts and minds and territories of the Cold War.

Although most Third World countries belonged at least nominally to the Non-Aligned Movement, that organization was incapable of providing them with effective security. For that, most felt they had only two effective choices: to identify to a greater or lesser degree with either the Western or Soviet camp. Thus a ramifying system of patrons and clients, one with an elaborate if mostly tacit set of rules, spread over the globe. Third World states were by no means always the passive objects of superpower manipulation in these arrangements, and many became very skillful at exploiting the Cold War for their own ends. But it was a dangerous game, requiring precise calculation. Those playing it observed carefully what happened to countries like Cambodia and Ethiopia—two vivid symbols of twentieth-century tragedy—when they got things wrong. They also noticed that if the Soviets kept Mengistu in power in Ethiopia, the West kept Mobutu in Zaire. This was a time when strategic imperatives did not allow for exquisite moral scrupulousness.

With the end of the Cold War, this state of affairs no longer pertains. Following the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Soviet proxies have either already fallen (like Mengistu) or been left exposed, without protection or subsidies, at the end of a long limb. The West, too, has reordered its priorities. No longer is there the same compulsion to prop up unsavory allies, in the name of national security. More stringent tests of human rights and democratic rectitude can be applied, and the inability of such allies to transform themselves at short notice to comply with these higher standards has been used as justification for abandoning some of them without feeling much in the way of guilt.

Whatever the ethical merits of thus using and then ditching allies, this sudden joint Soviet and Western abandonment of their erstwhile Third World friends has sent a powerful message through most of the Third World. The rules of the game have changed; indeed, the game itself has changed. Third World regimes have begun to realize that their previous "usefulness" has ended and the West now sees little value in taking any real interest in their fate. The results of this are not all bad. The end of superpower competition has created the conditions for the ending of many conflicts that were kept well-stoked by the Cold War, ranging from El Salvador through Namibia and Afghanistan to Cambodia. Many dictatorial regimes have disappeared. This is to be welcomed. But the removal of Cold War pressures also means that forces that have been bottled-up in these societies can now erupt.

To understand the epochal significance of this new Western tendency to withdraw and leave most Third World societies alone (observe, for example, how many Western embassies are closing down in Africa; the British have in recent years closed their missions in Burundi, Congo, Gabon, Liberia, and Somalia), consider that these societies have been subjected to heavy Western involvement in their affairs since the colonial era started in the sixteenth century. The current Western tendency to disentangle itself from the Third World should therefore

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be seen as the end not merely of a four decades-old involvement, but of one that is four centuries old. All the indigenous processes that were smothered and subdued for centuries, either because of metropolitan pressures or because global forces were raging above them, can finally surface. To hold these historically pent-up forces in place, the Western world has left behind in the Third World a thin veneer of Western concepts of national sovereignty, the nation-state, sometimes Western parliamentary institutions, and some principles of international law.

True, these forces were not totally bottled-up during the Cold War. But the end of that struggle has already seen an acceleration and intensification of such phenomena that amounts to a qualitative change. Tribal warfare in Africa, ethnic strife in Pakistan, Hindu-Muslim strife in India, Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria: all can surface now with greater strength. The disintegration in 1991 of Somalia (one of the more ethnically homogeneous states in Africa) would not have been viewed with indifference—would not have been allowed to happen—ten years ago. During the Cold War, the main political fault-lines in South Asia were *between* India and Pakistan, fault-lines accentuated by their superpower patrons. Today, the main fault-lines are *inside* India and Pakistan.

The Shrinking Globe

IN SHORT, the reversal of centuries-old Western processes of intervention in the Third World is probably going to lead to the emergence of a cauldron of instability in most of the Third World. In previous centuries geographic distance would have insulated the West from this cauldron. Ironically, it was during the Cold War that Western technology shrunk the world into a global village, destroying the insulation provided by distance and time.

Global communication networks that give the West a ringside seat when a Tiananmen explodes or a Gulf War breaks out have an equally spectacular reverse effect. Increasingly, once-remote villages in China, Central Asia, and the heart of Africa now have clear pictures of the comfortable and affluent lives of ordinary citizens in the West. Clausewitz once observed that "once barriers—which in a sense consist only in man's ignorance of the possible—are torn down, they are not easily set up again." It is a remark worth bearing in mind in this context.

The simple practical effect of all this is that a single mental universe and a single global society are in the process of being created. All through the early and middle decades of the twentieth century, Western societies had to struggle hard to remove from themselves the gross inequalities resulting from the early years of industrialization. This they essentially did. Now they are faced with a much, much larger proletariat on their doorsteps—one drawn irresistibly by awareness of Western affluence and opportunity.

Western Europeans are beginning to understand this. If something goes wrong in, say, Algeria or Tunisia, the problems will impact on France. In the eyes of the North African population, the Mediterranean, which once divided civilizations, has become a mere pond. What human being would not cross a pond if thereby he could improve his livelihood? Through all previous centuries, men and women have crossed oceans and mountains to seek a better life, often suffering terrible hardship in the process. Indeed, it is this drive that explains the wide geographic span of "Western" societies outside their origins in continental Europe, stretching from North America through South Africa to Australia and New Zealand. Today, many more people feel that they can make similar journeys. So far Western Europeans have only seen the beginnings of such mass movements, and already they are deeply troubled.

In 1990, the ratio of Europe's population to that of Africa was 498 million to 642 million; according to UN projections, by 2050, based on medium fertility extension, the ratio will be 486 million (a decrease, be it noted) to 2.265 billion—that is, a ratio akin to the white-black ratio in today's South Africa.

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Two nations, currently of the same population size, demonstrate the meaning of this trend. In the past few years, despite net immigration, Italy's population has been declining. Egypt's is growing by a million every eight months. Italy reacted very harshly to the Albanian boat people. How much more harshly would it react if the boat people were not fellow Europeans? Or consider this: In 1960 the combined population of Morocco and Algeria amounted to half that of France; today it is about equal; in another thirty years it will be double that of France.

To put it simply, within a few decades, when Western Europe will be confronted with teeming impoverished masses on its borders and when increasing numbers will be slipping in to join the millions already there, Europeans will find themselves in essentially the same strategic plight as the affluent but vastly outnumbered white population of South Africa today.

Even the United States, separated from the fast-growing population centers of Asia and Africa by two mighty oceans, is not immune. As Ivan Head observes, "North America is home to one of the fastest growing of all national populations. The population of Mexico in 1950 was 25 million. Before this decade concludes, it will be 100 million." Despite the magnetic power of American popular culture (which once made even the French feel threatened), some of the Southwestern states of the United States are effectively becoming bilingual societies, reflecting the great influx from the south. At what point will the nature of American society and culture change irreversibly?

The term "population explosion" is disarmingly familiar, a cliché. But like many clichés it expresses a vital truth. From 1750 to 1950, the populations of the five main continents grew at about the same rate. After 1950, there was a dramatic surge of population growth in the Third World, largely resulting from the spread of Western methods of hygiene and basic health care. The population balance between Europe and North America and the rest of the world has been irretrievably altered. In the year 2000 (a mere eight years away), out of a projected global population of 6.25 billion, 5 billion will live in the Third World. Ninety-seven percent of the world's population increase will take place in the Third World.

Population numbers matter. With extreme differences, they create the sort of security dilemmas that, in their different ways, nations like Israel, Mongolia, Nepal, and white South Africa face. Even in the absence of such conventional security threats, this population imbalance, aggravated by the enormous disparity in living standards, will be the fundamental underlying cause of the new sorts of threats facing the Western world, ranging from migrations of the poor and dispossessed to environmental damage, drugs, disease, and terrorism.

The Impact of East Asia

THE STARK picture of an affluent West and a poor Third World is complicated and confused by the increasing importance of the East Asians, the only non-Westerners already in, or poised to enter, the world of developed nations. Though their economic success, especially that of Japan, is seen as a serious problem by some in the West, in the larger context of relations between the West and the Rest it should surely be seen as part of the solution. For Japan and the other East Asian success stories are setting off ripples of development in the Third World in a way that no Western society has ever succeeded in doing.

Consider this great historical oddity: Why is it that decades of proximity to and contacts with North America and Western Europe did not inspire any of the neighboring societies in Latin America, the Middle East, or Africa to plunge into the free-market universe, despite the obvious economic benefits of doing so? Why is Japan the only developed nation to stimulate such emulation?

The answer will inevitably be complex, but one critical factor, largely overlooked, has been the psychological. In 1905, when Japan,

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an Asian nation, defeated Russia, a white power, it unintentionally provided a tremendous psychological boost to anti-colonialism. If not the vast majority, then at least the emerging educated elites of non-European countries could for the first time conceive of the possibility that colonial subjugation was not necessarily a permanent condition, a state of nature. The generation of Jawaharlal Nehru, a boy of fourteen at the time of the war, was greatly stirred.

Today, Japan's economic success is having a similar psychological impact on developing societies all over the world, gradually convincing them that they too can make it into the developed universe. This psychological leap is crucial. Until recently, most Third World nations believed subconsciously that developed status was out of their reach. Today, after looking at Japan and its neighbors, many believe otherwise.

Japan did not intend this. Global benevolence has not yet infused the character of the Japanese. But its success convinced its neighbors, ranging from Korea to Taiwan to Singapore, that they too could do it. Their success has, in turn, had a significant effect on China. The economic take-off of China's coastal provinces has reduced the ability of Beijing to reverse course from economic liberalization and has also helped convince Indonesia, the world's fifth most populous nation, to deregulate even faster, suggesting that a new economic synergy is developing in East Asia.

But the effect is not restricted to the region. Largely unnoticed, pilgrims from all other parts of the world have been coming to East Asia to observe and learn. Turks and Mexicans, Iranians and Chileans are fascinated by East Asia's success. If the East Asians can do it, why not they? So far no Islamic nation has successfully modernized. But if Malaysia and Indonesia, two Muslim countries far from the birthplace of Islam, can be swept along by the rising Asia-Pacific economic tide—and the process is well under way—the winds in the Islamic world will no longer move from West to East Asia but in the reverse direction, a major historic change. Over time, countries like Algeria and Tunisia may also be drawn into this process.

Looked at in this way, Europe and North America, which are increasingly feeling threatened by Japan's economic advance, may indeed have a vested interest in its progress. If the belief and expectation of economic development can be planted in the minds of billions of people, massive migrations may be averted. Those Western Europeans who are already fearful of such migrations from North Africa should do some fundamental strategic re-thinking and begin viewing the challenge from East Asia in a different light. What is a short-term challenge could bring long-term strategic redemption.

Economic Horses, Democratic Carts

AS THE NUMBERS mount and the prospect of ever-worsening poverty and massive immigration looms, most of those Westerners who have not become entirely indifferent to the Third World seem to be determined that first priority must be given to the promotion of human rights and democracy. For the first time since decolonization, many countries have been told that development aid, even from multilateral institutions like the UN Development Program, will be conditioned upon moves toward democratization. This campaign for democracy and human rights in the Third World could backfire badly and undermine Western security in the post-Cold War era.

The collapse of communism in the face of challenges from democracies has given a powerful new burst of confidence in democratic values. These values strengthen the social and political fabric of Western societies because they involve all citizens in national affairs and hence develop in the citizen a commitment to his society. In addition, democratic systems lead to constant circulation within the ruling elites, thereby ensuring the infusion of new blood and new ideas in critical councils. As well as the moral strength of these values, their functional strengths will enhance the global trend toward democratization and increasing

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respect for human rights. Those that fail to adapt to this trend are likely to suffer in the long-term Darwinian contest between societies. Japan, for example, could remain far ahead of China for centuries if China fails to create a system that will enable it to extract and use its human talent as effectively as Japan.

THE QUESTION remains, however: How does one successfully transplant democracies into societies that historically have had very different social and political systems? The conventional wisdom in some American political and intellectual circles today is that any society, including China, can make this transition virtually immediately. Yet most Western societies (including the most recent cases, like Spain and Portugal) did not make the leap overnight from traditional or semi-feudal systems. Economic development came first, creating both working and middle classes that had a vested interest in stability and would therefore not be pulled apart by demagogic democratic politicians trying to capitalize on ethnic and other sectional differences. That has also been the path taken by those who have made the successful transition to democracy in East Asia.

Today the West is encouraging, and sometimes demanding, the opposite approach in the Third World. It is promoting democracy *before* economic development. It assumes that democracy can be successfully transplanted into societies that are at low levels of economic development, and that are deeply divided socially across many lines—tribal, ethnic, and religious, among others. In a developed and industrialized society, a democratic system draws in the established middle class that has a vested interest in stability. In many Asian and African cases, without such middle classes the national polity breaks down into ethnic and tribal loyalties. If this in turn leads to internecine warfare, can one argue that democracy will always bring beneficial consequences?

As far back as 1861, John Stuart Mill said that democracy is "next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities." Even earlier, John Jay, writing in *The Federalist*, stressed that Americans were "descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs." He added that they were surely "a band of brethren" and "should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous and alien sovereignties." Earlier theorists of democracy would be surprised by the twentieth-century conceit that democracy can be applied to any society, regardless of its stage of development or its internal social divisions.

To avoid misunderstanding, let me stress that I am not arguing that democratic systems are necessarily antithetical to development in contemporary Third World societies. Theoretically, it is possible to have both. In some cases, it may even work. But a calm and dispassionate look at Third World conditions suggests that a period of strong and firm government, one that is committed to radical reform, may be necessary to break out of the vicious circle of poverty sustained by social structures that contain vested interests opposed to any real changes. Japan was able to go into high growth after World War II in part because of the wide-ranging socio-economic reforms that General MacArthur imposed. No democratically elected Japanese government could have done what he did. By contrast, the failure of the United States to carry out similar socio-economic reforms in the Philippines is one reason why the economy of that country has not developed well in the postwar years.

Of course, the Filipino case demonstrates that authoritarian governments can be antithetical to development. However, it is equally true that some authoritarian governments have been good for development, as is shown by the dramatic economic growth of South Korea and Taiwan in the early years. The point here is simple: the crucial variable in determining whether a Third World society will progress is not whether its government is democratic but whether, to put it simply, it has "good government."

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"Good Government" is hard to define, especially in the American context, where the term is almost an oxymoron. In the United States, good government often means the least government. In Third World societies, burdened with huge development demands, the common characteristics found in the successful East Asian societies may help to provide a useful definition of "Good Government." These would include: (1) political stability, (2) sound bureaucracies based on meritocracy, (3) economic growth with equity, (4) fiscal prudence, and (5) relative lack of corruption. With these criteria in mind, it should be possible for multilateral institutions like the World Bank to work out an operational definition that would determine eligibility for foreign aid.

The effect of such a reorientation of Western policies toward the Third World would be that less attention would be paid to the *process* by which Third World governments come into being and more attention would be paid to their *performance*. If their performance leads to serious and consistent improvement in the living conditions of the population, both the humanitarian and pragmatic considerations that underlie Western policies would be satisfied: the humanitarian, because there would be less starvation and suffering, and the pragmatic, because improving conditions would mean less migration to the West.

While human rights campaigns are often portrayed as an absolute moral good to be implemented without any qualifications, in practice Western governments are prudent and selective. For example, given their powerful vested interest in secure and stable oil supplies from Saudi Arabia, Western governments have not tried to export their standards of human rights or democracy to that country, for they know that any alternative to the stable rule of the Saudi government would very likely be bad for the West.

The recent Algerian experience introduces another complication for Western advocates of immediate democratization. Democracies work all too well in bringing out the true social and cultural face of a society. In Algeria the centuries-old Islamic heritage had been suppressed by the secular and modern values introduced by the post-colonial elite. That Islamic heritage is now surfacing, and it will probably surface in other Islamic societies that hold democratic elections. If these governments elected by popular mandate impose strict Islamic laws which restrict some human rights (as Iran has), should we respect their right to decide their own values and practices? There are no easy answers.

THE REACTION of the West to the military coup in Algeria illustrates the moral and political ambiguities. Nominally, most Western governments have condemned the coup. However, in reaction to the questions posed by the citizens of France, Italy, and Spain as to whether democracy in Algeria is good for their own countries, most Western governments have quietly welcomed the coup, a sensible pragmatic decision based on Western interests. In the eyes of many Third World observers this pragmatic application of moral values leads to a cynical belief that the West will only advance democracy when it suits its own interests. The same cynicism can develop—is almost certain to develop—over human rights campaigns. Would the West be as tough on the Chinese regime in Beijing if China were located where either Turkey or Mexico is today? Would the West then be as sanguine about the prospects of millions of boat people emerging from China if the regime broke down and chaos prevailed?

Take the case of Peru. In Peru, as in Algeria, there was a spectacular reversal in the trend toward democratization. But Peru was punished with sanctions, while Algeria was not. The Europeans wisely calculated that sanctions on Algeria would further destabilize the volatile socio-economic situation and exacerbate the flow of Algerian refugees. Hence nothing was done. Peru was further away from any Western society. So even though sanctions would be equally destabilizing in an equally volatile socio-economic environment, they were imposed.

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Westerners should surely have asked: What kind of authoritarian government was Fujimori imposing? Was he going to become a Marcos and enrich his personal coffers, or was he desperately trying to reverse course for a society on the verge of serious breakdown? Do such questions matter? Curiously, few have noticed that if *current* Western policies had been in force in the 1950s and 1960s, the spectacular economic growth of Taiwan and South Korea could have been cut off at its very inception by the demand that the governments then in place be dismantled.

In Peru, one additional cause for concern is that if the sanctions succeed in their purpose of unseating the Fujimori government, the possible alternatives of chaos or a Latin American version of Pol Potism could be much worse for the Peruvian people. Those who firmly advocate sanctions on Peru should be prepared to accept moral responsibility for the consequences of those sanctions, good or bad. If they do so, the world may avoid a repetition of the Cambodian experience, where all those who advocated the removal of the Lon Nol regime refused to accept moral responsibility for the genocide that followed. If the West chooses to be prudent in targeting human rights abuses where its own interests are involved, does it not have an obligation to exercise the same prudence when others may be affected by these campaigns?

IN THE FACE of these moral and political complexities, Western governments may find it in their interest to explain to their citizens that prudence may have to be a crucial consideration in the promotion of human rights and democracy. Unfortunately, while Western governments are prudent in practice, they find it almost impossible to speak honestly to their own citizens on the subject. Philosophically, it is difficult to discuss prudence in promoting democratization; it is not an uplifting, inspirational virtue. Yet both honesty and self-interest suggest that Western governments should do so.

No Western government has publicly confessed that in determining its particular human rights and democracy policies, it weighs them against other vital national interests. Yet every government does so. The Germans take a strong stand on Kurdish rights, the United States does not. The United States and the U.K. come down hard on Qaddafi, Italy does not. This pattern of inconsistencies in turn devalues the merit of these human rights policies in the eyes of the ostensible beneficiaries, the Third World societies, because instead of being impressed by the moral courage of Western governments, they notice the pragmatic and calculated application of moral principles.

The human rights campaigns launched by Western governments and non-governmental organizations have done much good. They have, for example, created a new global consensus that militates against the return of gross and egregious violators of human rights like Pol Pot, Idi Amin, and Boukassa. The victims of such regimes can breath a sigh of relief. Similarly, the strong global consensus against the gross forms of torture which prevailed in many parts of the world is a great advance in human history.

But from the viewpoint of many Third World citizens, human rights campaigns often have a bizarre quality. For many of them it looks something like this: They are like hungry and diseased passengers on a leaky, overcrowded boat that is about to drift into treacherous waters, in which many of them will perish. The captain of the boat is often harsh, sometimes fairly and sometimes not. On the river banks stand a group of affluent, well-fed, and well-intentioned onlookers. As soon as those onlookers witness a passenger being flogged or imprisoned or even deprived of his right to speak, they board the ship to intervene, protecting the passengers from the captain. But those passengers remain hungry and diseased. As soon as they try to swim to the banks into the arms of their benefactors, they are firmly returned to the boat, their primary sufferings unabated. This is no abstract analogy. It is exactly how the Haitians feel.

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In the long run, it may be wiser for the West to encourage a more viable process of transition in developing societies, one that puts the horse before the cart—promoting economic development through good government before promoting democracy. This is not to argue that the international community should tolerate vicious dictators like Pol Pot or Idi Amin as long as they promote economic development. Rather, Third World governments should be treated with the same degree of pragmatic realism as is already applied to the governments of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia by European governments.

Implementing this apparently simple reversal would be very difficult for most Western governments. Promoting democracy in most cases involves little in the way of costs or sacrifices. But promoting economic development has significant costs, direct or indirect. What may be good for the Third World in the long-run (promoting economic development first) could prove painful for Western societies in the short-run. The EC would, for example, need to abandon its massive subsidies to inefficient European farmers. If the West persists in taking the easy road in the short-run, promoting democracy first, it will ultimately prove painful and costly because the effects of massive Third World poverty and instability will appear on its doorstep. Unfortunately, when there is a conflict between the short-term and the long-term in democratic politics, it is usually safer to bet that short-term considerations will prevail.

Western Democracy vs. Western Interests

THE RECORD of Western democracies in overcoming the various challenges they have faced is impressive. Unlike Athens, they have so far triumphed in both peace and war. The resilience of these societies should never be underestimated. Yet it is dangerous to assume that they have no institutional defects.

In the absence of a clear and imminent threat, most Western governments find it difficult to convince their populations that given the seriousness of the post-Cold War challenges, they must be prepared to accept some painful changes and sacrifices. The problem is not lack of leadership in these societies, but institutional arrangements.

The global effects of these institutional defects of democracy can be demonstrated with two examples, both of which have harmed the non-Western world a great deal: the U.S. budget deficit and the EC Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

Despite a wide consensus in the United States that budget deficits have to be stopped, the budget has effectively become a monster that no government institution can effectively tame. Gramm-Rudman failed miserably. The problem arises out of institutional defects in the democratic system. The interlocking network of votes by the various lobbies means that they have a stranglehold on the budget process, thereby guaranteeing the perpetuation of the enormous deficits.

Private lobbies distort the economic competitiveness of the United States in other ways, with ramifications that spill outside U.S. borders. For example, as far back as the early 1980s, the U.S. auto industry asked for and, through the intervention of the U.S. government, received respite from Japanese competition in the form of voluntary restraints. In the decade that followed, the industry, instead of trying to learn from Japan and investing in competitiveness, continued to pay both its shareholders and management rich dividends. No effort was made to check whether this public intervention was being used for public or private good. The Japanese government's intervention in the Japanese economy is done with the clear understanding that long-term Japanese national interests lie in enhancing, not undermining, the international competitiveness of Japanese industries. Not so in America, where government institutions respond to ad hoc pressures from private interests.

The CAP is another monster that has been created out of the institutional defects of Western democracies. In private, virtually no EC leader can defend the CAP. In public, no

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French or Spanish or Italian leader would criticize it for fear of not being elected.

By absorbing over two-thirds of the EC budget, the CAP draws funding away from industries that could enhance the EC's competitiveness. It has also crippled the GATT discussions because the non-EC nations see no reason why they should accept painful changes when the affluent EC nations will not do so. Why, for example, should Indonesia, Brazil, and Zaire—three nations that could form an "oxygen cartel"—curb their lucrative deforestation activities when the affluent EC societies won't accept any sacrifices? Only the lack of awareness of such problems can explain why the crippling of the Uruguay Round of GATT talks in December 1990 was allowed to happen by the West. This crippling seriously aggravated the new threats that the West faces in the post-Cold War era.

To prevent massive migrations from the poor to the affluent societies, a significant burst of economic development would be needed around the globe. One crucial global instrument that is needed to trigger such widespread economic development is GATT. If all societies abide by its rules, it creates a single and massive global marketplace which all societies, rich and poor, can plug into. GATT has already demonstrated its power by carrying a significant portion of mankind—those living in the West—to the highest levels of comfort and affluence enjoyed in the history of man. It does this quite simply by creating a "level playing field" in which each society can exploit its comparative economic advantage. The impact on global productivity has been enormous.

There were few protests when the Uruguay Round was crippled in December 1990. Perhaps it was seen as merely a "trade" issue. The Brussels meeting failed because the European Community wanted to protect certain industries from global competition. This will eventually prove futile because capitalism is fundamentally a dynamic process. In trying to protect their industries from new competition, the West is trying to freeze an unfreezable process.

Given the historical impact it has already had and its relevance to the central problems of the immediate future, it is puzzling that more strategic thinkers have not focused on the GATT. It is a mistake not to do so. By denying the vast masses an opportunity to improve their livelihood, a retreat from the GATT to protectionism will force them to pound on the doors of the West.

REORIENTING Western strategy in the post-Cold War era is a major task, requiring the sort of leadership that the U.S. so handsomely provided after World War II. Unfortunately, at the end of the Cold War, the leadership of the West has fractured between America, Europe, and Japan at the very moment when the need for leadership in the Western world has never been greater. Unfortunately, too, Western societies are under strong pressure to turn inward when they should be looking outward. Having created a technology which has brought the world, with all of its attendant problems and promises, to its very doorstep, the West now has a strong impulse to shut the doors, a futile impulse. Futile because it has created a universe in which "interconnectedness" will be the order of the day.

The real danger is that the West will realize too late that—like the defenders of Singapore—it has been preoccupied with old challenges while new ones have been assuming massive proportions.□

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Samurai Legacies, American Illusions

Ivan P. Hall

JAPAN WANTS to be seen as eager to join the rest of the world, but would like to convey this impression while retaining (preferably unperceived) the luxury of its old insular mentality. As a result, its present tensions with the United States are as much the product of an intellectual event as they are of concrete negotiating snags. This event, a major watershed in the history of Japan-U.S. relations, is the advent of "Revisionism," that fresh and unvarnished look at the structure and exercise of Japanese economic and political power—at Fortress Japan—undertaken from the late 1980s by journalists Karel van Wolferen and James Fallows, political scientist Chalmers Johnson, former trade negotiator Clyde Prestowitz, publicist Pat Choate, and others.

These revisionists challenged what had long been for Tokyo the convenient notion that Japanese institutional arrangements, procedures, motivations, and purposes were fundamentally similar to ours—or at least were unfolding along an American or Western-model trajectory —and that if there were still a few glitches of custom and system to be worked out, all that was required was a little more time, patience, and cultural understanding on our part.

This lifting of the veil, with evidence that the revisionist perspectives were beginning to infect the American establishment itself, brought on a predictable panicky Japanese attempt to derail the argument—by ad hominem jabs at the revisionists as emotional and "unbalanced" in their views, as racist even; by tweaking the American conscience with laments that we were abandoning our grand Benedict & Mead tradition of cultural relativism and tolerance for a renascent Puritanical value absolutism; and by linking revisionist ideas to the cruder outbursts of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States—outbursts that, Tokyo warned, would provoke anti-American feelings in Japan and eventually engulf our own Japanese-American community in yet another round of indignities. The centerpiece of this counterattack has been the invention of the term "bashing" and its masterful extension to cover all serious but embarrassing analyses of Japan—surely the "Great Intellectual Train Robbery" of *this* century.*

The recent proposal by Sony Chairman Akio Morita that it is now time for Japanese

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*With a grateful nod to Clinton Rossiter, who, in *Conservatism in America* (1955), used this phrase of the nineteenth-century hijack of the old ethic of individualism by the ideologues of Big Business.

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corporations to become more "Western" and chase after profit rather than market share does not necessarily mean that the game is up, but it does suggest that the message has finally gotten through. And the most important responsibility now resting with Americans who study, describe, deal with, and talk to Japan is to see to it that these long overdue "moments of truth," these precious openings at last to a true dialogue across the Pacific, do not succumb to the attack now being made upon them. We must guarantee that straightforward discussion of Japan (as of China, Russia, or Germany) does not become a political and cultural taboo in our own country.

American Perceptions

OUR TASK here is to get an intellectual handle on the harsher side of Japan without flying into Yellow Peril or Pearl Harbor rhetoric. Every national culture is an interweaving of softer and harder surfaces—of Beethovens and Bismarcks, of flamencos and Falangists, of church suppers and corporate greed. The Japanese complain of our outdated images of a "Mount-Fuji-and-Geisha" Japan, but then take umbrage when we uncover the *keiretsu* or market conquest through dumping. We need to reassure the Japanese, and even more so ourselves, that there is no reason why—once we have their ways of doing things and their intentions more clearly in focus, and make the required adjustments in our own tactics and expectations—we cannot continue to be mutually respecting partners and friends in the decades ahead.

As the first step, we need to consider some of the habits of mind that prevent us from taking an unsentimental look at a society that has proved economically successful by our own yardstick but that "works" (and rather disturbingly well) without our cultural values of individualism and universalistic rules. It is a society that has substituted an adversarial relationship between itself and the world at large for the sort of energizing tensions that we have created in our own society between business and government. Our need to feel that Japan really is falling into step after all was pathetically evidenced by the euphoria with which much of the American press and public greeted the Tokyo stock market plunge and predictions of a major Japanese recession earlier this spring. Wiser watchers, better attuned to Japan's long-term strategies and world view, analyzed it as merely another adversity-induced opportunity for retrenchment and retooling—*reculer pour mieux sauter*.

Behind our diffidence about looking too clinically at Japan there have been some influential historical atmospherics, apart from the most obvious one—our guilt, or remorse, over The Bomb. Most of our senior generation of Japan experts and others active in transpacific dialogue first encountered Japan in the 1950s, a decade when the country was well out of the rubble but not yet into high growth and nasty trade disputes. It was an era when American attitudes—at 360 yen to the dollar—were typified by the sentimental exotica of James Michener's novel, *Sayonara*. Japan was not only a haven for G.I.s on leave from the Korean battlefields and an appreciative cocoon for the gestating Japanologist, but a pastoral arcadia for American aesthetes in flight from the Levittowns, gasoline guzzlers, and presidential soporifics of the Eisenhower years.

Steaming themselves in hot baths, or rattling open their old Japanese farmhouse shutters to watch the moon rise behind the twisted pine branches, these would-be denizens of Eden were totally oblivious to the sweating masses of workaday Japan, packed into their streetcars and commuter trains and hell-bent on rebuilding their country. So they helped to conjure up a Japan that never was nor ever would be—sweetly feminine, vunerable, and mystic, a Japan grossly unappreciated (so they complained) yet basically inaccessible (so they patronized) to the average American mind. This fancy of a gentle Japan was presciently challenged in the early 1960s by Paul Goodman in *Growing Up Absurd*, where he chided the Kyoto-nurtured West Coast Beats for seeking respite in a Zen shorn of its tough feudal samurai backbone.

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An even deeper historical conditioner may lie in some frequently noted proclivities of American thought—too dogmatic a faith in the goodness and perfectibility of man, too sentimental an approach to politics and culture, too great a trust in the efficacy of purely economic arrangements, and too much debilitating naivete about power and its manifold corruptions.

One of our simplest problems lies in our half-way mastery of Japanese etiquette, which requires the covering of true but problematical intentions (*honne*) with a mask of face-saving pleasantries or excuses (*tatemae*). Too many Americans have too often mistaken that facade for reality; or, having been told that the Japanese eschew direct confrontation—and being reluctant to be disliked or thought gauche—have pulled back and remained silent without playing the other, and equally important, half of the game, that of a decently veiled but convincing power positioning.

Far more paralyzing for our effective intellectual engagement of Japan is a certain paradoxical blind spot in what we think of as our ideal of cultural tolerance or cultural relativism—namely, our reluctance to see that tolerance of cultural intolerance, or relativism toward a nationalist-racialist absolutism, are both inconsistent and self-defeating. The fact of the matter is that Japan practices against foreigners, and against many of its own citizens, discriminations over which our cultural relativists would be the first to howl in protest were they to be perpetrated by Americans. Perhaps as Japan increasingly imports its insularity into the United States itself—with more litigation in our own courts over discriminatory employment and promotion practices toward American women, minorities, and white male executives—this point will become clearer.

It is ironic how some Americans who denounce discriminatory barriers in the United States or South Africa turn right around to join Japanese spokesmen in denouncing American requests for access and reciprocity as another instance of Western cultural absolutism. The point we need to make to our Japanese friends is that their country is being asked to change and bring under mutual rules only those practices that palpably impinge on others in a globally interdependent age—what John Stuart Mill would have called "other-regarding" behavior—not to overturn its entire heritage. To insist that the first is tantamount to the second stops all discussion and is one of the more effective ploys in Japan's public relations quiver.

A great deal of the American failure to fathom Japanese intentions and develop realistic strategies to deal with them can be traced, I think, to our own dislike of group-based exclusionism and discrimination. We refrain from judging Japan negatively on these for fear of violating our other American ideal of cultural tolerance. This makes it very hard for us to even see what it is that we are trying to grapple with.

Loyalty Unto Death

OUR MOST critical failure of perception has been our inability to catch Japan's own perceptions of itself, and of its relation to us and the rest of the world. The Japanese, for all their hi-tech and their talk of "globalization" are still in the thrall of a resolutely defensive insularity, neither the depth nor the rationale of which we fully understand. This insularity is the main source both of its trade "frictions" and of its hesitation in playing a more active world role.

The practical catalogue of Japanese exclusionism and xenophobia is all too well documented, starting with market barriers and their ethnocentric justifications—Japanese snow is different (skis), their intenstines are longer (beef), rice is one of the cultural *penates*. Foreign lawyers, journalists, and academics still run up against professional barriers that are not encountered by their Japanese counterparts working in the West. Third-generation resident Koreans are still subjected to discriminatory treatment. American baseball and sumo stars in Japan are deliber-

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ately tripped up just short of the highest honors.

None of this is to suggest the outlander makes no friends or has no fun in Japan or that, for the well-heeled, safely ghettoized, and non-threatening Caucasian expatriate, Tokyo cannot still be just this side of paradise. But what is odd is that these issues, all singly reported and deplored, have been so little understood *collectively*, as a possible clue to Japan's overall behavior and intentions. The prospects for a more open society, for the healthy development of its democratic institutions, and for a firm refusal to retread the old militarist path, will all be reduced if this mentality persists—and our own default in constructively engaging it makes that persistence more likely.

The garden-variety insularity of like flocking to like is of course pandemic to the human race, and all too evident in our own American record of racial discrimination and ethnic status-definition. What makes Japan fundamentally different is that its racially based national consciousness and exclusivity, far from being the objects of attack, disdain, and efforts at amelioration, are openly sanctioned by the intellectual establishment, public consensus, and government policy. Ethnic diversity has been roundly decried as a source of American weakness, by Japanese ranging from ex-Prime Minister Nakasone to my own sophomore seminar students; after the April 30 rioting in Los Angeles they are absolutely sure of it. The problem, in short, is an ideological one—in the end the product of artificial, politically willed, intellectual constructs running the whole length of Japan's 120 years of post-Meiji Restoration modern history.

Why does Japan's insular mentality have this preposterously adamantine edge? We miss both the tenacity and true root of it when we stop at the two most frequently given historical explanations—those of national security and communal cooperativeness. Having been obsessed with the former ourselves for the past half century, and now mourning the gradual loss of the latter in our own society, we nod assent to both of these justifications on the basis of our own values and experience. Some Japanese attribute their defensive mentality to the strategic sense of insecurity instilled a century and a half ago by Perry's "Black Ships" of 1853 and China's Opium War of 1840, but seldom stop to ask why, by the turn of the century, their country had turned recklessly expansionist, the predatory wolf rather than the bristling porcupine.

Others attribute Japanese insularity to the collective consciousness and the cooperative, harmonistic values learned over two millenia of rice-growing agriculture. But we can find other "traditional Asiatic" societies not nearly as tightly knit against outsiders as is Japan—for example, Thailand. Again, what is it that makes Japanese groups so super-groupy? With hardly any Japanese left knee-deep in the paddy fields, why do corporate officials trained at the Harvard Business School and jetting first class still go drinking night after night in Manhattan with other Japanese exclusively, lest (as a New York-based securities analyst confided to me) they be thought too "Americanized?"

A MORE powerful shaper of insularity—and more difficult for us to grasp, since it lies beyond the ken of our own mentality and contravenes some of our most deeply held values—is what I would call the survival in various guises of the "samurai ethic." This may sound a bit musty and old-fashioned, but Japan-explainers should start rummaging around once again among those concepts that were of serious concern before and after the Pacific War—things like feudalism, military values, the absolute quality of political, personal, and group loyalties, and the overwrought denial of self (the nub of the matter) to which all of the foregoing have contributed. It is here that we shall find our missing "plus-alpha," our clue to the *intensity* with which the Japanese seal off their groups—or the grand collectivity of their nation—against outsiders.

In short, we need an imaginative revisit-

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ing of the central samurai values of loyalty-unto-death and total self-abnegation that were spawned in the unconditional, non-contractual fealties of medieval Japan—existential commitments which tend inwardly toward an absolute identity and submissiveness to one's own group, while creating an outward posture of aggressiveness and suspicion toward others.

IT IS THIS ethic in its modern mask that has led some astute observers to compare the Japanese nation to a monastic community, or to the grand Teutonic Order of the old East Prussian marches. In psychological terms, these similes are far more apt than the more mechanical and economically defined stereotype of "Japan Inc.," or former French Prime Minister Edith Cresson's hill of busy ants. There is the militaristic aggressiveness and the quasi-religious devotion—although not to any transcendental being or universal principles above the human nexus. Japan's great religious and philosophical traditions all point away from a Western-style individual consciousness. Confucianism and Shinto stress the social continuities of the family and of the race, while Buddhism prescribes the negation of the ego as a means of escape from suffering and does without a personal, paternal, creator God—that quintessential Westerner who guarantees the infinite, transcendental worth, or "dignity," of the individual personalities He has created (and who, on "walking away" in the deistic eighteenth century, at least had the courtesy to leave behind an immutable universe of natural laws and natural rights). But it is the imposition of the warrior ethic on top of these broadly Asiatic sources of the Japanese mind and spirit that has made Japan so different from all of its neighbors—including China and Korea, with their centuries-long elevation of civilian over military mores and of family values over those of the state.

The concept of total self-sacrifice and service—not to a religious ideal as in the Judaic, Muslim, or Christian West, but to political superiors and to one's social group—was nurtured under the Tokugawa shoguns as the ethic of an entire civil and military bureaucracy. It was toughened philosophically and psychologically by non-rationalist injunctions from Zen Buddhism and the intuition-and-action school of Confucianism, blended with the rising tide of Shinto-based nationalism and xenophobia at the end of Tokugawa. Then it was foisted on the entire populace by the Meiji educational system, after the object of loyalty had been adroitly shifted from feudal superiors to the nation at large and to the emperor, as the center and source of all political and moral values. Finally, it was brought to its frothiest pitch in the militarism and ultranationalism of the 1930s, in the quixotic *kamikaze* missions and in the near-suicidal prolongation of a hopelessly lost war. Although discredited in those guises by the smashing defeat in 1945, the ethic still survives today as a mindset—in the devotion to company, in the single-minded pursuit of market share, in the instinctive rush to protect Japan against all comers, and in the stoic solemnity of Japanese bureaucrats and academics, true heirs to the samurai style.

Although this warrior ethic has nurtured many traits we admire—physical valor, self-control, hard work, honesty, and a vigorous if somewhat astringent intellectual and artistic culture—much of its ethical thrust runs counter to two things that the world increasingly asks of Japan today: a greater dedication to individual rights and to inter-group reciprocity and empathy. The dignity of the individual—this root ideal of Western liberalism and democracy and, yes, of consumer comfort—has no place in a code of self-abnegation unable to distinguish between individualism and raw egotism; while the absolute ethical primacy of one's own group (in this case the nation, Japan) militates against the more relaxed notion of a universal and mutually open comity, bound together by widely accepted rules and practices.

A reflexively pugilistic posture toward the intruding and aggressively expansionist West—salutary in the short run, but now

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outdated—was set in the late nineteenth century by two Meiji-era slogans that still govern the Japanese mind: the overriding national goal to "catch up with and surpass" the West (*oitsuke-oikose*) and to do so by means of a "wealthy country and strong soldiery" (*fukoku-kyohei*). Motivating these goals were a profound sense of insecurity and a deeply wounded pride, both of which (whether objectively justified or not) have consistently been underestimated by the West. Chastened by the disastrous defeat of Japanese arms half a century later, Japan transmuted the literal armies of its militarist adventurism into the equally energetic and dedicated troops of economic growth and expansionism, achieving by a judicious adjustment of the *fukoku-kyohei* means its original *oitsuke-oikose* end of at least parity with the West—in all but raw (and now unfashionable) military terms.

We must grasp that Japan's successes have been achieved in a fit of tough-mindedness. There has never been a lack of broad national purpose or public understanding behind the exercise of Japanese power in the world since the end of the Tokugawa seclusion, although the government has made some frightful miscalculations at the level of concrete application. The problem today is that the old overarching and mobilizing goals have become outmoded—dangerously so for Japan—without any fresh conceptual frame of purposes to replace them. The old reflexes remain firmly in place, creating new tensions with the outside world and leaving the taste of victory bittersweet.

The Political Translation

THE CONTEST between insularism and cosmopolitanism within Japan has political bases of support which we need to understand more clearly if we want to encourage greater domestic openings and international responsibilities—especially now that the Japanese are reconsidering not only their global role but their postwar party alignments as well. Japan's eras of relative cosmopolitanism toward the outside world have always corresponded to periods of political liberalism at home. Japanese liberalism has rested heavily on rationalistic Western constructs drawn in one way or another from Christianity, parliamentary democracy, and Marxian socialism—ideas variously tended by the liberal capitalist center (today's moderate conservatives) and the moderate socialist left (excluding, as non-liberals, the Communists and extreme-left Socialists). These currents of liberalism-cum-cosmopolitanism have always run afoul of sundry types of emperor-, family-, race-, or nation-fixated nativisms, openly celebrated for their blood-and-soil nonrationality—ideas that militate against both an outward openness and internal democratic freedoms. These ideas have been the historical stock-in-trade of the ultranationalist fringe and, more respectably expresssed, of the conservative right. For years our own anticommunist imperatives in the Far East drew the latter force to our side while aligning much of the moderate left against us. With the Cold War over, it should now be easier for us to distinguish our truer ideological cousins.

The most critical divide today runs between Japan's moderate conservatives and the unreconstructed old right—the key divergence being in their attitudes toward World War II, especially Japan's defeat, and toward the democratic reforms that followed. The former, whatever their chagrin, have been able to put defeat behind them, write off the war as a bad job, and get on with the rebuilding of a liberal and civilian-minded Japan, with an inner disposition toward the United States that is relatively unclouded. Their roster of prime ministers includes men like Yoshida, Ohira, Miki, Kaifu, and Miyazawa. The latter by contrast, still nurse the shame of defeat, view Japan's postwar democratic dispensation as an American imposition, remain rooted in prewar-style nationalistic values, and hanker after some device or development that will settle old scores and wipe the emotional slate clean. Those in this second group are more instrumental in their professed friend-

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ship for the U.S., although their two representative prime ministers, Kishi and Nakasone, were among our most vocal supporters. With Japan's newly found clout, however, the wraps have started to come off the xenophobia of what I would dub as this New Old Right—be it in the public disparagement of American minorities and Asian neighbors by prominent cabinet-level figures, or in the anti-American bluster of the provocative bestseller, *The Japan that Can Say "No"*, by Dietman Shintaro Ishihara, someone who well typifies this group and sets it off most clearly from the moderate mainstream.

UNCONSCIONABLY, just as their country has achieved unprecedented weight in global affairs, the intellectual wing of the New Old Right has begun once again to drum into their fellow countrymen the notion that they are a people set apart from the rest of mankind, and that their cultural and social heritage is racially, that is to say biologically, determined. Those not born Japanese can never fully participate, or even understand. The political agenda of the New Old Right is regressive, and best typified by their so-called "Spy Bill," introduced but withdrawn in 1987, which would have mandated the *death* penalty for the leaking of *diplomatic* secrets in *peacetime*—a clear throwback to the mentality of the thought control police of the 1930s. Better known, and even popular with some Americans, is their demand for the scrapping of the war-renouncing Article Nine of the postwar constitution, both as an assertion of fully restored sovereignty and in order (so the sales pitch goes) to permit a full-scale military contribution by Japan to future global peacekeeping operations. Their vision, however, includes heavy rearmament and even nuclear weapons, something that would terrify and destabilize Japan's Asian neighborhood and also put the United States in a very awkward position.

Some of the proponents, indeed, admit that one of the purposes of a nuclear arsenal would be to restrain Uncle Sam in his trade demands. Most damaging of all, however, would be the impact on the Japanese mind itself, undermining those civilian, nonmilitaristic values that have gained public acceptance over the postwar decades.

Behind their attack on Article Nine lies the profounder aim of scrapping and rewriting the constitution itself—something which the moderate-conservative defense intellectual and former Defense Academy head, Masamichi Inoki, has warned of as the opening of the "Lid of Hell" that would let out all the other "demons of reactionary conservatism."[1] Should this succeed, attempts would almost surely be made to move the emperor back toward some semblance of his prewar status, restoring that sort of "moral" authority that was used as a cloak of immunity for Japan's actual power holders, and as an ideological weapon to discredit the philosophical foundations of individual liberty and parliamentary democracy.

Unfortunately the profound anti-liberalism of the New Old Rightists has been obscured for many American and European democrats by their welcome anti-communist rhetoric. There is a special irony in the support given by some American conservatives—including those of our so-called "New Right" who swear by a libertarian and patriotic creed—to elements in Japan who would destroy the remaining liberal and democratic legacy of the U.S. Occupation as now fitfully tended by LDP moderates and the moderate opposition.

By the same token we need to re-engage Japan's moderate left—assorted progressives, radicals, and what I would call philosophical or "modernization" (as opposed to hardcore Leninist, revolutionary) Marxists. These were attracted to their ideology mainly as a vehicle leading to Western-style rationalism and modernity, and as a tool for rejecting the hoary irrationalism of Japan's prewar emperor-centered, family-state, orthodoxy. These are the people who (as a general category) deplore the racist-chauvin-

[1] *Asahi Shimbun*, August 7, 1991.

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ist rhetoric of right-wing politicians, who stand most firmly behind the present constitution, and who are most willing to contemplate a Japan open to the world, eschewing military adventurism, and refocusing its economic energies on the improvement of the social infrastructure of its own people.

Too often, Japan's postwar leftists fell into their own anti-establishmentarian orthodoxy. But at least they helped hold ground against the old spit-and-polish obedience to the state, and against carry-overs of bureaucratic high-handedness and secretiveness beyond the imagination of persons raised in the liberal traditions of the West. Despite all their clichés about monopoly capitalism, American imperialism, and the socialist paradise, we owe these old Marxist Cassandras a debt of gratitude for remaining the most trenchant critics of Japanese militarism, fascism, and expansionism, and for—in a country prone to historical amnesia—refusing to redefine the Nanking Massacre as a Sunday afternoon picnic.[2]

What Japan May Do

FOR THE time being, any dramatic new departures by Japan on the world stage are likely to be inhibited both by its tenacious insularity and its postwar habit of reactive adaptation to the international environment. The former (alas) prevents the Japanese from becoming a new-model paragon of noblesse oblige and enlightened leadership, such as we Americans fancy ourselves to have been in our own role as a postwar superpower. The latter (fortunately) serves to deter them from seeking an old-fashioned "great power" status, with blustery panoply of military, political, cultural, as well as economic, influence.

This second inertial pull—of opportunistic ad hoc adjustments to outside pressures, calibrating the exact point at which to budge and budge no further—stems mainly from four decades under the protective politico-military umbrella of the United States. This involved an implicit grand compact, whereby Japan ceded strategic initiative and cogitation to America in return for an untrammelled economic build-up, and the free and unreciprocated run of the U.S. market. In an imperfect world it was probably a brilliant trade-off, with a politically stable and unproblematical Japan contributing immeasurably to our overriding postwar objective of containing and eroding the threat from the communist bloc.

We are now paying the price, however, for the failure of our foreign policy leadership to deal with the new U.S.-Japan reality of economic parity without trade reciprocity in a non-Cold War context, and to do so in a firm yet well-reasoned manner that minimizes Japanese consternation and resentment as the old indulgences are withdrawn. Unfortunately, too much simplistic redneck hyperbole from our side has simply enabled Japan's elegantly sophisticated, English-speaking go-betweens to exaggerate the evidence of anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S.; to warn, with an elaborate show of anxiety, of a growing (but largely manufactured and much exaggerated) anti-Americanism in Japan; and to cow intelligent, sensitive Americans back into silence on Japan-related issues, for fear of being labelled "basher," "racist," or culturally uncouth.

For their part the Japanese have failed to notice when to stop making too much of a good thing and have tended to take Western complaints on trade issues as a sour-grapes attempt to deprive them of their hard-won gains. Too often they have forgotten that their postwar economic expansion (unlike the old military game) took place in the friendly and supportive continuum of a U.S.-led free-trade system and a laid-back community of industrial democracies—a community in retreat from the old colonialism and internecine nationalism and ready to expand the circle to include former Axis (and later, communist)

[2]One outstanding example of what I have in mind is provided by Professor Saburo Ienaga, who for decades has fought in the courts the watering down of Japanese wartime aggression and atrocities in school textbooks.

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adversaries on the basis of some mutually agreed rules of behaviour.

The *arriviste* gloating of too many high-placed Japanese has not gone down well with Americans and Europeans who already feel that Japan has taken unfair advantage of their own openness under the postwar trading system. Pronouncements to the effect that Japan has decisively defeated the U.S. in an economic contest, and that it is no use now trying to catch up, suggest a continuing inability to take success gracefully. Indeed, probably nothing accounts more for the recent cooling of influential Americans toward Japan than the evidence, coming on top of long-since documented adversarial trade practices, that what we had been taking as a rough but friendly competition has been all along for the Japanese a deliberate, humorless, and relentless economic war—a retaliation, even, for their erstwhile military defeat at our hands.

JAPAN REMAINS equally insular-minded toward Asia and has come no further in that region in breaking out of its old dualistic prewar mold of rejection-or-domination—be it the Meiji period's embarrassed flight from poor and fumbling relatives, or the spurious Pan-Asianism of the old Co-Prosperity Sphere. That the first proclivity survives today is clear from the poignant personal experiences of young Asian students and laborers who come to Japan full of admiration and expectation only to leave, many of them, embittered by the unreconstructed patronizing and discrimination. In the present high-demand labor market, the Japanese government has gone to arduous extremes to repatriate Thai and Pakistani foreign workers and replace them with ethnic Japanese from faraway places like Brazil and Peru—perhaps the clearest proof that any genuine shoots of Pan-Asian brotherhood will be strangled by the pervasive underbrush of ethnocentric Japanism.

The second type of posture toward Asia, that of regional domination, comes out today more circumspectly in the celebration of an enormously successful economic model which the East Asian newly industrializing countries have freely adopted, half a dozen of these lusty cubs trotting along faithfully in the path of the Japanese mother tiger. But Japan's Asian neighbors all smart from wartime hurts for which Japanese leaders still refuse to make the sort of emotionally convincing amends that their German counterparts have undertaken toward Israel and Poland.

What has been missing from Japan's historical conceptualizations of itself in respect to both the West and Asia, and what would seem to be a prerequisite for a genuine leadership role in today's drastically shrunken world, is a capacity to think in terms of "horizontal" relationships among equals—a greater sensitivity to universal human traits and needs and interests, in order to override the rigid verticalities of superior-inferior power relationships, and of the precipitous intercultural chasms that still dominate the Japanese view of the outside world. Having climbed to the top of the pile, Japan has difficulty deciding where to go next, since it cannot imagine simply going sideways—toward a relaxed collegiality.

In short, what may be blocking Japan's assumption of an enlightened leadership role more than anything else is its overblown particularism. Great powers in human history have all predicated their mandate (however presumptuous or self-serving) on some sort of universalism, on some sort of shareability. That goes for the great imperial purveyors of political *Pax*—be it America, Britain, ancient Rome, or even the perverted communist universalism of the old Soviet bloc—as well as for the major cultural players like France, with its self-appointed *mission civilisatrice*, and the Chinese with their superb self-confidence over the ages that the barbarians at the gates would eventually succumb to the overpowering charm of Chinese culture. Indeed, one of the most striking features of contemporary, hi-tech Japan is the persisting Japanese fear of the adoption of their own culture by others. This, combined with the

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conviction that it simply cannot be done, leads many of them to consider a foreigner's mastering of their language and social mores less as a compliment and a sharing (as, say, even the French would) than as an unwanted prying into their national psyche.

Japan's repeatedly promised "internationalization" (known as *kokusaika*) is, indeed, more a device for continued self-protection than for a fresh outward engagement with the rest of the world. What Japan's partners are now demanding is access by foreign personnel to commercial, legal, journalistic, and academic activities and institutions that have a direct impact on Japanese as well as on international affairs. The Japanese, however, fearing the contamination of their own social structures, continue to mean by *kokusaika* an ongoing "internationalization" of *things*, as opposed to people. Japan's stunning importation and adaptation of Western material, institutional, and intellectual culture over the past 120 years were accomplished with a calculated minimum of human contact—as when the Meiji government sent students abroad and invited foreign teachers to Japan, putting each of the two groups back on the return steamer just as quickly as possible.

Most Japanese cultural commentators and exchange experts still stubbornly cling to the old notion that the social and professional barriers to foreigners today are of a culturally determined and therefore virtually intractable nature, rather than the product of specific ordinances and historical decisions of relatively recent provenance and therefore reversible, given political will. Behind their reluctance lies the anxious supposition that opening Japan to fuller participation by foreign people would destroy Japanese identity itself, the way a clam dies once it has been pried open.

A final corollary of this doctrine of cultural vunerability is the conviction that today's economic "frictions"—which most of Japan's partners would attribute to a clash of objective economic interests—are basically subjective in nature and stem from an insufficient knowledge and appreciation by others of Japanese culture, and that with enough explanations and public relations on Japan's part these annoying pressures will go away. This assumption is the driving force of Japan's cultural exchange and overseas information efforts today, especially toward the United States—one area in which Japan since the mid-1980s has shed its wall-flower reticence with a vengeance. Much of the new governmental and corporate largesse is highly welcome and long overdue—the language programs, Japanese Studies chairs, arts festivals, and scholarships to Japan. But some of it requires a more watchful eye: the buying into foreign academic and research establishments; the wooing of overseas opinion by Japan's chosen intellectual propagandists speaking with one voice at lavishly staged international conferences; and the rising tide of glossy English-language publications specifically tailored for foreign readers and not always reflecting the fuller spectrum of Japanese views.

What Americans Should Do

THERE ARE many practical institutional and financial aspects to our ineptness in the current dialogue and psychological tug of war with Japan that require immediate attention but are beyond the scope of an essay primarily about ideas and perceptions. The main problem is that America's top-drawer intellectual, political, and business leaders (unlike Japan's) have relatively little in-depth knowledge or well-thought-out opinion toward the other country. This ignorance makes them vunerable both to Japanese PR and to simplistic Japanophobia. Meanwhile our academic and governmental Japan hands, though often distinguished in their own callings, have little status at the elite level. They speak more to other narrowly based specialists than to the broader public, and are sometimes blinkered in their analytical assessments by a sentimental Japanophilia that comes naturally enough with years of personal friendships and professional investments in that country.

Into this gap between the eminent and the expert the Japanese have now come crash-

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ing with extraordinary organizational skill and financial resources, very often enlisting our experts in their wooing of our eminent. There is now in the United States—for the specific purposes of promoting bilateral friendship and a greater understanding of Japan, be they under American, Japanese, or joint sponsorship—tier after tier of cultural, business, civic, and grant-making organizations that have no real counterparts doing the same thing for the U.S. in Japan. The Japanese government's new Global Partnership Program (the so-called Abe Fund), for the exclusive purpose of cultivating American academic, civic, and business leaders, was capitalized in April 1991 at 50 billion yen — about $375,000,000, over nine times the size of the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, our one official agency specifically for cultural and intellectual ties with Japan.[3] The Japanese, too, are all compelled to study English, and are thereby enabled to exploit our entire intellectual GNP and to tune in on everything we say to each other.

This is a massive imbalance, and what the U.S. needs now is an unprecedented mobilizing of its resources to develop the informational, analytical, linguistic, negotiating, and communicating skills truly to fathom the Japanese and to get our own message across to them. And we can no longer afford to pursue this end in the old, patronizing mode of "sensitizing" ourselves to an "exotic" culture. It has to be seen as a matter of the most urgent national interest.

Ultimately we shall have to realize that this challenge encompasses not only Japan but China as well, and indeed the whole of East Asia. With poetic justice, we are now getting a tiny inkling of the intellectual and psychological anguish thrust upon those countries by the pressures from our more dynamic civilization. Most of our present quandary is traceable to our very success in winning the three world wars of this century—First, Second, and Cold—and to the proven strength of the ideals of individual freedom, liberal capitalism, and structured world peace for which we fought. Our relative power decline stems in the first instance from the success of our own policies, which made possible the advance of others. America's old religious and political missionizing impulses toward the region should be gratified by the fact that hundreds of millions of East Asians are no longer starving, and by the evidence that the desire for some form of modern democracy and individual rights has been sufficiently implanted in the minds and hearts of enough dedicated local leaders to suggest an upward trajectory over the long term.

WHAT HAS BECOME problematic for us is the economic impact of our successful twentieth-century agenda on nations with a significantly greater social cohesion than ours, and with a political leadership more clearly focused on the comprehensive national interest, including the programmatic linking of economic activity and strategic security. The energies released by capitalist entrepreneurialism and by the individualistic erosion of traditional societal restraints are not nearly as incompatible with highly developed forms of social collectivity and government-business cooperation as we assume them to be from the premises of our own atomistic-mechanistic, Lockean-Adam Smith view of social and economic man. Played out over decades of peace (as we held the ring) and of political stability, the result in East Asia has been economic growth and a trade challenge of unprecedented proportions.

Mme. Cresson, though putting it far too crudely, was nevertheless right about the Japanese challenge to our way of life and the fundamental values that undergird it. I do not mean our hedonistic binge of the 1980s, but the basic Western proposition that man works to live in pursuit of his own personal development, rather than lives to work on behalf of some superordinate secular entity be it corpo-

[3] As of September 1991, the dual-specie fund of the Friendship Commission stood at $14.9 million and 3.54 billion yen—a total of about $41.2 million.

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ration, race, or state. If we do not wish Japan and its imitators to set the terms of the contest, and if we intend to preserve some of the non-mobilized, non-purposive space necessary for the survival of our type of individualism, we shall have to meet this challenge with a high degree of political and intellectual purpose. The possible political measures—industrial and trade policy, restoration of our own competitiveness—are already topical in this year's presidential contest. They now need their intellectual counterpart.

The immediate task for America's transpacific interlocutors is to help convince the Japanese that a willingness to receive unflattering analysis from abroad and to consider it as material for constructive self-examination is only normal—and expected of any nation aspiring to leadership within the advanced industrial world today. A major entity practicing both economic and intellectual protectionism will be increasingly difficult to accommodate.

These considerations would take on a supreme urgency should world events conspire to throw the U.S. and Japan together against some other combination, for example Professor Lester Thurow's predicted European behemoth. Among some of the Japan-America "bridgers" one occasionally hears talk (as if the rest of the globe were beneath consulting) about a joint "U.S.-Japan hegemony," or a "Pax Nipponamericana," or of the interpenetration of the two economies or even the two political systems. As one American citizen, I find this a rather frightening script as long as Japan remains socially and intellectually a closed country. A Japan that is both powerful and insular minded would be less worrisome if we could at least feel that democracy, individual rights, and freedom of expression were firmly rooted within Japan itself. But I find quite unattractive the prospect of an increasingly direct penetration of my own country's economy, politics, and internal discourse by a Japan that still refuses to come to terms with its own darker past, that avoids serious dialogue over criticisms directed at it from outside, that responds to its own newly felt powers with the reassertion of an outmoded, regressive, race-centered, particularistic national consciousness.

For starters, the Japanese need to perceive that *we* perceive their fortress mentality for what it is, and that leadership in the world outside can only come with a more relaxed Japanese posture toward that world. That accomplished, great things could then follow from the advent of a genuinely self-confident Japan.□

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The Post-Modern State

James Kurth

IT IS THE natural condition, said Hobbes, for the lives of men to be poor, nasty, brutish, and short. In order to escape from this natural condition, men erect artificial creatures who are sovereigns with the sword, "great Leviathans." The central actors of history have been great Leviathans who have been rich, civilized, brutal, and big. That is, they have been great macro-organizations, comprehensive and complex enough to operate in the economic, cultural, and military dimensions of social life, and large enough to dominate the arenas in which these operations take place.

In the pre-modern era, these great Leviathans were city-states, feudal lords, or multi-ethnic empires. As such, most of them were either not very large or not very cohesive; that is, they were not very Leviathan. In the modern era, they were nation-states and very great Leviathans indeed. The greatest of these Leviathans and the makers of modern history were the great powers.

Now, at the beginning of the post-modern era, it seems likely that there will be new kinds of macro-organizations. But it is also likely that whatever else they may be, they will have to be, as always, rich, civilized, brutal, and big. For if they are not, our lives will be poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

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Modernity and the Nation-State

THE NATION-state was the most distinctive and most effective form of social organization in the modern era, that great epoch that began half a millennium ago and has only recently come to an end. Each of its two elements, the nation and the state, was the product of that era. In most places, the modern era brought only one or the other of these elements: some places developed a nation but no corresponding state (e.g., the Arab world); others developed states but no corresponding nations (e.g., Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa). But the most effective social organizations were created, and the most explosive energies were released, when these two elements were fused together into the nation-state. This was the case with, in rough order of historical appearance, England, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Two apparent supranational exceptions, the United States and the Soviet Union, may turn out to have been exceptions that prove the rule.

Before the modern era, there were tribes, ethnic groups, peoples, even "natives." But these were only converted into nations with the arrival of wide-spread, multi-class literacy in a common language, especially in a

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common literature. This process began with the invention of printing, was spread first by the Protestant Reformation and then by the Enlightenment, and culminated in the standardized schools and mass education of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Before the modern era also, there were cities, kingdoms, empires, even estates. But these were only converted into states with the arrival of systematic, professional bureaucracies, also using a common language. The most crucial of these bureaucracies was the army. The growth of armies began with the invention of gun powder, was financed first by the commercial revolution and then by the industrial revolution, and ended with the general staffs and mass conscription of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Thus, by the sixteenth century, there were two dynamics underway—the spread of literacy, which produced the nation, and the growth of bureaucracy, especially the army, which engendered the state. And although it might seem natural for the two dynamics to operate, even cooperate, together (as in the bureaucratic school systems of a later time), it was not inevitable. For much of the modern era in Europe, there were nations that did not correspond to states (e.g., Germany and Italy until the 1860s), and there were states (e.g., the Habsburg monarchy) that did not correspond to nations.

THE FIRST place where the two elements came together was sixteenth-century England. In the aftermath of the War of the Roses in the fifteenth century, the new Tudor monarchy developed and deployed a centralized bureaucracy and a national church (Anglican Protestantism) to create the first nation-state. Elizabethan England quickly became one of the most effective powers of the time.

The next place the two elements came together was France in the seventeenth century. In the aftermath of the wars of religion of the sixteenth century, the new Bourbon monarchy developed and deployed its own centralized bureaucracy and national church (Gallican Catholicism) to create the second nation-state. As has often been the case, the later developer carried the logic of development further than the earlier one, and the Bourbons established a far larger and more centralized bureaucracy than that of the Tudors. Bourbon France also quickly became one of the most effective powers of the time.

The bureaucracy then extended its reach into the growing economy. The new modernizing monarchies established a grand array of state arsenals, royal monopolies, chartered companies, navigation acts, and mercantilist policies, bringing into being the mercantilist state. The economy joined literacy and the bureaucracy as one of the three great pillars of the nation-state.

Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century (and the end of those famous crises of that century, the Thirty Years War and the English Civil War), there were two nation-states, England and France. The very fact that there were two and only two, and that they were right next to each other and yet separated by the English Channel, meant that they became fixated on each other while remaining utterly distinct. Like two titans wrestling on Mount Olympus high above everyone else, these two nation-states struggled with each other for almost a century and a half, until Waterloo in 1815. This tremendous struggle made each of them even more nation-like and more state-like than it had been before.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, then, there were two archetypical nation-states and a mass of other entities. Some of these were half modern, in that they either were states without being nations, or nations without being states. Most were not modern in any sense at all, but were merely ethnic groups gathered within empires. But the Anglo-French nation-state model was about to begin its triumphal march across the Rhine and the Alps, its great drive to the East, with consequences that would be both momentous and paradoxical.

Immediately to the east of France were two nations that were not yet states but were

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already more than "geographical expressions" (Metternich's phrase, which represented wish more than reality)—Germany and Italy. These were dominated by a state that was not a nation but an empire of several nations—the Habsburg or Austrian Empire. But Germany and Italy each had within it a truly modern state that was not yet a nation—Prussia and Piedmont.

The stories of how Prussia created the nation-state of Germany and Piedmont the nation-state of Italy are two of the most familiar tales of the nineteenth century. For our purposes, it is useful to note that it was a state within a nation, a core organization better organized than competing organizations, that converted the nation into a nation-state, one that was formed largely in the image of the core state. The Prussian and Piedmontese states performed tasks similar to those of the Tudor and Bourbon monarchies.

THERE WERE now four exemplars of the nation-state model, a sort of Big Four. The model radiated its influence eastward with even greater light, and with more heat, than it had before. But now there were not just two or a few nations immediately east of the model states, there were a dozen or more. It is true that most of these nations spoke some kind of Slavic language (the Hungarians and the Romanians were exceptions). At one time, the differences between these Slavic languages had not been much greater than the differences between German dialects or Italian ones. Russia appeared as the obvious candidate to perform for the Slavs the role that Prussia had performed for the Germans. ("Russia is just like Prussia, only with less letters.") Or, on a smaller scale, Serbia could appear as the leading candidate to perform for the South (Yugo) Slavs the role that Piedmont had performed for the Italians. These potentialities were recognized by the Pan-Slav and the Yugo-Slav movements of the time.

However, the spread eastward of the national element, based on literacy, had outpaced the spread of the state element, based on bureaucracy. By the time the candidate states were in a position to pursue a Pan-Slav or Yugo-Slav project, the spread of literacy had crystallized the different Slavic languages into different national literatures and different nations. Thus, many Slavic nations emerged. Most were too small and one was too big. The nations from Poland to Bulgaria were too small to form viable nation-states (their populations were only one-half to one-tenth that of each of the big four—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy), and the resulting states were too small to perform the security or even the economic functions of a classical nation-state.

Conversely, Russia was too big (its population was twice that of each of the big four). If it got any bigger (by uniting all the Slavic nations within it, in the manner of Prussia and Piedmont), it would threaten most of the other powers, and these resolutely opposed the Pan-Slav project. Russia was too big in another sense as well. Like the Habsburg monarchy, the Romanov monarchy was not so much a nation-state as it was a multinational empire, "the prison-house of nations." The czarist state engaged in systematic efforts at Russification, but these were limited in their effectiveness by the multinational realities, including the strength of the national literatures.

The nation-state model met similar incongruities in its still later and even further journeys eastward away from its western and central European core. In the Middle East, the model largely fit the conditions of post-Ottoman Turkey, but that was about the only case where it did so. The Arab world formed an Arab nation of a sort, and Nasser's Egypt for a time sought to play the core-state role of Prussia and Piedmont, but it was too weak to carry it off. The Arab world has remained, like Germany and Italy in the early nineteenth century, a nation without a state (or rather with too many states, which is much the same thing). Conversely, Iran, even after the Islamic Revolution, has remained, like Austria and Russia in the nineteenth century, a multinational empire, a state without a nation.

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Most of the rest of the world has never produced serious candidates for nation-state status. There have, however, been exceptions. The most important are in East Asia, where Japan early became an exemplary nation-state and where South Korea now appears to be becoming one.

Japan was a nation even by the early nineteenth century, when its literacy rate already equaled that of most European countries. The Meiji Restoration quickly added a modern state and thus converted Japan into a nation-state. Industrializing about a generation after Germany, it followed the German path in many other ways as well. As a late industrializer, Japan provided an even greater developmental role for the state than had the earlier nation-states. Today, after a century and a half of state-led development of a culturally homogeneous nation, Japan is the most effective, indeed, the most perfect example of a nation-state in the world.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, then, there were five exemplary nation-states—Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Each operated in the cultural, security, and economic dimensions of social life and was supported by the three great pillars of literacy, bureaucracy, and industry. These, in turn, were institutionalized in the school, the army, and the factory, which were engaged in mass education, mass conscription, and mass production. These mass activities gave rise to mass political parties, mass labor unions, and even mass professional associations as well. The nation-state had brought into being an ensemble of mass organizations, which in turn made the nation-state even more of a macro-organization, the organization of organizations, than it had been before.

American Exceptionalism

THE UNITED States has never been a nation-state in the manner of the big five. In a sense, 1789 (the ratification of the American Constitution and the beginning of the French Revolution) saw the fulfillment of two different models of political organization, the federal republic and the nation-state. These models have co-existed with each other during the two centuries since, but they have not been equally attractive to the rest of the world.

The French model dominated the century and a half after 1789. Almost everyone wanted to become a nation-state; almost no one wanted to become a federal republic (although at times Mexico and Brazil so titled themselves, and Switzerland after 1848 successfully adopted the American model to its circumstances).

The American model has been more prominent in the last half-century (the American half-century). It was not that everyone wanted to become a federal republic, and it is true that West Germany was totally under American control when it became the Federal Republic of Germany. But it is also true that the United States made it in the interest of almost everyone to go "beyond the nation-state" by becoming a member of several of the international organizations that the U.S. created (the UN, OAS, NATO, GATT, IMF, and World Bank, which together formed a sort of U.S. six-pack) or encouraged (the European Community).

The two models of nation-state and federal republic have competed with each other within the United States itself, as well as in the rest of the world. In a sense, the American Civil War was a war between them, although with a characteristically American imprecision of terms. The Union represented the nation-state model (even though the Union Army was called the Federals and the ruling party was called the Republicans), while the Confederacy represented the federal republic model (but because these terms were appropriated by the Union, it had to call itself something else). Historians have noted that it was at that time that "the United States" was converted in popular grammatical usage from a plural to a singular noun. This period, therefore, marks the first founding of the American nation-state. But after the Civil War and particularly after the end of Reconstruction (the Compro-

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mise of 1877), the federal republic model again became ascendant.

The second founding of the American nation-state occurred in the 1890s. It was marked by, first, the "critical election" of 1896 and the formation of a new and stronger Republican-led political bloc (the "system of 1896") and, second, the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the emergence of the United States as a great power in international politics. The second founding reached its culmination in the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and in his "new nationalism."

The United States acted very much like a nation-state from the 1890s to the 1960s, roughly from one Cuban crisis (the blowing up of the Maine in 1898) to another (the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962), or perhaps from one president from Harvard (Theodore Roosevelt) to another (John Kennedy). The zenith of the nation-state era was marked by the Second World War and the greatest president (as well as the third Harvard president) of the twentieth century, Franklin Roosevelt.

During this golden age of the American nation-state (not even an American century, but hardly three-score-and-ten years or a human lifetime), the United States was led by a confident and cohesive national political class. After the fact, this political class would be termed the American Establishment, but nobody called it that at the time; in the history of ruling classes, such self-consciousness, rather than constituting evidence of self-confidence, is already a sign of decline.

The American national political class was confident and cohesive enough to impose not only literacy but Americanization by means of mass education (from the 1900s to the 1960s), to impose National Emergency Acts and widespread military service by means of mass conscription (1940s–1960s), and to compose national economic programs and Keynesian economic policies in support of mass production (1930s–1960s). In brief, the American nation-state, like those in Europe and Japan, carried out great enterprises in the cultural, security, and economic dimensions of social life. But unlike the other nation-states, it did all this on a continental, truly colossal scale. And even while it did so, it was also creating the post-modern world, and thus preparing its own demise as a nation-state.

Spheres of Influence

AT TIMES, there were several nation-state great powers operating close to each other in the same general region. This was particularly the case in Europe from the 1870s to the 1940s. The arena in which a particular nation-state held sway was not much larger than that nation-state itself. Along with the several great powers that were nation-states, there were two or three other great powers left over from the pre-modern era: the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov empires. Together, these great powers formed a balance-of-power system.

Often, however, a particular region might consist of only one great-power and many smaller entities, some of them nation-states, some merely states, and some merely nations. Such regions were not balance-of-power systems but spheres of influence. The central, core power could largely shape the sphere in its image, or at least in its interests. During the period when the United States most closely approximated a nation-state, or at least had a cohesive and confident political class, it created such spheres of influence, first in the Caribbean and Central America after the Spanish-American War, and then in Latin America more broadly, and in Western Europe after the Second World War.

To properly organize a sphere of influence, a great power needs to create and conduct an array of international organizations or international regimes, which order relations among the smaller states of the arena. The Habsburgs had been successful practitioners of this craft (the Holy Roman Empire and, after the Napoleonic Wars, the German Confederation and the Italian League). The British had their British Empire and their Commonwealth of Nations,

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though more significant and successful was their "informal empire" or "imperialism of free trade," whose heyday was from the 1840s to the 1930s.

It seems clear, however, that the world-champion composer and conductor of international organizations and regimes was the United States. In its day, the United States did this job superbly, as the already-mentioned "six-pack" of the UN, OAS, NATO, GATT, IMF, and World Bank testifies. Many of these were so successful that they seemed for a while to take on a life of their own, "beyond the nation-state" and "after hegemony." But the recent performance of some of them (the OAS, NATO, GATT) counsels some skepticism. An orchestra can continue to play for a while after the composer has died and even after the conductor has departed. But in the end the sounds that will come forth will not be compositions but cacophony.

Why was the United States so successful at creating and conducting these international organizations beyond the nation-state? An obvious answer is that the U.S. itself was already beyond the nation-state and had been so ever since the Constitution established a federal republic, a "new order for the ages," that was neither a nation nor a state. But the United States had particular advantages in each of the cultural, security, and economic dimensions as well.

In the cultural (or ideological) dimension, American liberalism, like British liberalism before it, was by definition individual and universal rather than communal and national. Liberalism can provide a common ground, a least common denominator, for many states in one international organization in a way that nationalism, by its nature, cannot. In the security dimension, the American nuclear deterrent, like the British navy before it, could provide protection for an ally without necessarily entailing the troubling presence of a large foreign army on its own territory. In the economic dimension, American capitalism, like British capitalism before it, was based on private enterprise and the global market rather than on "organized capitalism" and a more narrow, at times only national, market. International capitalism of this sort naturally can compose common, if specific, tasks for international financial organizations.

Most of these advantages remain in force. The security dimension has obviously undergone profound changes, with the end of the Soviet threat and with the development of conventional deterrence based on high-tech weapons. However, the culture or ideology of liberalism and the economy of capitalism are more triumphant now than ever before (the "end of history"). The United States is also even more a diverse society, the world in microcosm, than it was before.

CAN THE PERFECT nation-states of Germany and Japan organize arenas into spheres of influence of their own? It seems clear that they cannot do so on the truly international or global level of the United States. On the other hand, it is now also clear that their influence is not limited to their own national territory. The natural scale of the German and Japanese spheres of influence is not the world, nor the nation, but the region, particularly and respectively Central Europe and East Asia.

In the cultural dimension, German ways and styles resonate with the people of the large realm of *Mitteleuropa* (especially Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, but also Poland, the Baltic states, Slovenia, and Croatia). Similarly, Japanese ways and styles resonate with the people of several countries of Confucian culture, especially Korea and Taiwan, but also Singapore and parts of China. (To say this, of course, is not to say that Japan and the Japanese are necessarily *liked* in these countries; in most cases they are not. They are, however, respected.)

In the security dimension, Germany and Japan now have nothing to contribute to their respective regions. Each, however, is confronted with a security problem that will force it to begin the long process, perhaps taking a decade or more, of reconstructing a security pillar commensurate with the other

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dimensions of its identity as a nation-state and a great power. For Germany, that problem is Croatia; for Japan, it is Korea.

In the meantime, it is in the economic dimension that Germany and Japan are exercising their influence both in the regional realm and in international organizations. It is not so much that they are creating new organizations in their own image, but rather that they are recreating existing ones in their own interests (Germany with the European Community and the IMF; Japan with the Asian Development Bank and the IMF). In addition, German economic aid and investment now comprise the largest and most dynamic economic presence in Central Europe, and Japanese economic aid and investment now comprise the same in East Asia. Finally, the German practice of the "social-market economy" and the Japanese practice of "organized capitalism" fit the practical realities of their respective regions more than the free-market economy, liberal capitalism, and economic "shock treatments" that the United States—especially during the last decade—has promoted abroad (rather more than it has practiced at home).

America in the Post-Modern World

THE NATION-state was a powerful engine modernizing its society, and the modern society had a functional need for the nation-state. In short, the two had an "elective affinity" for each other. Now, however, the modern era has come to an end, at least within the United States. Each of the three social dimensions—cultural, military, and economic—has undergone a profound change, a great transformation, within the United States in the last two or three decades. The United States is no longer a modern society, but a post-modern one. And, as we shall see, it no longer resembles a nation-state, but rather a multicultural regime.

Post-modern society, and especially American society, is not characterized by standardized schools engaged in mass education in a national, often high, culture. Rather, post-modern society is characterized by organized media engaged in mass entertainment in an international, usually pop or low, culture. There are entities called public schools, but it is doubtful that much education occurs in them. Post-modern schools result in less literacy and less numeracy than their modern predecessors.

Post-modern society is not characterized by large conventional armies, based on mass conscription and providing national defense. Rather, post-modern society was initially characterized by nuclear weapons, providing extended deterrence for permanent international alliances (as with NATO). It has more recently been characterized by high technology, precision-guided and stealth weapons, providing military power for temporary international coalitions (as in the Gulf War).

Post-modern society is not characterized by efficient industries engaged in mass production, principally for a national market. Rather, it is characterized by financial enterprises and industrial management engaged in multinational operations within a global market. This might be called the high economy. It is also characterized by a mass of service workers engaged in low-skill tasks for a local market. This is the low economy. Those services that can be exported, such as financial ones, are part of the high economy. Most services, however, must be consumed at the point they are performed (as in restaurants) and are part of the low economy. In contrast, almost all industrial products can be exported, as long as they are competitive.

In a service or post-industrial economy, therefore, large numbers of workers cease to produce for the global market (while they continue to consume from it). In a sense, post-industrial workers in the low-service economy are like pre-industrial workers in a subsistence economy who contribute nothing to the wider economy beyond their own immediate locality. It is not surprising, therefore, that what Marx called "the idiocy of rural life" reappears as the idiocy of post-modern life. In contrast, in an efficient and competitive industrial economy, most workers produce for the global market, or they provide services

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directly supporting that production. These workers contribute greatly to the global economy. They are also less likely to be idiots.

Although a country, even the leading power, may become post-industrial, the world does not. The world will continue to have industrial countries existing alongside any post-industrial ones. When countries like Britain became industrial (and "post-agricultural") economies, this did not mean that the world became post-agricultural. Indeed, there was an even greater demand for agricultural commodities than before (fibers for industrial products, food for industrial workers), except that now these were supplied by the most efficient producers in a global market (e.g., the United States).

Similarly, when countries like the United States become service or financial (post-industrial) economies, there is an even greater demand for industrial products than before, and these too are supplied by the most efficient producers in a global market. The countries where efficient industrial production takes place are well known—Japan and the newly industrialized countries or "little tigers" of East Asia, Germany and the specialty countries or "niche-occupiers" of Western Europe.

These efficient producers and success stories in the global market have received a good deal of attention from social scientists trying to define their distinctive nature. Some of them have been termed "trading states" as opposed to "military-political states" (Richard Rosecrance), "corporatist states" as opposed to "liberal states" (Peter Katzenstein), "strong states" as opposed to "weak states" (Stephen Krasner), and "late developers" as opposed to "early developers" (Alexander Gerschenkron). Each of these terms captures an aspect of the distinctive nature of these states. Most of them also happen to be the clearest examples of the nation-state in the world today.* It turns out that the most successful competitors in the global market of the post-modern era are the nation-states of the modern era. This is yet another chapter, on a higher stage, of the well-known saga of "the advantages of backwardness."

It is a saga in which Germany and Japan, the perfect nation-states, have been the leading characters for a century, and characters with dual personalities and dual capabilities at that. Fifty years ago, in the 1940s, the term "trading state" would not have been the first to come to mind when one thought of Germany and Japan; "military-political state" would have been more like it. But seventy years ago, in the 1920s, Germany and Japan were widely recognized as highly efficient industrial producers and traders. And ninety years ago, in the 1900s, they were widely recognized as highly efficient in both industrial production *and* military operations.

As for the United States, it now seems to be a case of the disadvantages of forwardness. It is the prototypical post-modern society, post-literate culture, post-conscription military, and post-industrial economy. The United States is also no longer a nation-state. Perhaps it never really was one completely, even when it was a modern society. In any event, since the 1960s, it has steadily become less a nation and more a multicultural society. It has also steadily become less a state and more a divided and stalemated government, led by a political class whose interests are as much international as they are national. As a multicultural regime rather than a nation-state, the United States may not only have much in common with the pre-modern Habsburg monarchy, but may also be the model for much of the world in the post-modern future.

The New Landscape

IN THE 1990s, the map of macro-organizations—major powers in culture, security, or the economy—includes both old and new features. The map's most prominent features are old states—especially the United States, Germany, Japan, Russia, and China—and new organizations which are not states—especially the European Commu-

*The city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as Taiwan, are obvious exceptions.

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nity, international organizations, multinational enterprises, and global media.

The United States is certainly a comprehensive, complex, and big organization, so much so that it is the only superpower. It is not, however, a cohesive organization. It engages in activities in the cultural, military, and economic realms, but it does not have coherent and consistent policies pertaining to them. Nevertheless, the map of macro-organizations in the 1990s must include the United States, just like the map of great powers in the 1900s included the British Empire and the Habsburg monarchy.

The map also includes Germany and Japan, the largest and richest true nation-states in the world today. Each is in the midst of a region comprising many nation-states, states, or nations. Each has as a neighbor an even larger nation (respectively Russia and China) that is also a nation-state of a sort. It is likely that there will come a time when they are as well-organized as Germany and Japan, but that time sometimes seems to be on an ever-receding horizon. ("Russia is the nation of the future, and always will be.") In any event, Russia and China each still rules over a number of minorities, and each is beset by a time of troubles, although they are very different ones. Consequently, the true nation-states of Germany and Japan will shape their regions in their own images for years to come.

Much of the rest of the world will consist of states that are not nations (Latin America, the Middle East, the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia) and nations and even tribes that are not states (Sub-Saharan Africa, the ex-Yugoslav peoples of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Macedonia). Most states that are not nations lack the cohesion that makes for a robust and autonomous actor on the world stage. Some are only Potemkin states, engaged in a great game of "let's pretend." As for most nations or tribes that are not states, they cannot even pretend, but are condemned to endemic civil war.

On the cultural dimension, these non-nation-states will be overwhelmed by the global media, with its mass entertainment and pop culture, that emanate from the post-industrial countries, especially the United States. On the security dimension, they will be dependent on and occasionally overwhelmed by the military forces armed with high-tech weaponry that again emanate from the post-industrial countries, especially the United States. On the economic dimension, they will be dependent on and often overwhelmed by the multinational enterprises and the associated international financial organizations that emanate from the advanced industrial countries as well as the post-industrial ones, especially from Germany, Japan, and the United States.

These non-nation-states were not makers but rather takers of history during the modern era, and they will remain so during the post-modern age. Most of them will be collected into Potemkin international organizations, engaged in another great game of "let's pretend," this time that we are all independent and equal. But the real organizations, because they perform the real operations of culture, security, and the economy, will be the global media, the military forces, and the multinational enterprises that project out from the post-industrial and the advanced industrial countries.

A Maker or Taker of History?

THE UNITED States, as the major creator of these organizations, will thus be the major contributor to the disorganization of these non-nation states and to the reorganization of much of the world upon non-state lines. But the United States itself could become less and less organized and more and more a non-nation and a non-state. In part this is because the media enterprises have turned the American nation into a multicultural audience, and the multinational enterprises have turned American producers into global consumers. Together, they have "deconstructed" the United States.

Can there be a reversal of this deconstruction, a new Reconstruction, of the American nation-state? It would seem that

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for this to happen there would have to be a return to the central purposes of the classical nation-state with respect to culture, security, and the economy.

The economic dimension has received the most attention in the political debates of the past year. Some political figures and policy analysts are again advocating a national industrial policy for America, like that of the perfect nation-state, Japan. But most political observers believe that American political institutions (the federal republic and the separation of powers) and American political ideas (liberalism and free enterprise) make a coherent and constructive industrial policy impossible in the United States. Any industrial policy that passed through the grinder of these institutions and the blender of these ideas would come out as narrowly focused and self-interested protectionism.

The security dimension is even less promising. A truly national security policy for America is very unlikely in the post-Cold War era, when the external adversary is no longer obvious to all, and in the high-tech weapons era, when the conscript army is no longer necessary at all. The United States can no longer count on a foreign enemy to provide a cause for its national identity.

It is the cultural dimension, the most fundamental one, that offers the greatest potential for ill or good, for deconstruction or reconstruction. A foreign enemy may be necessary for a good army, but it is not necessary for good schools. Liberal political institutions and ideas may not permit an industrial policy, but they require an educated citizenry. At one time these institutions and ideas and the schools that represented them cultivated educated citizens who went on to become productive workers in the economy and loyal members of the military. Today, that time and those schools seem long ago and far away. It is in the cultural dimension and in the schools that the American nation-state has been most radically deconstructed. But it is there that its reconstruction, if it is to occur, will have to begin. If the United States cannot be a maker of educated citizens in the post-modern era, it cannot be a maker of history.

In the modern era, the United States was surely a maker rather than a taker of history. Indeed, it was "born modern." It grew up to become a major maker of the modern world from the American Revolution to the Second World War, and then, with the American half-century, it became the master history-maker of them all. In doing so, however, the United States created those great organizations, the multinational enterprises and the global media, that have created the post-modern world.

The makers of history in this new world will include these archetypical organizations of the post-modern era. They will also include those archetypical organizations of the modern era, the nation-states of Germany and Japan. Indeed, much of early post-modern history will involve a titanic struggle between multinational enterprises and global media, on the one side, and the German and Japanese states, on the other.

The role that the United States plays in this titanic struggle will depend on the outcome of another. For early post-modern history will involve a parallel struggle, a civil war, within the United States between multicultural enterprises and mass entertainment on the one side, and national culture and mass education on the other. For now, it appears that it will be the post-modern camp that will prevail. If so, the United States, in the traditional sense of the American people and the U.S. government, will not be the actors, but rather the audience—or even the arena—of the post-modern world. They will become takers rather than makers of history.□

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
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America and Its Immigrants

Lawrence E. Harrison

THE UNITED States is one of the few advanced countries in the world that does not effectively control immigration. Large numbers continue to enter the United States illegally each year, most of them from Latin America, and most of those from Mexico. Conservative estimates place the number of illegal immigrants residing in the United States at three to four million. Some estimates run as high as ten million. The illegal immigrant population may be increasing by as many as 300,000 people each year. The Center for Immigration Studies in Washington estimates that the pool of illegal Mexican settlers alone currently may be increasing by as many as 250,000 annually.

Immigration is an important engine of growth of America's population, which has increased more rapidly since 1950 than the population of any other advanced country. Apart from the number of legal and illegal immigrants, their high fertility rates after arrival have helped drive the national fertility rate close to the 2.1 percent replacement level. Current immigration and fertility trends, if sustained, would result in a national population of 500 million, twice that of today, by the end of the next century. The mind boggles at the implications for the quality of life—for example, the impact on the environment—not to mention the stresses of a slow pace of acculturation that threatens to transform the assimilative "melting pot" into a multicultural "salad bowl."

We are a society inspired by the words of Emma Lazarus on the Statue of Liberty: "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free." When the Statue was dedicated, 105 years ago—about the time my grandparents emigrated from Eastern Europe—some 60 million people lived in the United States, less than a quarter of today's population. An open immigration policy clearly suited its needs. Today the United States, with more than 250 million people, each year accepts over half of all the persons in the world who migrate permanently across an international border. The competition of immigrants with poor citizens for jobs and social services is particularly troubling in our current economic distress. The words of Katherine Betts, in *Ideology and Immigration*, about the immigration issue in Australia are relevant to the United States: "Humanitarianism became the chief goal of immigration for some people and immigration itself came to be seen as a form of international aid . . . the relatively poor in this country pay a disproportionate share of the cost of the conscience of the rich."

Lawrence E. Harrison has directed development programs for the Agency for International Development. This article is adapted from his new book, *Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success* (Basic Books) and is used with the permission of the publisher. ©1992 by Lawrence E. Harrison.

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Emma Lazarus notwithstanding, there is compelling evidence that most Americans are opposed to continuing high levels of immigration, legal and illegal. A 1990 Roper poll found that about three-quarters (including 74 percent of Hispanic-Americans) are opposed to proposals to increase immigration, two-thirds support reducing legal immigration, and 91 percent support an all-out program to stop illegal immigration.

They are right. We should call a moratorium on immigration while we forge a new policy that meshes the needs of our society with the educational and professional experience of immigrants, rather than one that emphasizes family relationships, as the current one does. We should also be moving more aggressively to deport those who are here illegally and have not qualified under the amnesty provisions of the 1986 act, and to devise an effective and humane border control system. We should not be deterred by fatuous comparisons with the Berlin Wall, whose role was to keep dissatisfied citizens in, not dissatisfied foreigners out.

Immigration—Lawful and Unlawful

THE FIRST sweeping immigration control law was passed in 1924. It attempted both to stem the flow of immigrants, principally from Europe, that totaled about 30 million in the four preceding decades, and to freeze the ethnic proportions of the United States by the use of national quotas. While the 1924 law had some salutary effects—it let a saturated melting pot do its work and led to increased upward mobility for poor citizens, including blacks—the law was blatantly racist. "Oriental" immigrants were now totally excluded (Chinese immigration had been banned in 1882, and Japanese immigration limited "voluntarily" by the Japanese government in 1908). Hitler's rise to power generated strong pressures for liberalizing the 1924 act, but, while efforts were made during the 1930s to accommodate Jews within the German quota, it was not until the horror of the Holocaust became apparent—and when it was too late for most of its victims—that quotas were significantly relaxed. Special arrangements were made for refugees from the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, and in 1959 and thereafter for refugees from Cuba and Vietnam.

National origins quotas were eliminated in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, the principal goals of which were to reunite families and assure that immigration was consistent with manpower needs. (The reverse of "consistent with manpower needs" is, of course, the protection of American workers from an influx of competing foreign workers.) The 1965 legislation combined with the communications revolution, faster and cheaper transportation, and the revolution of rising expectations to trigger a vastly increased flow of immigrants, legal and illegal, from Latin America—above all, Mexico. The Vietnam War drove hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asians, many of them overseas Chinese, from their homelands. Large numbers of Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos, and Indians have immigrated during the past few decades. Tens of thousands of Africans, most of them young, have escaped from poverty and political turbulence to the United States. Many from the Middle East—Arabs, Iranians, Afghans—have done the same. The latest heirs to the Sephardic-German-Eastern European Jewish immigrant tradition are Jews who lived in the former Soviet Union.

With that diversity, however, has come concern that immigration is out of control. Millions of immigrants, particularly those from Latin America, are here illegally. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 established a formula for amnesty and regularization of illegal immigrants, imposed sanctions on employers who knowingly hired illegal immigrants, and called for a stepped-up program of border surveillance and enforcement. IRCA has had some success in reducing the flow of illegal aliens but not as much as had been hoped for by its proponents. The flow today is probably higher than it was before the act came into effect. About three million illegal aliens have applied for regularized status.

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Even with the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and the Immigration Act of 1990, the large majority of those who enter legally continue to do so under family preference provisions of the law. The 1990 law increased legal immigration by 40 percent, with the result that total immigration, legal and illegal, will probably now exceed one million annually. Nearly 70 percent of the legal non-refugee newcomers will enter because they are related to naturalized citizens, resident aliens, and former illegal immigrants who qualified for the amnesty provisions of the 1986 immigration act. As many as three million immigrant workers will enter the United States labor force legally and illegally during the next five years.

Most will come without the skills needed to upgrade the labor force, the wage structure, and the competitiveness of our products. The availability of cheap labor skews investment decisions downward toward low-tech, low-wage, employment-intensive production. As a consequence, the skill levels of the work force, wages, and American technology do not advance as rapidly as in other advanced industrial countries, most notably Japan and Germany. As historian Otis Graham of the University of California at Santa Barbara has observed, a world-class economy "constantly moves its labor force toward higher value-added activities requiring higher skills." But George Borjas concludes that "the skill composition of the immigrant flow entering the United States has deteriorated significantly in the past two or three decades" with major implications for American global competitiveness.

High levels of immigration have not produced the positive economic results that advocates like Ben Wattenberg, the author of an article entitled "The Case for More Immigrants," and Julian Simon, author of *The Economic Consequences of Immigration*, expected. In addition to the adverse impact on productivity and wage levels in general, researchers like Rice University's Don Huddle are finding that immigrants compete for jobs with poor citizens, particularly blacks—for example, large numbers of blacks have been displaced by Hispanics, chiefly Mexican-Americans, in building maintenance jobs in Los Angeles. To be sure, many immigrants pay taxes, but studies conclude that what they contribute does not cover the cost of services they receive, particularly when the costs of education are factored in (a Supreme Court ruling has assured the children of illegal aliens access to primary and secondary schools, and some states have granted residential tuition rates at public universities to illegal aliens). According to one study done in 1987, long before the recession, almost 40 percent of Haitians in Miami and Fort Lauderdale were receiving welfare assistance. A 1988 government report showed that 21 percent of California's adult welfare recipients were non-citizens. The extensive social services programs of Massachusetts have made that state a magnet for immigrants. From the 1980 census to the 1990 census, the Hispanic component of the state's population more than doubled, from 141,000 to 288,000. Almost half of the increase represents immigration. During the same period, the Asian population of Massachusetts almost tripled, from 49,000 to 143,000, with immigration accounting for the bulk of the increase. The imbalance between the state and local taxes immigrants pay and the social services they receive has contributed to the state's fiscal crisis. Recently, for example, Massachusetts officials, faced with an intensifying fiscal crisis, discovered that about ten percent of the prison population consisted of illegal aliens. (It costs taxpayers about $30,000 per year per prisoner.) In April of this year, New York sued the federal government to recover the $100 million the state claims it pays out annually for some 4,000 illegal aliens in its prisons.

The East Asians

IMMIGRANTS OF some ethnic and national groups do better than others. The principal explanation lies in cultural values and attitudes. There is a close correlation, for example, between the impressive economic and social development of Taiwan

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and South Korea since World War II, and of Japan since 1868, on the one hand, and the performance of Chinese, Korean, and Japanese immigrants in the United States, on the other. The Confucian ethos has profoundly influenced all three nations. Similarly, the poor performance of Mexican immigrants has reflected Mexico's—and Latin America's—history of slow growth, social inequality, and limited political participation, the chief consequences of the traditional, anti-progressive Iberian value system.

In the face of much adversity, discrimination, and cruelty, Chinese-Americans have been one of the most successful American ethnic groups. Chinese were first drawn to the United States by the California Gold Rush. As work opportunities opened up in railroad construction and mining, the flow accelerated: by the early 1880s, almost 300,000—mostly male sojourners—had made the journey. Sometimes employed as strike breakers, Chinese workers were forced out of mining camps and expelled from several West Coast cities, including Seattle, Tacoma, and Vancouver; some were lynched by white mobs.

The laws were also stacked against the Chinese. From 1854 to 1874, they were prohibited from testifying in court against white men, which was tantamount to declaring open season on the Chinese. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 virtually cut off legal immigration. Other laws prevented Chinese from acquiring U.S. citizenship and then required citizenship as a prerequisite for entering a number of professions or acquiring land. Many Chinese returned to China, but many more who wanted to were unable to come up with ticket money. It was during this period that, for understandable reasons, the expression "not a Chinaman's chance" first surfaced. The result was a standing population of 60,000 to 80,000 Chinese through the first half of the twentieth century.

Though the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in 1943 as a gesture of solidarity with a wartime ally, it was not until the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that Chinese immigrants were placed on a nondiscriminatory footing with immigrants from other parts of the world. The result was a surge in Chinese immigration—about 20,000 legal entrants a year and perhaps an equal number of illegal immigrants through the mid-1970s. In contrast with the first wave of Chinese professionals and students under the 1965 legislation, many recent Chinese immigrants who have entered under the family preference category have little education or professional background.

The vast majority of today's approximately one million Chinese-Americans live in cities on the East and West Coasts and in Hawaii, many of them in Chinatowns but many also in the suburbs. (New York has overtaken San Francisco as the largest Chinese center in America.) Prior to World War II, the Chinese reacted to discrimination by withdrawing into the Chinatowns. Chinese laundries and restaurants were the principal employers of Chinese, and Chinese commercial activity was substantially confined to intra-Chinatown transactions.

A FEW HUNDRED Japanese migrated to the United States in the 1860s and 1870s. A few thousand came in the 1880s. But the number soared to 26,000 in the 1890s and 130,000 in the first decade of this century. Most came as sojourners—a preponderance were males—but as with the Chinese and other immigrant groups, many remained permanently, mostly in California and Hawaii. They were hard working, cooperative, frugal, and uncomplaining, and they had an abiding interest in education, consistent with the Confucian tradition.

The competitive success of Japanese farmers led to a spate of discriminatory laws and regulations in California, including the infamous Alien Land Law of 1913, and a similar law in 1920 that prohibited the leasing of land to persons "ineligible for citizenship" (read "Asians"). But both laws were substantially circumvented. In the wake of the face-saving "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1908, in which the Japanese committed themselves to

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restrain the emigrant flow, Japanese immigration dropped from 130,000 during this century's first decade to 84,000 in the second decade, and 33,000 in the 1920s.

By 1920, the first generation Japanese, the *Issei*, had produced a second generation of American-born citizens, the *Nisei*, who were beyond the reach of the Land Laws. By World War II, Japanese farmers accounted for one-third of the truck crops produced in California. The excellent reputation of the Japanese as farmers facilitated their movement into commercial or contract gardening. And it was natural for them to market fruits and vegetables, often buying from Japanese producers, a pattern also successfully followed by Japanese immigrants in Brazil. The Japanese were also successful in other sectors of the economy: they owned hotels, dry cleaning establishments, commercial fisheries, and lunch counters in West Coast cities and Hawaii.

Japanese-Americans were model citizens. Their children were diligent and polite students. Japanese families were stable. Japanese social and mutual aid organizations sprang up wherever Japanese settled. Japanese almost never applied for public welfare programs: the needs of the poor were met within the family or the association, as with the Chinese and Jews. While the *Issei* retained strong emotional ties to Japan, the *Nisei* were outspokenly proud of their American citizenship, a contrast between first and second generations common to many immigrant groups.

Today, most Americans correctly view the internment of the Japanese on the U.S. mainland as a gross miscarriage of justice, driven in part by racism. The consequences for Japanese-Americans were appalling. In addition to the disruption of the family patterns so central to Japanese culture, financial and property losses were enormous—the government itself estimated the losses at $400,000,000 in 1942 prices. By 1944, President Roosevelt, who had signed the 1942 internment Executive Order, was publicly extolling the loyalty of the Japanese-Americans, including the 300,000 *Nisei* youths who fought with distinction and valor in Europe and the Pacific, and at the end of the year, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the internment of Japanese who were American citizens (at the same time validating the internment of Japanese who were resident aliens). By that time, though, most Japanese-American businesses were either bankrupt or in the hands of others.

After the national origins quota system, which barred immigration from Asia, was adopted by Congress in 1924, the previous small trickle of Korean immigration ceased until after the Second World War. By one estimate, there were about 17,000 Korean-Americans in 1950. The Korean War precipitated a new flow of Koreans to the United States, many of them wives of American soldiers and orphans adopted by Americans. The 1965 act stimulated an even greater flow, and between 1966 and 1984, more than 400,000 Koreans entered, making Koreans the third most numerous immigrants, after Mexicans and Filipinos.

Achievement and Integration

SINCE WORLD War II, the isolation of East Asians from the American cultural mainstream has increasingly broken down. For the many Chinese-Americans who live in Chinatowns, the contemporary experience is still closer to the salad bowl than the melting pot. But achievement indicators suggest both a considerable Americanization and a considerable drive for advancement on the part of the Chinese.

Estimates based on 1980 census data indicate that, among native-born Chinese-American males between the ages of 25 and 64, the average number of years of schooling is 14.9, compared with 12.9 for non-Hispanic American whites. Nineteen-seventy census data indicate that more than 25 percent of Chinese-Americans have completed four or more years of college, more than double the percentage of American whites. Along with other Asian-Americans, they are dispropor-

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tionately represented in first-rank universities. According to David Reimers in *Still the Golden Door*, "In the early 1980s, Asian-Americans amounted to about 1.5 percent of the nation's population and about 5 percent of California's residents, but made up 20 percent of the University of California at Berkeley's student body. They were 9 percent of Harvard's class of 1985 and a similar figure at Columbia, Yale, and Princeton." One-third of the students at New York's Juilliard School of Music are Asians.

High Chinese-American educational levels are reflected in high income. The average family income for native-born non-Hispanic whites was $26,535 in 1980, for all Chinese-American families $28,377 ($39,805 for native-born Chinese-Americans, $26,230 for the foreign-born). The advantage enjoyed by Chinese-Americans is not just a function of education and occupation. More family members work, particularly wives, in Chinese-American families than in white families.

The Japanese-American experience has been similar. In spite of the earlier cruel discrimination against them, they are the second-highest ethnic group, after Jewish-Americans, when it comes to family income. The melting pot has probably worked on the Japanese more than on other Asians: they live less in ethnically concentrated neighborhoods and, in what Milton Gordon has identified as the last stage of the process of assimilation, fully half of Japanese-Americans now intermarry.

In a manner reminiscent of the Cuban middle class that fled to the United States in 1959 and subsequent years, most Japanese-Americans had to start at much lower rungs on the economic ladder than they had occupied before the war. As late as 1958, about 75 percent of all Japanese-owned businesses in Los Angeles were in contract gardening. Within a few years after World War II, Japanese-American personal income was equal to that of white Americans, and family income was substantially higher. In 1980, 700,000 people of Japanese antecedence were living in the United States, according to the census of that year. Average income for all Japanese-American families was $35,207 in 1980, compared with non-Hispanic whites at $26,535. (Average income of native-born Japanese-American families was $38,324, for those born in Japan—presumably younger—$25,094.) As with the Chinese and the Koreans, the wives of Japanese-Americans tend to work more than white American wives. Average years of schooling for native-born Japanese men age 25–64 were 13.7, compared with 12.9 for non-Hispanic whites. Strikingly, the average years of schooling for men of this age group born in Japan but living in the United States were much higher—15 years. About 60 percent of native-born Japanese-Americans were in white-collar occupations, substantially less than Chinese-Americans (77 percent) but substantially higher than non-Hispanic American whites (50 percent).

The achievements of the approximately 500,000 Koreans in America are similar. The average years of schooling of recent Korean male immigrants, almost 15 years and about the same as recent Japanese immigrants, is higher than the native Korean-American male average of 13.8 years (also about the same as native-born Japanese-Americans). Sixty-three percent of Korean-Americans are in white-collar jobs, lower than the Chinese-Americans but higher than the Japanese-Americans. Average family income of Korean-Americans, at $25,234 in 1980, was slightly below the non-Hispanic white average of $26,535. But native-born Korean-American families earned an average of $38,610, even higher than native-born Japanese.

The success of the East Asians in America is testimony to the virtues of an open political and economic system in which fair play is increasingly a reality. But it is also testimony to immigrant cultures heavily influenced by Confucianism, in which work, austerity, education, family, and community are all highly valued. Peter Rose has observed that "to most [Asians], meritocratic principles are the norms by which their lives in the

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United States have been organized in the past and ought to be in the future. It is this ethos—and the publicity their achievements have received—that causes many to look to them (but rarely to the Hispanics) as archetypes of acculturation."

East Asian communities are not without problems, particularly with respect to recent immigrants, many of whom have entered through the family preference emphasis of current immigration legislation. Chinese gang activity, for example, has increased notably in New York and California. But the successful adaptation of prior generations of East Asian immigrants should leave us hopeful about the acculturation of the new immigrants in the long run.

The Mexicans

LIKE THE Asian immigrants, Mexican-Americans have also experienced discrimination, but probably no more than the Chinese and Japanese. Like the Puerto Ricans, whose achievement levels are among the lowest of any minority/ethnic group, they have acculturated slowly and have remained disproportionately in the lower classes.

Mexicans constitute the single largest immigrant group of recent decades, accounting for more than half the burgeoning Hispanic-American community. About 100,000 Mexicans who inhabited the territories ceded to the U.S. after the Mexican war were the first Mexican-Americans. Little immigration from Mexico to the United States occurred during the balance of the nineteenth century. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, intense poverty in Mexico, in part the result of rapid population growth precipitated by improving public health, combined with the instability and bloodshed of the 1910 Mexican Revolution to impel the first of three great waves of Mexican immigration.

The depression of the 1930s arrested the first wave of Mexican immigration, and with unemployment approaching 25 percent, local and federal authorities undertook a massive campaign of expulsions that, by one count, reduced the Mexican-American population from about 600,000 to about 400,000. But the hiatus was brief. World War II placed extraordinary pressures on America's labor force, and one response was the *bracero* contract-worker program. Vastly larger numbers entered illegally. After the war, the Mexicans were generally viewed as competitors for American jobs, and large numbers—Thomas Sowell, author of *Ethnic America*, says four million—were deported between 1951 and 1964.

The third wave of Mexican immigration into the United States may well have been underway simultaneously with the mass deportations. The principal motivator of the flow was the disparity in wages between the United States and Mexico, aggravated by high unemployment in Mexico. The World Bank estimates Mexico's 1988 per capita GNP at $1,760 and the United States' at $19,840, more than ten times larger (the disparity would be larger yet if Mexico's highly inequitable income distribution were taken into account). A powerful magnet pulls on the U.S. side of a 2,000-mile-long border, while a combination of rapid population growth, slow job creation, and social injustice on the Mexican side gives a powerful push. As a result, illegal immigration has become so massive that no one knows with any degree of precision how many Mexicans, or indeed other foreign nationals, are living in the U.S.

How many people of Mexican origin live in the United States today? The 1990 census shows 22,354,000 Hispanics (Hispanics accounted for 6.5 percent of the total population in 1980, 8.9 percent in 1990). Of the 1990 total, 14,000,000 or 63 percent were estimated to be of Mexican antecedence. That represents about 5 percent of our total population. About 75 percent live in California and Texas. Thus, Hispanic-Americans (predominantly Mexican-Americans) accounted for 12 percent of California's population in the 1970 census, 19 percent in the 1980 census, and 26 percent in the 1990 census. Leon Bouvier and Philip Martin project that the Hispanic component may rise to 38 percent by 2030. A similar study of Texas

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by Bouvier and F. Ray Marshall projects an Hispanic—presumably even more predominantly Mexican—population in a range of 28 percent to 53 percent in the year 2035, depending on assumptions about the rate of immigration. Short of a concerted effort by the United States to stem the flow, we must expect a continuation of the influx, particularly into the Southwest.

MEXICAN-Americans range from the offspring of the pre-1847 Spanish-American aristocracy—highly educated, now often intermarried with the mainstream American upper or upper-middle class, totally acculturated, and often non-Spanish speaking—to the illegal immigrant—often illiterate, monolingual in Spanish (in some cases speaking only Indian dialects), and monocultural. Using the same definitions that we used for the Asian immigrant groups, 19 percent of the Mexican-born and 45 percent of the U.S.-born Mexican-Americans are in white-collar jobs compared with 61 percent of all Californians (a figure that includes Mexican-Americans).

The Hispanic value system has been the principal obstacle to human progress throughout Hispanic America, and indeed in Spain itself until recent decades, and it may contribute to lagging Mexican-American performance in such indicators as education, employment mobility, income, and political participation. A principal element of Hispanic culture is familism—emphasis on the interests of the family to the exclusion of the interests of the community and country. Family is also central to East Asian culture, but in Korea and China, and above all Japan, the idea of family carries over to the community and the nation. Several other aspects of traditional Iberian culture are the major obstacles to progress in Latin America and Mexico: an excessive individualism, particularly in the upper classes, that expresses itself in authoritarianism on one hand, and social irresponsibility on the other (passivity in the lower classes is also a consequence); mistrust of, even hostility toward, those outside the family; a flexible ethical code; and negative attitudes about work, saving, and entrepreneurship, in part the consequence of a present-oriented, zero-sum world view.

Thomas Sowell observes that "the goals and values of Mexican-Americans have never centered on education." Second-generation native-born Mexican-Americans ages 25–34 in California average about 10.5 years of education. All Californians (including Hispanics and blacks) average about 12 years (the national average for native-born Chinese is 14.9 years, for native-born Japanese 13.7 years, for native-born Koreans 13.8 years). Nearly two-thirds of Mexican immigrants have had no high school education. Department of Education nationwide data show an Hispanic high school dropout rate of 35.7 percent in 1988, three times higher than white students and more than twice that of black students.

In *Out of the Barrio*, Linda Chavez points out that this alarming dropout rate is skewed upward by the inclusion of recent immigrants from Mexico; she adduces data showing the dropout rate for second-generation Mexican-Americans to be 22 percent and *29 percent* for the third-generation compared with 10 percent for non-Hispanic whites. The overall Hispanic rate is 1.4 percent higher than it was in 1972, when drop-out statistics for Hispanics were first recorded. High drop-out rates suggest that many Mexican-American youngsters are not going to be qualified for the kinds of jobs the American economy is likely to generate in the future.

A 1985 study by Kevin McCarthy and R. Burciaga Valdez of the RAND Corporation demonstrates that movement toward the cultural mainstream by Mexican-Americans is slower than that of most other immigrant groups, and dramatically slower than that of the Asians. Further evidence of a lag in Mexican-American acculturation is provided by the conclusions of a recent three-year study by David Hayes-Bautista, head of the Chicano Studies Research Center at the University of California in Los Angeles. In a June 30, 1991 article in the *New York Times*, Dr.

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Hayes-Bautista concluded: "We could come back in 100 years and the Latinos will not have assimilated in the classic sense." The article also stresses the ease with which that culture is maintained in places like East Los Angeles, citing the experience of Jose Hernandez, a twenty-six-year-old Mexican, who was shocked to discover that the "Mexican community in East Los Angeles is so self-contained that he could not even find anybody with whom he could practice English." Poor enclave communities not only make it easier for homeland values and language to persist, but they also possess the potential, particularly during bad economic times, for resentment-driven violence, such as the rioting in the Mount Pleasant district of Washington, DC in the spring of 1991 or the devastating April-May 1992 Los Angeles riots. One-third of those apprehended in Los Angeles for looting were illegal Hispanic immigrants.

The persistence of Spanish as the dominant language for many Hispanic-Americans virtually assures a slow pace of acculturation, since language is the conduit of culture. Strident Chicano "nationalism" and insistence on bilingual education and bilingual public services are evidence of the "salad bowl" rather than the "melting pot" view of the United States. Linda Chavez observes that bilingual education was sold to Congress and the American people principally by Hispanic activists as a means of facilitating the transition to English and improving the quality of education received by Hispanic-American youngsters. But the reality, as documented by several studies, has been very different: As Chavez says, bilingual education has proven to be "at its heart a program to help maintain the language and culture of Hispanic children," a conclusion also stressed in Rosalie Pedalino Porter's *Forked Tongue*. Isolation from the cultural mainstream is likely to have tragic consequences for human beings: a sense of alienation and resentment as well as disproportionate levels of poverty, welfare dependence, drug usage, and crime.

In addition to promoting bilingual education, Hispanic activists have also succeeded in convincing Congress that the non-availability of electoral material, including ballots, in Spanish was the equivalent of the literacy tests that were used in the South to prevent blacks from voting. Congress ignored the fact of substantial Hispanic voting—and large numbers (relative to blacks) of elected Hispanic officials—long before the Voting Rights act of 1965 and legislated an automatic requirement for bilingual election materials where voting fell below 50 percent of the Hispanic population. This pandering to Hispanic activists reinforces the divisive bilingualism movement.

If large numbers of Mexican-Americans are acculturating very slowly, in part because of the very size of the immigration flow, then the long-term implications of the vast immigration from Mexico—along with heavy immigration from Latin America in general—are profoundly troubling. Several studies conclude that, on balance, the legal and illegal immigration of Mexican-Americans in California has been economically beneficial, at least for the cities, above all Los Angeles, where they live in large numbers. These studies do not factor in all the costs. The circumstances of Hispanics in Colorado are troubling: 11 percent of the population is Hispanic, principally Mexican-American; one-third of welfare recipients and a quarter of the prison population are Hispanic. Nationwide, almost 30 percent of female-headed Mexican immigrant families were receiving welfare in 1980.

The persistence of Spanish among Mexican-Americans brings the divisions between French-speaking and English-speaking Canada to mind. *Dallas Morning News* columnist Richard Estrada believes that, in the long run, the language problem in the Southwest may prove to be greater than in the case of Quebec:

> For Quebec. . . does not lie contiguous to France. . . .The Southwest, on the other hand, shares a 2,000-mile-long border with a Spanish-

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speaking country of at least 85 million people, hundreds of thousands of whom yearly move to the United States, or who reside with one foot in one country, the other in the other. The twin factors of geographic contiguity and rate of immigration must give pause. No one can witness the growth of Spanish-language media in this country and fail to believe that things are headed in the direction of a parallel culture.

What Is to Be Done?

IMMIGRANTS from China, Japan, and Korea have brought the positive Confucian values of work, education, merit, and future orientation—similar to the Protestant ethic—to an environment that substantially unburdens them of the negative Confucian values of authoritarianism, hegemony of the bureaucrats, and disdain for economic activity. They have made a successful transition to the American cultural mainstream, notwithstanding a history of racism and persecution. Asian-Americans today inject a commitment to achievement and excellence into a society where, over recent decades, those values have eroded.

In recent years, however, many uneducated and unskilled Asians, particularly from China and Southeast Asia, have immigrated, both legally and illegally. While their long-term prospects may be better than those of Mexican immigrants because of their value system, in the short run the benefits to the United States of their immigration are limited, and may well be exceeded by the costs, particularly at a time of slow growth, high unemployment, and fiscal distress at all levels of government.

The roots of our economic troubles are deep, and a recovery from the current recession will not produce circumstances in which the national interest will be served by the immigration of uneducated, unskilled people. We face a major problem of integrating those who are already here, above all Hispanics, of whom Mexicans comprise the large majority. For Mexican-American citizens and other immigrants who are here legally, the principal objective must be to assure maximum exposure and access to the cultural mainstream. One of the most effective ways of achieving this is to reduce sharply the flow of immigrants, thus arresting the growth of enclave communities like East Los Angeles. Although the border with Mexico is 2,000 miles long, vastly improved control *is* feasible if we have the will. Almost all of the border is forbidding desert, and surveillance and control need to be fortified significantly only for about 200 miles. The problem would, of course, be far easier with the cooperation of the Mexican government, which we should insist on in negotiating Mexico's inclusion in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area.

Such programs as Head Start that enhance the educational and social opportunities of children from lagging ethnic groups and improve their access to the cultural mainstream should have a particularly high priority for Hispanic-Americans. Bilingual education is a major impediment to acculturation; it should be limited to the relatively small number of cases, presumably mostly adults, where it demonstrably facilitates the transition to English. We should also discontinue the use of bilingual election materials, an innovation that moves us one step closer to the divisiveness that threatens Canada's integrity. While we study, articulate, and legislate such reforms and work toward better integration of recent immigrants, we should call a moratorium on immigration.

It is time to work toward an immigration policy based on U.S. national interests, one that leaves the decisions about who enters the United States in the hands of the U.S. authorities rather than individual citizens of other countries, one that emphasizes our obligations to our own society and its citizens, particularly those in need. We need an immigration policy less responsive to the failures of other societies and more responsive to the needs of our own.□

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Russia in Search of Itself

Sergei Stankevich

WE MUST discuss the foreign policy of Russia at a time when the country has yet to recognize itself as a state and to shape the attributes of statehood—an army for instance. It does not have borders fixed in accordance with the practice of international law, does not have a sensible and formulated system of national interests on which foreign policy might be built, and has not recognized its particular historical mission.

With us, foreign policy does not emanate from the precepts and priorities of evolved statehood. On the contrary, foreign policy practice, frequently based on search, analogies, and intuition, is helping Russia become Russia. Dealings with the surrounding world are helping shape Russian statehood and helping Russia recognize its interests.

Categorical assertions to the effect that Russia is required to renounce messianism immediately have been heard increasingly often of late. If what is meant by this is a renunciation of the global mentorship of the communist rulers who stinted on neither the money nor the lives of others for the sake of the universal establishment of the totalitarian utopia, there is no reason to argue with this proposition. But what if we should rush to the other extreme, going so far in our denial of messianism as to jettison the similar sounding, but not identical, concept of mission?

A policy that is built on interests alone is highly vulnerable, and in Russia, in my view, it would be simply disastrous. Aside from interests, a mission—not degenerating into messianism, of course—is needed.

It is said that pragmatism should be the leading principle, virtually, of our foreign policy. This assertion is in need of particular reservations and limitations. Pragmatism not balanced by healthy idealism would with us, alas, most likely degenerate into extremes and cynicism. Russia's foreign policy must provide for goals and tasks elevated above opportunistic pragmatism.

Russia's mission in the world, from my viewpoint, is to initiate and support a multilateral dialogue of cultures, civilizations, and states. Russia the conciliator, Russia connecting, Russia combining. A charitable state, tolerant and open within the limits drawn by law and good will, but formidable beyond these limits. A country imbibing West and East, North and South, unique and exclusively capable, perhaps, of the harmonious combination of many different principles, of a historic symphony. Such is my vision of Russia in a renewed world.

This is a perfectly natural role for it,

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since Russia is in itself, by nature, dualistic. It has always bifurcated and acted as an opponent to itself in order subsequently, negotiating a chain of ordeals, to reach an accord with itself. It is pointless to complain about the nature of this historical destiny. It is very important for everyone who ventures to speak on Russia's behalf to listen closely to the voice of its essence.

Frankly, I would greatly regret it if some Russian version of the strictly rational school of foreign policy were to monopolize Russia's foreign policy. At the same time, were a foreign policy school to emerge combining rationalism and the pragmatic principle on the one hand and, on the other, our innate idealism and sense of Russian mission, I would be prepared to associate myself with such a school immediately. I am not talking about some speculative notions or emotional preferences.

Russia should seriously reconsider its role in the United Nations and use its seat on the Security Council for the realization of its mission, for acquisition of a new status. It would make sense, evidently, having appreciably reduced the quantitative presence of Russia's representatives in the UN structure, to pay considerable attention to the qualitative aspect and to laying claim to specific offices which would help Russia realize precisely its inherent mission. The European organizations of the United Nations, and also the strengthening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) mechanism, merit special attention. Russia's new role in these structures would help it not only establish itself as a leading European power but also compensate for its present geographical distance from the center of European international life.

AS I SEE IT, two lines, which may conditionally be designated Atlanticism and Eurasianism, have emerged in our foreign policy practice of late. Atlanticism gravitates toward the following set of ideas and symbols: to become European, to become a part of the world economy in rapid and organized fashion, to become the eighth member of "the Seven," and to put particular emphasis on Germany and the United States as the two dominant members of the Atlantic Alliance. This is rational, pragmatic, and natural. There is credit, aid, and advanced technology there.

Its opposite trend—Eurasianism—is not as yet as clearly expressed as Atlanticism, but it is already knocking on the door of the tall building on Smolenskaya.*

At the close of the twentieth century, attempting to resuscitate the idea of Russia's reorientation toward the East and to counteract Russia's Europeanization in its extreme forms would obviously be just as pointless and unproductive as hastily pulling the Atlantic dinner jacket and bow tie onto Russia's broad shoulders. It is obvious that it is necessary to seek a new balance of Western and Eastern orientations characteristic of the present Russia and our times. Initially, in fact, it will most likely be necessary to pay special attention to a strengthening of our positions in the East, straightening the manifest distortion permitted by the creators of the "common European home" concept.

There is no way that the present Russia can escape a combination of old and new realities. The fact is that we are now separated from Europe by a whole chain of independent states. We have become further removed from it geographically and geopolitically, which will inevitably entail quite an appreciable redistribution of our resources, our options, our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, of the eastern direction. In addition, the development of the domestic political situation, which will inevitably be reflected in foreign policy, is pushing us in this direction also.

There will be a most difficult search for accord, mutual understanding, and cooperation with the Turkic and Muslim components, which have performed a tremendous role in the history of Russia. Our state emerged and grew strong as a unique histor-

*Moscow's Foggy Bottom or Quai d'Orsay.

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ical and cultural amalgam of Slav and Turkic, Orthodox and Muslim components. Relations between them currently are on the brink of a fateful conflict. Avoiding this conflict and finding harmony here, a synthesis that will allow Russia once again to feel itself the combining, connecting conciliator, is of categorical importance.

The shaping on and around the territory of the collapsed Union of an appreciably different configuration of strategic interests is confronting Russia with a new historical challenge. We are seeing how the influence of the Muslim world, both geographically close to us and further removed, on our domestic political situation is growing, how zones of influence in the territories of contiguous Asian republics and in the territory of Russia are gradually emerging, and how an arc of crisis (to use the well-known image of the 1970s) from the Transcaucasus through North Caucasus toward the Volga region is progressively taking shape.

Ignoring all this is impossible. Not to understand which dominant powers of the Near and Middle East (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia) are displaying a heightened interest in the arc of crisis is also impossible. We should be preparing to respond purposefully and consistently to the emerging, intricate knot of counterinterests and influences. It is possible, evidently, to talk about a revival of the "Eastern question" in Russia's foreign policy in something close to the classical sense. But we have as yet, alas, no conceptualizers capable of formulating the Eastern question at the modern level, nor are there practical men capable of offering effective answers.

The preservation and gradual strengthening of the special relationship with the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—permeable borders, close economic and cultural ties, allied relations in the military and political spheres—correspond to Russia's long-term strategic interests. But there are distinct limits to the realization of this tendency.

In order to broaden its field of political action as much as possible, Russia must quickly become self-sufficient—that is, Russia must provide itself with all vitally important means and resources from internal sources, or from several independent sources both within and outside the framework of the CIS.

In increasing the volume of treaty relations with its CIS partners, Russia should approach them in differentiated fashion. It will inevitably be necessary to distinguish between those which use the CIS merely as a means of dividing up the Union inheritance prior to a "definitive" parting, and those for whom the Commonwealth is a fundamental historical choice. Concessions to the first in the name, allegedly, of preserving the CIS are pointless and dangerous, and nonviolent competition resulting in agreements beneficial to Russia are more appropriate here. The second group of states, on the other hand, has the right to expect the preference accorded to strategic allies.

There is no need for Russia to insist on unanimity in reaching agreements consolidating its relations with its CIS partners. Better that there should be fewer signatures and more precise meaning, clearer consequences, and higher quality in the case of each document.

IT IS frequently maintained that Russia's concern for the fate of Russians in neighboring states signifies interference in the internal affairs of the independent states. Russia cannot, in my view, agree with this interpretation. The proclamation of independence and its recognition in international law are only the first step on the long path toward the formation of full-fledged statehood. It is the obligation of a new state laying claim to a worthy role in the international community to come to terms in humane and civilized ways with the legacy of the former era, adopting a solicitous attitude toward people and their fate, and cautiously doing away with the most painful contradictions.

Unfortunately, several states that were formerly a part of the USSR have opted for a different path. Nationalist forces, essentially

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driven by paranoid ideas of historical or national vengeance, have bestirred themselves there. They are exerting one-sided pressure on the authorities. As fragmented minorities, the Russian communities are not in a position to balance out this pressure, and, as a result, they are falling victim in countries like Estonia and Latvia to discriminatory citizenship legislation which is in fact introducing apartheid practices.

Russia does not have the moral right to remain a passive observer of this process. Responding to any discriminatory decision or action with respect to the Russian population and, more broadly, the Russian heritage (graves, monuments, schools, churches, monasteries, museums) should be the first priority of both our embassies in our "near neighbors" and of our Foreign Ministry.

The attitude toward the Russian population and the Russian heritage of this or that state is a most important criterion for Russia in deciding whether to assign the state in question to the category of friend. The entire set of our bilateral relations—from the question of the fate of the army through the economy and finances—cannot, in turn, fail to depend on the outcome of such a process.

Contrary to all the charges of an "imperial syndrome," such a policy has nothing in common with imperialism. On the contrary, it is for Russia a legitimate and natural aspiration to erase conflicts and harmonize relations on the territory of the former USSR. Furthermore, Russia will invariably take the part of the undeservedly insulted and unjustly persecuted.

Unfortunately, insufficient diplomatic assertiveness on the part of Russia in the sphere in question is leading to a distorted perception by some European politicians of what is happening in the states of the former Union.

We cannot, for example, overlook the speeches in Estonia of Madame Lalumière, secretary general of the Council of Europe. She made common cause, in fact, with the idea of the separation of peoples into indigenous and nonindigenous in this region. This extremely dangerous idea will never be accepted by Russia and is categorically rejected by the Russian government. We cannot permit a division whereby "nonindigenous" peoples are unequal. We consider such an approach unacceptable on both moral and political grounds.

The subject of the defense of the rights of the populace ethnically connected with Russia will inevitably be a very important topic throughout the negotiating process with the states of the former Union. It is inevitable that Russia will endeavor persistently to incorporate the corresponding provisions in international documents of various levels. In my opinion, at least, it is clearly time for Russia to adopt a tougher tone on this issue than has been the case hitherto—without, naturally, overstepping the bounds of absolutely necessary restraint but, for all that, displaying far greater insistence. For the appeals which have been made thus far have not been heard.

STABILITY IS a priority, a very important value, which must be present in Russia's foreign policy. I would add to this value another: balance, which at the same time is an important condition of stability. Balance both along East-West lines, which we have already mentioned, and along North-South lines. There are giant, as yet unutilized, possibilities here. A rapid move into the markets and full-fledged integration into the system of economic relations of such states as the United States, Japan, and the economically developed states of Europe are highly problematical. We are obviously assigned here, for many years to come, at best the role of junior partner who should not be admitted to the inner circle.

At the same time, on the other hand, there are far broader and qualitatively better opportunities connected with other states, other countries of, relatively speaking, the second echelon, which are at a historical frontier similar to ours—that is, at the frontier of historical breakthrough. These are the countries lying to the south of our traditional

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partners: in Latin America, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina; in Africa, South Africa; further in the direction of Europe, Greece; then Turkey; in Asia, India, China, and the Southeast Asia countries.

These states are attempting to accomplish historical tasks similar to ours: integration into the world economy without losing their identity and defending their own interests; transition to a new technology structure; implementation of comprehensive reforms encompassing both industry and agriculture; acquisition of financial, food, and other self-sufficiencies.

Interaction with them, use of the potential available to both parties, movement into their markets, and the use of the potential of our market—these are the opportunities which must not be overlooked. They have thus far, for incomprehensible reasons, remained on the periphery of our foreign policy activity.

The world is changing rapidly, and new intersections of interests and new regional formations with an independent orientation are emerging. All this is affording Russia opportunities to obtain propitious geopolitical positions in key regions, and to rank, in time, among the world leaders.□

Four Comments

Leon Aron:

WHEN ITALY, unified at last, acquired Rome as its capital in 1870, the great German historian Theodor Mommsen reportedly asked an Italian acquaintance: "What do you intend to do in Rome? You cannot be in Rome without having cosmopolitan projects." Few serious students of Russia ever believed that what seemed like a replay of America's Vietnam syndrome—which, having begun to set in under Gorbachev at the time of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, intensified in the last two years of the Soviet collapse—would last forever. Stankevich's article confirms the veracity of Mommsen's axiom: In Moscow, as in Rome a hundred years ago, the "cosmopolitan projects" are beginning to stir again under the still thick and heavy crust of isolationism and inward-directedness which formed during the years of disintegration.

Foreign policy is not Stankevich's portfolio: In Yeltsin's cabinet he is in charge of "social organizations" and "political questions." The absence of a formal responsibility for foreign affairs—which, together with national security, are firmly in the hands of State Secretary Gennady Burbulis—liberates Stankevich from circumspection and accounts for the very useful candor of this piece.

Regardless of whether he succeeds, Yeltsin's uniqueness and his place in Russian history are secured by his attempt at a massive revision of Russia's national values and priorities. Among several core notions tackled by the Russian president, two are relevant here. First, Yeltsin set out to build a "normal" bourgeois state, a state like any other, whose national security and foreign policies are shaped by national interests, not by national ideology. Yeltsin's historic breakthrough is not so much in de-communization as in the de-ideologization of Russian foreign policy.

Yeltsin's other major revision concerns the comparative weight of domestic and foreign policy considerations in policy-making. For four centuries, the well-being and rights of the Russian citizenry, as well as most of Russia's economic priorities, were defined by, and largely sacrificed to, national security strategy. A domestic political context for Russian foreign policy was virtually nonexistent. Yeltsin is the first Russian ruler to de-link Russian nation-building and foreign expansion and to reverse the traditional causality by attempting to root Russian national security in domestic order.

Both of Yeltsin's revisions are questioned by Stankevich. De-ideoligization is found

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wanting when Stankevich insists on instilling Russian foreign policy with a "mission" and strikes at the "degeneration" and "cynicism" of "opportunistic pragmatism." The primacy of Russia's domestic civilian concerns over those of national security is implicitly challenged by the state counsellor when he, like Russian rulers from Ivan the Terrible through Stalin, claims that national security ("the surrounding world") is helping shape Russian statehood, and, in fact, constitutes the very core Russian national interest.

The operational specifics of the article are not on a par with the conceptual charge of the first few paragraphs. What Stankevich propounds by way of concrete action is nebulous and unoriginal, although largely well meaning. The Slavophile doctrine of Russia's "special" destiny as a bridge or, in the poet Alexander Blok's word, a "shield" between East and West; the imperative of a healthy balance between "Eurasianism" and "Atlanticism" in Russia's emerging foreign policy; the "Eastern," or Muslim, "question" in Russia's past, present, and future; and finally the appeal for self-interested realpolitik in relations with the members of the CIS—all have been bandied about in Russian mass and high-brow media for months.

Perhaps the only noteworthy feature here is the length to which Stankevich goes to express his concern for Russian minorities in the new post-Soviet states. From the pro-Union Communist internationalist Viktor Alksnis, to the proto-fascist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, to Yeltsin's neo-nationalist Vice President Alexander Rutskoy, this legitimate issue has been exploited for political profit by forces largely outside the democratic camp. Devoting almost one-third of the article to Russian *pieds-noirs* is more than a nod to the nationalist right; it is a deep bow. We shall see if it indicates a shift in Stankevich's broader political position—or indeed in that of the Yeltsin administration in general.

Be that as it may, the import of Stankevich's article is not in the operational detail but in the firm, albeit understated, insistence on a set of national values distinct from those advocated by Yeltsin so far. Future historians may well trace to this piece the beginning of the modification of, if not indeed a retreat from, Yeltsin's "rational" revolution in national security and foreign strategy. It may turn out to be the point at which Stankevich's "historic symphony" of the Russian tradition began to compete with the pragmatic jazz of the last ten months of Russian foreign and national security policy, and "historic destiny" began to challenge "rationalism."

This recombination is, of course, inevitable: both history and geostrategy are bound to pull the Russian pendulum away from extreme isolationism. We can only hope that the final product will be benign for Russia and the world.□

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Francis Fukuyama:

BY FAR, the most significant aspect of Stankevich's piece in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* is the way in which he talks about the centrality of the need for Russia to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in the other successor states of the Soviet Union, something that has several very immediate and rather troubling consequences. By contrast, the essay's other themes—the need for a new messianism vaguely connected with the UN, the need to reorient toward the Islamic world, collaboration with other "middle-rank" powers—are all fairly nebulous and of uncertain import.

That the protection of Russians outside Russia should be a central issue for Moscow's foreign policy is completely unobjectionable. There are currently some twenty-five million of them, constituting 20 percent of the population of Ukraine and 40 percent of Kazakhstan. Whatever the historical conditions under which these Russians got there, they may well be subject to discrimination and worse in the turbulent times ahead. It would

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be irresponsible for any Russian government—and for Yeltsin and the "democrats," suicidal—to ignore their interests. The United States and other Western countries are hardly in a position to lecture Russia about "interference" in the "internal affairs" of its neighbors on these grounds, given the fact that we justified invading Grenada ostensibly to protect a handful of U.S. medical students and Panama because the wife of an American officer was sexually accosted.

On the other hand, Russia, just like Germany after 1945, has an imperialist legacy which it cannot simply wish away. It would be impossible for Ukraine, Estonia, or any of the other successor states *not* to see Russian defense of Russians on their territory as an excuse for reassertion of imperial control. Because of such historical memories, the post–1945 Federal Republic has had to tread lightly in defense of the interests of ethnic Germans in Central Europe, an issue that it was spared in many cases only because of the wholesale expulsion of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc. after the war. Stankevich seems quite blind to this aspect of the problem. Indeed, he borrows certain phrases from the Russian nationalists, with whom he is at total odds in other respects, as when he asserts that Russia "will invariably take the part of the undeservedly insulted and unjustly persecuted." Not so fast, bro—your neighbors (and the international community) will not see this as an instance of spontaneous altruism.

This will all come to a head sooner than we would like in the Crimea. If the referendum promoted by the Crimean parliament and its Moscow-based backers yields a majority in favor of independence, Stankevich and most of his fellow "democrats" will have to line up in support of it. As far as I can tell, there is scarcely anyone in the democratic camp (save perhaps Mrs. Bonner or Yuri Afanasyev) who would oppose it, and very many on the nationalist right who would promote it enthusiastically. For their part, even the most reasonable Ukrainians have very little appreciation of the Russians' emotional attachment to Crimea, and virtually no one in Kiev would find independence acceptable. The stage is therefore set for a deadly confrontation that could easily derail the process of democratization in both countries.□

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Jim Hoagland:

THE WORLD turned upside down: that is what Sergei Stankevich describes in his provocative, at times astonishing essay. Without "the precepts and priorities of evolved statehood," Russia must use foreign policy as a tool to "become Russia," he writes. By figuring out how it deals with its neighbors (most of them ex-subjects) and other countries, Russia will figure out what it is.

Stankevich comes as close as a senior official can to acknowledging that his country is caught up in a giant identity crisis for which his government has no clear remedy. The confusion that besets Russia's attempts to provide geographic, ethnic, and national definitions for the old/new entity unearthed by the Soviet collapse gleams through "Russia in Search of Itself."

But there are also, I suspect, immediate concerns at stake. The existence of the essay and the arguments it uses are evidence of a serious debate in the upper reaches of the Yeltsin government about Moscow's relations with the other former Soviet republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States. The piece makes it clear that an incipient power struggle is underway in Moscow.

Stankevich takes direct aim at those in Yeltsin's entourage who would turn their back on Russia's imperial past and former imperial nature to construct a modern, postcolonial, outward-looking Russia. This camp is led by Deputy Prime Minister Yigor Gaidar, Yeltsin's economic specialist, and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who made his

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career in the International Organizations department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry before he broke with the Gorbachev team and joined Yeltsin early on.

Although not named, these two policy technicians are the obvious targets of Stankevich's accusation that Russia's "insufficient diplomatic assertiveness" is undermining and even endangering the Russian populations stranded in other republics. Stankevich comes down in the camp of his fellow politicians who emphasize Russian nationalism and see the Baltic nations and Ukraine as the sources of what Stankevich calls here "nationalist forces essentially driven by paranoid ideas of historical or national vengeance."

Yeltsin has not committed himself in this debate. It is significant that he has done nothing to undercut Gaidar or Kozyrev in their dealings with the other former republics. I can only conclude that Yeltsin shares their view of imperial fatigue as the cause of Russia's current disaster. But I also have to conclude that Yeltsin feels the argument is far from being settled and intends to keep his options open.

Stankevich's fluent English and detailed knowledge of the American political system make him a favorite of American journalists, and give him the air of being the most modern of Russian politicians. But, surprisingly, he adopts in this essay written for a domestic audience a traditional view of his land, arguing that Russia must be a "combining, connecting conciliator" between Europe and Asia, "a unique historical and cultural amalgam of Slav and Turkic, Orthodox and Muslim components."

To carry out this civilizing mission, as the French would have put it, to protect Russian minorities and "heritage" on others' soil, to "respond purposefully and consistently to the emerging, intricate knot of counterinterests and influences" in the Middle East—this is a tall order.

Stankevich softens the implications of his message by pointing to the need for restraint and reason. But it is difficult to see how he could accomplish the goals he describes as essential without resorting to methods used by both czar and commissar—without, that is, trying to edge back toward an imperial past that is beyond reach today. It is puzzling that he has written this essay, this way. More puzzling, and more troublesome, is the fact that someone as keen as Stankevich thinks there is an important constituency for this view in Russia today.□

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Bruce D. Porter:

SERGEI STANKEVICH disavows messianism, yet he broaches a mission for Russia, one vaguely reminiscent of the age-old vision of Moscow as the Third Rome: "A country imbibing West and East, North and South, unique and exclusively capable, perhaps, of the harmonious combination of many different principles, of a historic symphony." A country that will once again feel itself the combining, connecting conciliator. Huh? Play that again, Sergei. Russia the conciliator? Russia the connecting and combining? This is neither idealism, nor a plausible statement of a Russian national mission. It is sheer fantasy and bad history to boot. The only connecting and combining the Russian state has done for centuries has been military conquest and annexation. A country steeped for nearly a millennium in self-isolation, a people with only the most limited knowledge of the outside world, a culture still struggling to rid itself of xenophobia—this is hardly a country that can play the role of world conciliator and harmonizer. It is admirable that Russia finally is striving to shed itself of communist messianism so as to enter the civilized world. That it should pretend to become the connector and harmonizer of the different parts of that world is ludicrous.

If Russia is a state in search of itself, then the search should begin at home, not abroad. Sergei Stankevich argues that only a sense of

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global mission can help Russia find its national identity. That has been the problem throughout Russian history—striving to find an identity by great deeds on the world stage, rather than by internal healing and renewal. The Russian state has never represented Russian society. The events of the past five years have narrowed the gulf between state and society, but have not closed it. Boris Yeltsin may be the first Russian leader elected in a millennium, but even now his government rules by decree and the links between it and the people are weak, informal, and tenuous.

Nowhere in Stankevich's essay does he speak of democracy, representative government, constitutionalism, or popular will. Human rights for him are an Estonian issue. Perhaps he regards democracy as a purely domestic affair, yet its absence has been a source of Russian foreign expansionism for centuries. How ironic, yet how telling, that an essay that begins by talking of Russia as the conciliator should end with a diatribe about how it must protect the interests of Russians throughout the CIS, make no concessions to its neighbors, and adopt "a tougher tone. . .than has been the case hitherto."

Stankevich argues that pragmatism not balanced by healthy idealism may degenerate into extreme behavior and cynicism. To the contrary, it is idealism that has ever degenerated into extremism in Russian history. If the Russian people have a weakness, it is a passion for absolutes. Pragmatism has never been their undoing; its absence in the realm of politics has ruined them. Russia indeed has much that it can offer the outside world, but the offering will not be accomplished by the Russian state. It will not come from the Russian political leadership, foreign ministry, or diplomatic corps. Boris Yeltsin will not be the leader of the Russian Magi. He and his government will contribute quite enough to the world by concentrating on the reconstruction of their ravaged country and by acting with responsibility and prudence on the world stage. Russia's real gifts to the world will not be political or diplomatic in nature. They will be cultural, literary, scientific, and intellectual. In these spheres, the Russians are quite possibly the most gifted and talented people on the face of the earth. They have already immeasurably enriched our world with their intellectual and cultural contributions, largely produced in the face of state oppression and persecution.

Even now, Russian citizens still cannot travel freely abroad without an invitation; their channels for expressing their political will or redressing their grievances are primitive; they are condemned to spend their best energies in scavenging for food and consumer goods in an economy still reeling from the inanities of Bolshevist economics. Only when these conditions cease and a genuine liberal democracy is established will the Russians finally be free. The resulting release of the energies, creativity, and talents of a great people will be the real Russian Revolution. Sergei Stankevich's advice to his country no doubt reflects the best of intentions, but he should recall the wisdom of the biblical proverb: Physician, heal thyself.□

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Why America Must Lead

Elliott Abrams

THE STRUGGLE for mastery in Europe engaged the United States for nearly three-quarters of a century. It was a struggle that exacted enormous sacrifices. In the two world wars over half a million Americans lost their lives, and another 100,000 were killed in a global Cold War that was not always cold. The question arises: With the Cold War won, should the American definition of security now begin to contract? Are the great tasks and sacrifices of the last seventy-five years finally behind us?

The temptation to withdraw from leadership in international politics is great. A variety of sophisticated and plausible arguments is on offer to justify such a course. As the year 2000 approaches, some take a millenarian position that non-violence and democracy have already triumphed, leaving little reason for American activity. Some argue that the collapse of communism and Soviet power has eliminated any serious physical or ideological threats to American interests. Others maintain that while threats remain, a collective security system will emerge to protect us. Perhaps most important is the assertion that, however real the need for American leadership, our own social and economic weaknesses are so deep as to prevent us, now or in the near future, from continuing to carry the burdens involved.

Whether reflecting optimism about the international system or pessimism about America, these views have a common thread: they manifest a desire to declare an end not only to the Cold War but also to the period of American leadership. Arguments that the world's problems are solved, or irrelevant to U.S. security, or likely to regulate themselves in a new and interdependent world political system, or beyond the range of current American influence, all excuse (and often celebrate) the reduction of American activity, influence, and power. But before accepting such arguments and joining in the celebration, we should subject them to close scrutiny; and when we do, they appear seriously flawed.

Has Democracy Triumphed?

THE EXPANSION of democracy in the 1980s, first in Latin America and Asia and then, triumphantly, in Eastern Europe, is a stunning phenomenon. Given the insight, familiar since Kant, that democracies are more likely to pursue peaceful foreign policies, and given the shifting balance of power in Europe after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the prospect of war

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among the major powers continues to diminish.

Starting with the region I know best, as recently as 1980 the vast majority of Latin Americans lived under military dictatorships. When these juntas began to fall, it was often said (not without justification, in light of past experience) that this merely constituted a familiar pendulum swing which would soon be followed by movement back to autocracy. Remarkably, however, in spite of the region's deep economic difficulties and the fragility of new political structures, as the 1980s ended not a single new democracy in Latin America had fallen to a coup. There has also been real movement toward democracy in both Africa and Asia, while the transformation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has been the most spectacular and important event of the epoch.

The impressive consensus on democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes, however, is incomplete. For one thing, it is missing some key adherents among the Islamic countries, as Iraq reminded the world in August 1990. Among these countries the most common political patterns are monarchy and tyranny, with rare examples of more modern democratic systems in Turkey and Egypt (but, sadly, no longer Pakistan). Can it be accidental that the most democratic country in the region, Turkey, is the most secular one?

The problem is not the imperfect translation of Islamic political ideals into reality, but the incompatibility of some of those ideals with democracy as the term is used in the West. Moreover, under current conditions and contrary to prevailing doctrine, the introduction of free elections in these countries might well increase, rather than decrease, the propensity toward violence, and might—as in Algeria recently—produce results that bode ill for Western-style democracy. In some Arab states, where the anti-Western strain is deepest in the Islamic world, greater popular participation in foreign policy decision-making might actually be conducive to war and state-sponsored terrorism. Who can say how a referendum on war with Israel, or with other Arab countries for that matter, would fare in each Arab state?

At the same time, from Central Europe eastward to the Islamic regions of the former Soviet Union, innumerable boundary, nationality, ethnic, and religious disputes remain unresolved. It is not inevitable, or even probable, that all these disputes will be resolved democratically through peaceful political processes. In the excitement of victory it was easy to equate the collapse of communism with the success of democracy, but clearly this is a false equation. Given the polarized state in which these societies were left by the totalitarian experiment, whether democracy can take hold is uncertain. Even if it does, the equation of democracy with peace and harmony is questionable. In Asia, democracy seems to be a distant goal for Vietnam, North Korea, and the world's most populous nation, China. And to return to Latin America for a moment, recent events in Peru make it clear that even in the Western Hemisphere the triumph of democracy is neither universal nor permanent.

The point need not be labored further. Democracy has expanded spectacularly and the gains continue. And it is true that hitherto democracies have a good record of avoiding war with each other. Still, the international political system is very far from becoming an exclusively democratic society living under a rule of law that eliminates the use of violence to settle arguments. Vast portions of the world's population do not live in democratic countries, and it seems unlikely that they will soon have this privilege.

A Self-Regulating System?

THE SENSE of relief at the end of the Cold War was both enormous and understandable. Understandable, too, was the initial, euphoric belief that, with its conclusion, international stability was almost assured. If the danger to us and our allies, and more generally to world peace, had

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come from immensely powerful and aggressive dictatorships and their totalitarian ideology, it seemed reasonable to conclude that the demise of those regimes and their ideology would deliver us from problems of security and stability. The new interdependent, multipolar world would surely lend itself to a stable balance of power, replacing the prolonged superpower confrontation.

This view, however attractive, lacks both logical and historical foundation. Two centuries ago, Rousseau observed of the states of Europe that they "touch each other at so many points that no one of them can move without giving a jar to the rest; their variances are all the more deadly, as their ties are more closely woven." More recently Robert W. Tucker pointed out in the Fall 1991 *Foreign Affairs* that "interdependence itself is not constitutive of order. . . . [but] creates the need for greater order because it is as much a source of conflict as of consensus."

Peace is not the normal state of affairs. Equilibrium in the international system is not a natural or automatically realized phenomenon. History establishes that the international system can be peaceful only if determined, sustained, and intelligent efforts are made to keep it so.

THE REPLACEMENT of the historically rare bipolar system with a new but more familiar multipolar system serves to underline this point. It was characteristic of the Cold War that *everything* counted, at least briefly; in a twist on Andy Warhol's dictum, during the last four decades it seemed that every locale, no matter how small, remote, barren, poor, and obscure, had its fifteen minutes of fame: Quemoy and Matsu, Vientiane and Pnomh Penh, Leopoldville and Addis Ababa, Managua and even St. Georges, Grenada. Everything mattered, and every win and every loss imparted a sense of historical momentum.

From this it followed that little was done by any country without taking the interests of the superpowers into consideration. Their boundless concerns constrained not only one another but also every other actor in the international system. True, the superpowers could occasionally be defied; but they could never be ignored, and defiance required careful calculation. Intermittently, one superpower or the other would give a sharp pull on the leash, as a reminder of who really ran the show: thus Eisenhower forced the British, French, and Israelis to withdraw in humiliation from Suez in 1956; and thus the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba in 1962 without consulting Castro.

This way of carrying on, which has characterized a good portion of our lifetime, is a historical rarity. What preceded it, from the Congress of Vienna to the Second World War, represents the more usual pattern. Typically, no single power or pair of powers predominated. Instead, nations formed and broke alliances in a multipolar system with a facility dubbed Metternichian after its master practitioner.

While a bipolar system is "managed" by the two powers that dominate it, or is constrained by their rivalry, a multipolar system is freer, more fluid. This obviously has much to recommend it, but there are pitfalls as well. For the balance of power is the product of human endeavor. The most powerful members of a multipolar system must be willing to act resolutely when the rules of the game are broken; without that willingness the system becomes less stable and more prone to violence. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century was remarkably peaceful because there was a leading (though not dominant) power actively enforcing the rules and willing to intervene, if necessary with force, to maintain the system's stability.

Determinism is the enemy of resolution. As Robert W. Tucker and David Hendrickson observe in *Empire of Liberty*, the balance of power "may be most endangered precisely when men persuade themselves that the tendency toward equilibrium is an iron law, for in this way they free themselves from the onus of maintaining it." In Hans Morgenthau's terms, some nation must act as "holder of the balance" or "arbiter" of the

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system, bestowing "restraint and pacification" upon it. Many of the conditions prevailing in the European state system during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries no longer exist. The system has expanded to embrace the world. Communication, transport, weaponry, and many other things have been revolutionized. But if the terms have changed, the basic requirement remains: one nation, deeply committed to the rules of international conduct and strong enough to enforce them, must assume the role of "holder of the balance." The only country capable of this in today's world is the United States.

THE ROLE is particularly important when circumstances call for coalition-building. The participation of the most powerful nation helps other, weaker states to reach agreements or to undertake actions that they might otherwise be reluctant to. The latter are aware that the absence of the most powerful nation can render their decision tentative and frustrate their efforts. They can be undone by its opposition. The American-led coalition against Iraq could not have been assembled by the Soviet Union, or Japan, or France, or Great Britain, without the engagement of the United States. Why should states with fewer resources risk committing them if the greater nation hangs back? Its reluctance to act will reduce the chance that a coalition will be formed at all, let alone succeed, and it will raise the cost enormously for those who proceed without it.

The most critical role for the arbiter lies in its capacity to enforce the rules of international behavior. The invoking of collective security mechanisms all too often fails to achieve this, for collective security is little more than a system of mutual promises among peacefully inclined states. "A system of general collective security," Henry Kissinger observes, "has historically proved useless against the biggest threat to peace—a major rogue country. How would the 'peace-loving' states respond? What sanctions would be at their disposal?" (*Washington Post*, March 15, 1990). With the disappearance of Cold War constraints on rule-breaking, some other form of enforcement—and its crux, military force—must be found if rogue countries are to be restrained.

Neither Germany nor Japan is a convincing candidate to succeed the United States as world leader. Within living memory, both these countries made unsuccessful efforts to achieve dominance and, as a result, suffered the trauma of utter defeat, disgrace, and occupation. In both cases the experience has left deep scars that make it difficult for the two countries to carry their full weight as major powers. Both are inhibited about possessing or projecting military force. Both are aware that they are viewed with suspicion by other countries in their regions. Even more important, behavior in which timidity and assertiveness tend to alternate in an unpredictable manner suggests that, even in their own eyes, the two countries lack legitimacy as world leaders. In the case of Japan, in particular, its attempt to accumulate and exert political influence has been purposely circumscribed by the Japanese themselves, precisely to protect them from involvement in divisive and dangerous crises.

In addition to all this, Japan and Germany are not quite today the economic superpowers they appeared to be yesterday. Japan's export of capital is slowing markedly, and Germany is both suffering under the great economic burden of absorbing the East and showing signs of entering a period of political turmoil. Moreover, they are among the most rapidly aging countries in the world. The impact of an aging population is evident in a contracting labor force, a rising dependency ratio (defined as population aged sixty-five and over as a percentage of population aged fifteen to sixty-five), a decline in the savings rate, and an ever-larger welfare bill. These are not historical and economic conditions conducive to strong international leadership. Except in rare and usually minor regional crises, the central actor in the enforcement of standards of international behavior must remain the United States.

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The End of Violence?

FOR A brief moment in the late 1980s, the end of the Cold War was thought to mean an end to the threat and use of force in international politics. Many mistook the declining likelihood of world war for an increasing chance for world peace, as if these are the only alternatives. They are not, of course.

It is true that among the current major powers the areas of conflict will usually not be political and military, but economic. But the avoidance of violence by the most advanced nations in their conflicts with one another will not be emulated by others. It is also wrong to assume that the major powers will always be able to stand aside from the conflicts started by those other actors.

Francis Fukuyama, in his Summer 1989 essay "The End of History?" in these pages, warned that the end of violence among the major powers would "not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se." Conflicts among states still "mired in history" and between such states and "post-historical" democratic nations would continue. A year later in *The National Interest*, Edward Luttwak resorted to metaphor to make a similar point:

> In the train of history, the last wagons, such as the fragile states of sub-Saharan Africa, are still prebellic: they cannot wage war on each other, because regimes sustained only by the direct force of their armies cannot send those armies away to remote frontiers. The wagons at the head of the train by contrast are now postbellic because their ruling elites have become convinced that they cannot usefully fight one another. Only the wagons in the middle—countries such as India, Israel, Iran, Iraq, and a few others—are still capable of war with each other.

In place of the Cold War's translation of every regional problem into a world crisis, we have what Geoffrey Kemp has called "the regionalization of regional conflicts." But the dangers that originate in regional conflicts can spread, as the Iraq-Kuwait crisis of 1990–91 demonstrated. The possibility of violence is highest in two areas: the Middle East and the formerly communist regimes of the old Soviet bloc.

Today's political map of the region made up of those two contiguous areas is scarred by dozens of fault lines, most of which cut across official borders. As Soviet power dissolved and Eastern Europe was liberated, politics returned to the region with a vengeance, and in forms not confined to the ballot box. It is far too soon to know how many national, religious, or ethnic groups will use violence to seek rights or privileges they think they deserve. But some have already done so and it will be surprising if others do not. As Andrew C. Goldberg has pointed out in the Winter 1991 *Washington Quarterly*, complicating the problem is the fact that the Soviet Union was

> one of the main territorial buffers between the populous, quarrelsome, and increasingly militarily sophisticated states of the Middle East and Southern Asia and the wealthy Western democracies. As Byzantium crumbled in the Middle Ages, leaving Europe open to the depredations of the militant East, the Soviet Union might be succeeded by states that would accentuate the existing competition between these two alien worlds.

Intrinsic to the specific problems of the Middle East—the Kurdish search for independence, the Arab-Israeli struggle, or even the interstate conflicts among Arab nations—is a widespread rejection of the very system from which the code of Western international behavior springs, "a rejection," in the words of historian Bernard Lewis, "of Western civilization as such, not only what it does but what it is, and the principles and values that it practices and professes." This is not a problem that can be solved by adroit diplomacy. Human rights, democratic politics, and, most critically, an aversion to violence, remain alien—and alienating—concepts to many Islamic leaders. Within these states, among them, and

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against any enemy they identify, violence can be expected and is often practiced.

The Islamic world and the newly liberated areas of Europe are far from the only places where force may be used. Though the world's most populous nations, China and India, differ enormously in their internal structures and in their relations with the international system, they have these common traits: each sees itself as a dominant power in its own region, each has an enormous military establishment, and each has demonstrated a willingness to use force to protect its interests. The troubled internal situation in China, as well as the currently declining levels of tension along the Sino-Soviet border and between China and Taiwan, Indochina, Korea, and even Vietnam, make it difficult today to imagine circumstances in which China's rulers would send troops abroad. But China's foreign policy since 1949 has been marked by violent discontinuities, and it is far from inconceivable that China may seek to play a greater military role in the region as its economic power grows. Should the communist regime collapse, the ensuing struggle for power and national unity will most likely include violent episodes.

The immediate risks are greater in the case of India, which spent the 1980s in a steady build-up of its military. In its neighborhood, India has used force time after time. Tensions with Pakistan and within Sri Lanka are unresolved. Internal discord within India—much of it reflecting religious differences—may spill over to affect its neighbors. Among democracies in the Third World, India's resort to the non-defensive use of force and its large military build-up are exceptional, and given its size and weight the exception is very significant.

Nor is the use of violence restricted to nation-states. During the last decade Americans have been subject to repeated terrorist attacks, from airport and airplane bombings to the mass slaughter at the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. While we have recently confirmed that Soviet bloc states assisted not only ideological allies but anti-Western terrorists, the collapse of communism will deprive terrorist organizations of that support. True, too, the PLO's sponsors among the Gulf monarchies have shown reduced enthusiasm for it after Palestinian support for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Nevertheless, the rich mix of ethnic, nationalist, and religious divisions in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is likely to lead to the use of violence by groups unable to attain their goals peacefully. And familiar terrorist groups continue to exist and draw support from states including Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Libya. Several of these regimes can fairly be considered "terrorist states" themselves—not only do they train, arm, bankroll, and house terrorists, but they accept the use of violence and terror toward their own people as a normal activity of the state. What is good enough for fellow countrymen is certainly good enough for foreigners, when the occasion arises.

Violence, then, will not vanish with the Soviet-American rivalry. There is even worse news: the technology of violence is becoming more dangerous and destructive than ever before.

Is America Invulnerable?

IT IS comforting to believe that whatever the world's troubles, their salience for the United States has dropped dramatically now that the bipolar struggle has ended. The physical and ideological threat of Soviet communism has been removed, and America is unquestionably the world's greatest military power. While the fate of Nicaragua, Cuba, or Vietnam is of surpassing interest to their citizens and perhaps their neighbors, it is of little import to Americans. The United States no longer needs to dedicate nearly so much time, personnel, and money to safeguarding European security. Instability in the Balkans is unfortunate, fighting between Armenians and Azeris is tragic, but these are not matters seri-

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ously affecting the security of the United States.

All true. But if many issues have faded in importance, others continue to grow. The argument that if during the Cold War everything mattered, after it nothing does, cannot be sustained. Even at its height, the Cold War did not define the sum of American interests in the world. Indeed, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of its control of the countries of Eastern Europe, combined with advances in military technology, have created a new peril for the United States: the ready availability of weapons of mass destruction to dozens of states and terrorist organizations, along with the incentive to acquire them.

A more fluid international order, even as it leaves some nations safer, will leave others feeling more vulnerable. As security guarantees by superpowers to friends and client states weaken or end, these states are most likely to seek security not in new alliances or new superpower guarantees, but in new weaponry.

The spread of sophisticated military technology has given many lesser nations, including terrorist states, unprecedented capabilities and potential in chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare, as well as delivery systems for their new arsenals. Long-range missile technology is already available in some of the world's most volatile regions, and the number of countries with ballistic missiles has doubled to eighteen in the last decade. Efforts to limit proliferation have failed in part because purchasers have been able to modify short-range missiles to reach longer-range targets and to adapt space-launch vehicles for military use; in part because the most advanced nations no longer maintain a monopoly on production. Many countries hostile to the U.S., including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, are developing biological or chemical weapons. Many developing countries are also investing heavily in conventional forces (India, for example, now has the world's third-largest army and seventh-largest navy).

THERE IS a painful irony for the United States in all this. After seventy-five years of costly conflicts, we are now finally at peace with all of the most powerful nations, only to find that developments in, and the dissemination of, military technology threaten to make America vulnerable once again.

The end of the Cold War, then, has produced a number of perceptions which, although superficially plausible, are mistaken. It is a mistake to believe that democracy's triumph worldwide is assured; that the international system will regulate itself in the absence of a leading power; that violence will wane; and that the United States is now militarily invulnerable.

The post-Cold War order is characterized not only by opportunity but by uncertainty. One thing, however, is certain: American leadership, far from being a casualty of the peace, remains a precondition for a peaceful world.□

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A New Proliferation Policy

Ted Galen Carpenter

PREVENTING the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been an American priority for decades. The U.S.-led international nonproliferation system is breaking down irretrievably, however, and it is time to consider alternatives.

Even before the final disintegration of the USSR, there was mounting evidence of a failure to hold the line. When, following the end of the Persian Gulf War, UN inspectors discovered Iraq's surprisingly advanced nuclear weapons development program, the extent of the failure became apparent. Now the prospect of the diffusion of nuclear weapons both within and from the former Soviet Union adds a further complication to this serious problem. Despite the assurances of Boris Yeltsin and other leaders of the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that a central command and control system for the former Soviet Union's vast nuclear arsenal will exist, in the short term at least four of the republics—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—will continue to have such weapons deployed on their territory.

These trends underscore the futility of hopes for a nuclear-free world. The five openly declared nuclear powers show no serious intent of giving up their weapons, and other states clearly hope to acquire arsenals. There may be opportunities for major reductions in the bloated strategic arsenals of the two former Cold War superpowers, and U.S. leaders should press vigorously for such reductions. But the notion that Washington can somehow orchestrate a global renunciation of nuclear weapons—always an impractical objective—is now a utopian fantasy. Like it or not, such weapons will be a major factor in international politics for the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, U.S. officials seem to be in a state of denial about the mounting evidence of proliferation, and they cling reflexively to a non-proliferation system that is becoming less and less viable. There is an urgent need for a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. policy. Moreover, policymakers may have to accept the possibility that there are no "good" solutions to the problem—only a difficult choice among unpleasant alternatives. Three options appear to be available to the United States: a "status quo plus" policy, coercive non-proliferation, and adjustment to proliferation.

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Status Quo Plus

BY INTELLECTUAL and political default, the Bush administration is pursuing a status quo plus policy. Its operating assumption appears to be that while the non-proliferation system, symbolized by the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation

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Treaty (NPT), is under siege from many sides, it is still working relatively well. Evidence of continuing relevance is sought in the success of the U.S.-influenced decisions by France and China in the summer of 1991 to sign the NPT, with the result that all five of the official (declared) nuclear weapons powers are now under its jurisdiction. The administration's policy prescription for the 1990s consists essentially of a redoubled commitment to the objectives of the treaty by the United States and like-minded states.

One of the most difficult tasks for statesmen is knowing when events have overtaken a previously successful policy and rendered it obsolete. The NPT served American security interests effectively in the past. When it proved impossible for the United States to perpetuate its atomic weapons monopoly, Washington adopted the next best goal—limiting the number of nations that would have such weapons. U.S. leaders hesitated before acceding to Britain's wishes to possess a small independent arsenal, repeatedly tried to discourage France from developing a nuclear weapons capability, and reacted with great alarm when China, at the time an outspoken enemy of the United States, successfully exploded an atomic bomb in 1964. Indeed, it was the emergence of both France and China as uninvited members of the previously exclusive nuclear weapons club that impelled Washington to try to codify its non-proliferation policy in the form of an international treaty. The result was the NPT.

Given the realities of the Cold War, the U.S. enthusiasm for the virtues of non-proliferation made sense. A starkly bipolar international system dominated by two nuclear-armed states was characterized by a perverse form of stability. The size of the two arsenals, combined with increasingly reliable delivery systems, virtually guaranteed the survival of second-strike forces, thereby enhancing deterrence. While rivalry for geopolitical advantage might be pursued vigorously at times through the use of surrogates, no political leader in Washington or Moscow wanted a situation in which an overzealous client could draw its patron into a nuclear exchange.

As long as client states lacked nuclear weapons of their own, their ability to create such a problem for the superpowers was constrained. NATO nations that hosted U.S. nuclear weapons were given a veto over their use—the dual key system—but only the American president had the right to make an affirmative decision to launch. That is why U.S. leaders were so upset when France opted to create an independent arsenal. Once it had the *force de frappe*, Paris theoretically had the power to drag the United States into a nuclear conflagration.

IN EXCHANGE for the allies' willingness to forego nuclear weapons, the United States extended to them the protection of the U.S. strategic arsenal. From Washington's perspective, the combination of non-proliferation and extended deterrence served American interests well. True, the United States did have to deter a Soviet attack on a host of "free world" nations that had become U.S. protectorates. But an implicit set of rules gradually emerged to govern the superpower rivalry, and as time passed it seemed less and less likely that the Kremlin would ever take a reckless gamble that might plunge the world into nuclear conflict.

Of course, had deterrence ever failed, the stability of the bipolar world would have collapsed catastrophically. Because deterrence did not break down, U.S. officials may have learned some erroneous lessons. Instead of regarding non-proliferation and extended deterrence as useful (or at least tolerable) policies under a peculiar set of conditions, they assumed that both policies had enduring value to the point of being sacrosanct. Thus the Bush administration's insistence on preserving and strengthening the NPT in a vastly different post-Cold War era.

There are two serious problems with pursuing a status quo plus policy: more nations have the ability and apparently the intention of acquiring such weapons; at the same time, with the end of the Cold War,

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more nations have an incentive to do so. Even before the end of the Cold War there were signs that the non-proliferation system was beginning to unravel. Both Israel and India apparently developed small covert arsenals during the 1970s and early 1980s. Pakistan also pursued a weapons program (largely to counter India's), an action that severely strained relations between Washington and Islamabad. By the late 1980s there was a flurry of reports that Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Algeria, North Korea, South Africa, and apparently even Brazil and Argentina had active programs. (In recent months, the last three states have officially renounced such ambitions, and Brazil and Argentina have even agreed to a bilateral inspection regime—although neither, it should be noted, is yet willing to sign the NPT.)

In Iraq, the evidence uncovered by UN inspection teams after the Gulf War not only confirmed the reports of an ambitious program but discovered that it was far more advanced than experts had believed. Moreover, the documents the UN inspectors obtained revealed a complex international network of firms—most based in NPT signatory countries—that had assisted the Iraqi effort and were probably available to help any other regime willing and able to pay the right price.

IT IS NOT surprising that the non-proliferation regime is beginning to break down. Rudimentary nuclear technology is now almost five decades old, and it is unrealistic to assume that only a small number of advanced industrial states will have the requisite technology or know-how to build a bomb. More than two generations of Third World scientists and engineers have been educated at some of the finest Western (or Soviet) universities, and can put their expertise at the disposal of a government determined to develop nuclear weapons. These may now be joined by émigré Soviet nuclear scientists and technicians.[1]

Nor is it proving impossible to get the fissionable material needed to build a bomb. Israel apparently built its arsenal using some material that was obtained illegally from U.S. and other Western sources. It may have been easier for Israel to do this because it is not a signatory to the NPT. To prevent the diversion of fissionable material, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in theory has rigorous inspection requirements for treaty members who build reactors for electric power or other peaceful purposes. NPT signatories with advanced nuclear technology are also supposed to make a diligent effort to prevent any diversion when they assist other nations in building or operating reactors. Nevertheless, the case of Iraq—subjected to IAEA inspections for several years—demonstrates clearly that those safeguards have been ineffective. The leakage of both nuclear technology and the material for weapons is likely to accelerate. There are more than 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons (in addition to some 10,000 strategic weapons) in the former Soviet Union under turbulent conditions. A wealthy government could conceivably acquire a small, fully operational arsenal without having to go through the time-consuming process of creating its own weapons-development project. Indeed, there are indications that Iran and Libya have embarked on a vigorous procurement effort.

At the same time that it is becoming easier to acquire independent nuclear arsenals, the nature of the post-Cold War international system is increasing the incentives for various powers to do so. Regional disputes that were often submerged during the long rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union are now resurfacing with a vengeance. Moscow clearly no longer has an ability to keep its onetime allies and clients in line, and even Washington's ability to do so has begun to wane. For example, during the Cold War, Pakistan was hesitant to defy the United States, even though Washington's policy preferences might sometimes inhibit Islamabad's ability to deal with its principal

[1] See Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz, "Five Minutes Past Midnight," *The National Interest* (Winter 1991/92) and responses (Spring 1992).

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adversary, India. But with the dissipation of the Soviet threat, that restraint is far weaker and the focus on the "India threat" much more pronounced.

A similar transformation has taken place in Moscow's relationship with North Korea. The advent of Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons program dates almost precisely from the point when the Gorbachev government began to downgrade relations with the DPRK and seek closer economic and political ties with South Korea. When Soviet protection began to disappear and China showed no enthusiasm for taking on the role of substitute patron, the North Koreans opted to create their own deterrent. And Moscow has discovered that it has little ability to dissuade them.

The reality of increasing proliferation means that a status quo plus policy will not be sustainable. It likewise casts doubt on the corollary doctrine of extended deterrence. Indeed, by clinging to those two doctrines, Washington risks creating the worst of all possible situations for the United States. The non-proliferation system is producing an especially perverse result: the regimes that are the most determined to acquire nuclear weapons are in many cases the same ones that the world community would least like to see have them. An analogy with an unintended consequence of domestic gun control laws may be applicable: Those laws are fairly effective at taking guns out of the hands of people who would never use them for criminal purposes, while doing little to prevent hardened criminals from obtaining them. Similarly, the NPT does an excellent job at persuading the Italys, Swedens, Venezuelas, Japans, Australias, and South Koreas of the world not to acquire nuclear weapons. But it is progressively less able to dissuade the Irans, Libyas, and North Koreas of the world from doing so.

If U.S. policy does not change, the United States will find itself in the position of having to shield an assortment of non-nuclear allies from a rogues' gallery of nuclear-armed adversaries. That would be a more difficult, and ultimately more dangerous, mission than shielding those allies from Soviet aggression during the Cold War. Washington always operated under the assumption that although the Kremlin leadership might be ruthless and brutal, it was rational and not unduly reckless. U.S. leaders cannot assume rationality with anything approaching the same level of confidence if the U.S. arsenal must deter the likes of Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, Kim Il Sung, or Iran's Shiite fundamentalists. That is especially true if the United States is attempting to deter an attack by one of those regimes on a hated ideological or religious opponent.

By continuing to discourage allies from acquiring independent deterrents while keeping the doctrine of extended deterrence intact, the United States is placing itself on the front lines of regional disputes that could easily go nuclear. It is undertaking the risks associated with attempting to deter regimes that may be undeterrable. True, the consequences of failure in the case of a small nuclear power would not be as catastrophic as a failure to deter the USSR during the Cold War would have been. But they would be bad enough, and the probability of stumbling into a nuclear conflict would be far greater.

The Bush administration's status quo plus policy is intellectually bankrupt. It is unhealthy for both the United States and the allies that it has protected and kept non-nuclear. The administration's enthusiasm for non-proliferation and extended deterrence is a classic case of clinging to a policy beyond its expiration date.

Coercive Non-proliferation

SOME MEMBERS of the foreign policy community, sensing that the old non-proliferation system is losing its effectiveness, have begun to advocate a new, more coercive form of non-proliferation to supplement diplomatic cooperation and technology export controls. In its extreme manifestations, that strategy involves a willingness on the part of the United States to launch

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pre-emptive strikes against the nuclear installations of "undesirable" regimes. Some see the "Osirak model"—referring to the Israeli air strikes against a reactor outside of Baghdad in 1981—as an appropriate option if less drastic measures fail. Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), for example, has called for military action against Iraq to eliminate that country's program if Baghdad fails to comply with UN resolutions. In a similar vein, a Defense Department official warned that if North Korea's leaders "missed Desert Storm," they might have "a chance to catch a rerun."[2]

More sophisticated versions of a coercive non-proliferation strategy view pre-emptive military strikes only as a last resort. Instead they suggest strengthening the IAEA's inspection authority and imposing more effective diplomatic and economic sanctions on violators of the NPT. They also typically prefer an international effort directed by the UN Security Council rather than a unilateral policy enforced by the United States.

Behind even these apparently moderate proposals, however, is a willingness to use military force to implement the non-proliferation regime. Citing the UN's response to the Persian Gulf crisis, William H. Lewis and Christopher C. Joyner see an opportunity for international military cooperation to thwart the spread of nuclear weapons. "This approach involves recourse to the United Nations Security Council to authorize the adoption of coercive arms control sanctions against nations threatening use of unconventional weapons to intimidate other nations or initiating acts of aggression in violation of the UN Charter and international law," they write. Their rationale is that the Council "has both the judicial authority and moral suasion to sanction the elimination of doomsday weapons in the hands of irresponsible members of the international community." Operationally, this would mean that if the Security Council determines that a nation's "potential nuclear weapons capability constitutes a threat to or breach of the peace, it may authorize a member state or group of states to take coercive arms control measures against the former in order to restore international peace and stability."[3]

There are several serious problems with a strategy of coercive non-proliferation. In its milder incarnation, the approach shares most of the defects and limitations of the status quo plus policy. Although more intrusive IAEA inspections may seem to be a worthwhile idea in the abstract, the regimes that would support unimpeded inspections are not likely to be the ones pursuing clandestine nuclear weapons programs in the first place. At the very least, inducing recalcitrant governments to consent would require the imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions, which have seldom been effective.

That reality inevitably leads most proponents of coercive non-proliferation back to the ultimate coercive mechanism: military force. Unfortunately, the use of military force has some serious drawbacks. One of the most basic difficulties occurs if attacks are made on operating reactors. Such attacks could easily produce a major leak of radiation that would pose a danger not only for citizens in the target country, but for people in neighboring states. One expert, Bennett Ramberg of UCLA's Center for International and Security Affairs, fears such a strategy could someday produce a level of contamination greater than that of the Chernobyl accident.

There are other dangers and problems. One of the lessons learned by would-be nuclear-weapons states from the successful Israeli raid on the Osirak reactor was the need to make their programs as clandestine as possible. The Osirak facility had been duly registered with the IAEA, was complying with the inspection requirements of that agency, and was widely known in the international community. Conversely, Iraq's post–1981

[2]Quoted in "Raising the Pressure on North Korea," *Chicago Tribune*, editorial, November 26, 1991.

[3]"Proliferation of Unconventional Weapons: The Case for Coercive Arms Control," *Comparative Strategy* (Fall 1991).

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program was secretive and involved the creation of several underground facilities. Even with the vaunted intelligence capabilities of the United States, most of those facilities were not discovered during Operation Desert Storm. Other nations, including North Korea, have apparently adopted the Iraqi techniques of hiding some of their installations underground.

Those concealment techniques create a serious difficulty for any strategy of preemptive strikes. Nations conducting such strikes could never be certain that they had even discovered, much less destroyed, all of the pertinent facilities—unless they were prepared to invade and occupy the offending country. Moreover, the nation that had been attacked would have every incentive to seek revenge. Bombing North Korea's nuclear facilities, for example, could easily trigger a general war on that heavily armed peninsula.

Even if a target regime does not resort to overt military action, there is always the possibility of a terrorist reprisal. Proponents of the April 1986 air attacks on Libya believed that those attacks had intimidated Qadaffi and quelled Libyan-sponsored terrorism. U.S. officials persisted in that illusion until the autumn of 1991 when evidence pointed to the involvement of two high ranking officials of Libya's intelligence service in the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988. If that evidence is accurate, Libya exacted a fierce revenge for the 1986 attacks, even though it waited nearly three years to do so.

Finally, coercive non-proliferation would present significant political problems. For example, how is it to be determined whether a nation seeking to build a nuclear arsenal is an "irresponsible member" of the international community? There might be some easy cases: North Korea's incumbent regime, for example, not only started the Korean War but has a long record of engaging in or sponsoring terrorist incidents. Most cases will be far more ambiguous, however. Would Saddam Hussein have fit the "irresponsible" description prior to August 2, 1990? If so, one would have to explain the support he had been receiving throughout the 1980s from a host of "respectable" nations—including the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the eventual victim of his invasion, Kuwait. Deciding whether Iran warrants the "irresponsible" label might be equally dicey. Its record under the Ayatollah Khomeini was highly unsavory, but the current regime has (supposedly) pursued a more responsible course. Would a government be accountable for the aggressive acts of its predecessors, and if so, what would be the statute of limitations? There are some in the international community who would maintain that Germany and Japan must not acquire nuclear weapons because of the actions of their fascist governments in the 1930s and 1940s.

The same problems would bedevil attempts to identify "aggressor" states. Whether an arsenal is designed for intimidation or deterrence is frequently in the eye of the beholder, and there can be differences of opinion even about overt military acts. Pakistan might well regard its nuclear weapons program as an indispensable counter to India's; New Delhi undoubtedly views the matter quite differently. By what standard would the United States or the UN Security Council decide whether Islamabad's nuclear ambitions are "aggressive" or "defensive"?

The possibilities for double standards and hidden agendas in a coercive non-proliferation policy are virtually unlimited. If the Security Council arrogates to itself the right to judge these matters, the fact that the five permanent members are also the five openly declared nuclear weapons states is not going to be lost on nations seeking to acquire such weapons. From their perspective it will be the verdict of a kangaroo court, however much the Council might invoke noble sounding principles, and the United States, as the leader of an international program of coercive non-proliferation, would be the principal target of their wrath.

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Adjusting to Proliferation

THERE IS an option for the United States other than clinging to a futile status quo plus policy or adopting the excessively dangerous coercive non-proliferation approach. That option is a strategy of adjusting to the reality of nuclear weapons proliferation and devising ways to insulate America from the most harmful consequences of that trend. A policy of adjustment would require major changes in the forty-seven-year-old U.S. non-proliferation policy. It would not claim to be an ideal policy, merely the best available option given a set of disagreeable choices.

The emergence of a multipolar nuclear weapons environment has several implications for U.S. policy. First, it underscores the need to maintain a credible deterrent despite the demise of the Soviet adversary. That is not to say that the United States cannot make sizable reductions, especially since the CIS seems willing to downsize its deterrent. There is no need to retain the more than 12,000 strategic weapons that were in the U.S. arsenal during the latter stages of the Cold War or even the 4,700 weapons that would still exist if the CIS accepted President Bush's January 1992 arms control proposals.

Nevertheless, there is a limit to the reductions that can be made prudently. An excessively small U.S. arsenal might tempt an aggressive state to assume that it could "take out" such an arsenal with a sufficiently coordinated attack. Even if that assumption proved wrong—as it probably would—that would be small comfort to Americans following a nuclear exchange. There is also a more subtle danger created by excessive reductions. As the U.S. arsenal would become smaller, the *relative* strength of even minor nuclear powers would become greater. For example, although China's arsenal of a few hundred bombs and warheads is markedly inferior to current U.S. capabilities, that would change if the United States cut its arsenal to 1,000 weapons—as suggested by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and others—or to even lower levels. At the very least, it might create the perception of strategic parity between the two states, and such a perception could have unfortunate effects if the United States and China ever became embroiled in a dispute. The U.S. deterrent must remain credible to potential adversaries, and credibility is at least partially a function of size. Given the continued existence of other significant nuclear powers, an arsenal of fewer than 2,000 bombs and warheads might undermine that credibility.

A related feature of deterrence credibility is the survivability of the arsenal. To maximize survivability, reductions in the strategic arsenal should come predominantly from the more vulnerable fleet of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The backbone of the new deterrent should be the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), since most new nuclear weapons states will have even less ability than the Soviet Union did to detect the deployment of such systems in the world's vast oceans. With the demise of the Cold War, there is no compelling need to retain the venerable strategic triad of bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs. Guaranteeing the survivability of the deterrent from threats posed by smaller and less sophisticated nuclear powers is considerably easier than the survival problem familiar during the Cold War. A scaled-down "strategic dyad" consisting of eight or nine Trident missile submarines and a small bomber fleet (fifty or so B1-Bs and B–2s) should be sufficient.

Although maintaining an adequate deterrent will materially reduce the probability of a premeditated attack on U.S. territory, three possible sources of danger would remain. One would be an accidental launch of nuclear weapons, a risk that is likely to mount with the increase in the number of nuclear weapons states. Many of the new nuclear powers will have neither the financial resources nor the technological sophistication to establish the elaborate command and control systems that were developed by the United States and the Soviet Union.

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A second source is the threat posed by the occasional undeterrable leader or regime—the "crazy state" problem. Although there may be a tendency on the part of observers in Western democratic nations to exaggerate the irrationality of ruthless or volatile dictators, the crazy state scenario cannot be ignored—especially in a multipolar nuclear environment.

The third source of danger is a familiar one from the Cold War period: the possibility that a conventional conflict might spiral out of control and, through a series of miscalculations, culminate in a nuclear exchange. The emergence of a multipolar international system increases the probability of disorders and conflicts, and given the proliferation of nuclear weapons, increases the odds that one might breach the nuclear threshold. Although the United States should make every effort to avoid becoming a party to such conflicts, it cannot be certain that it will never become a target of a belligerent.

For all of those reasons, it is essential for the United States to augment a credible deterrent with effective air and missile defenses. That is the second adjustment that U.S. policy should make to the reality of nuclear weapons proliferation. The development of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system does not necessarily require the creation of President Ronald Reagan's ambitious Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Even a "thin layer" ABM system could offer crucial protection in the case of an accidental launch of a few dozen missiles. The same would be true of a deliberate attack by a new nuclear power possessing a limited arsenal.

It is true, as some critics have argued, that there is little danger that any Third World state will have ICBMs by the end of this decade. The apparent goal of most existing programs appears to be confined to the development of short- or medium-range missiles capable of reaching regional adversaries. Therefore, ABM opponents contend, the United States should delay efforts to build a defensive shield until a credible ICBM threat to U.S. territory emerges.[4]

Their conclusion is dangerously naive. First of all, it ignores the problem of an accidental launch of existing Commonwealth ICBMs. Moreover, it is not all that large a technological leap from developing short-range missiles to having an ICBM capability. None of the emerging nuclear states may have ICBM fleets by the end of the 1990s, but one cannot be as sanguine about the following decade. With even a single ABM installation taking at least four years to become operational, building a nationwide system would take considerably longer. We cannot wait until hostile powers have fully operational ICBMs to build adequate defenses.

The other principal objection raised by critics—that ABM systems offer no protection against alternative delivery methods that enemy governments or terrorist movements might use—is also unconvincing. True, hostile forces might find other means of delivering nuclear weapons—small aircraft or smuggling in "satchel bombs"—but the crucial difference is the magnitude of the potential damage. Even an imperfect shield would protect the vast majority of American population centers from a devastating attack—and from nuclear blackmail.

A third policy adjustment to the reality of nuclear proliferation should be the exercise of far greater caution about involving the United States in disputes that are not essential to America's own vital security interests. The most important step would be to abandon the doctrine of extended deterrence. Without the threat posed by a would-be global hegemon, it is difficult to imagine what interest could be important enough for the United States to risk the consequences of a nuclear war to defend NATO member Turkey

[4]See, for example, David C. Morrison, "Where's the Threat?" *National Journal* (October 26, 1991); "A Meaningful SDI Mission," editorial, *Boston Globe* (November 2, 1991); and Matt Hansen, "Sounding Taps for Star Wars and the Stealth Bomber," *Defense Monitor*, vol. 20, no. 5 (Washington: Center for Defense Information, 1991).

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from a nuclear-armed Iran or to defend South Korea from a nuclearized North Korea. It might be unpleasant to watch such expansionist regional powers prevail, but the stakes are much lower than was the case during the Cold War. Extended deterrence is a superpower status symbol that the United States can no longer afford.

Beyond that, the looming reality of nuclear proliferation makes it imperative that Washington exercise greater caution about meddling in regional quarrels. Such promiscuous intervention is unwise even against adversaries armed with conventional weapons. It is utterly reckless when one or more parties is armed with nuclear weapons. That level of risk should never be undertaken unless a vital American interest is in imminent jeopardy.

The final adjustment to the reality of proliferation is to change the focus of Washington's non-proliferation policy, substituting discrimination for uniformity of treatment. U.S. policy-makers must rid themselves of the attitude that all instances and forms of proliferation are equally bad. It ought to make a substantial difference to Americans whether nuclear weapons are acquired by a stable, democratic state or by an unstable or brutal anti-American dictatorship. The provisions of the NPT allow for no such distinction. Moreover, U.S. proponents of the NPT frequently have seemed *more* determined to prevent such nations as Japan or Germany from developing nuclear weapons.

THOSE PRIORITIES must change. It is not that Washington should encourage its major Western European and East Asian allies to develop their own arsenals. Encouragement would probably be superfluous in any case. A decision by the United States to abandon the doctrine of extended deterrence would impel each of those nations to reassess its policy toward nuclear weapons in light of its own circumstances and security requirements. Some might decide to take the risk of remaining non-nuclear in an increasingly nuclear world or conclude that they can neutralize the danger through sufficiently sophisticated conventional weapons. (The U.S. performance in Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that a considerable amount of damage can be inflicted on the infrastructure of an adversary with such weapons.) Most beneficiaries of the U.S. nuclear umbrella throughout the Cold War, however, would likely conclude that they now need independent deterrents. What is required from Washington is not overt encouragement, but merely an acceptance of that change.

The United States needs to move beyond the "one size fits all" philosophy symbolized by the NPT. Indeed, Washington should decline to support an extension of the NPT when it comes up for renewal in 1995. To the extent that the United States continues to pursue a non-proliferation strategy, it should concentrate instead on making it difficult for aggressive or unstable regimes to acquire the technology and fissionable material needed to become nuclear powers. U.S. policy-makers must adopt a realistic attitude about the limitations of even that more tightly focused non-proliferation policy; at best, U.S. actions will only delay, not prevent, such states from joining the nuclear weapons club.

But delay can provide important benefits. It may give the United States time to develop adequate strategic defenses and give the other Western nations time to build their own deterrents and/or strategic defense systems. A delay of only a few years may significantly reduce the likelihood that an aggressive power with a new nuclear weapons capability will have a regional nuclear monopoly and be able to blackmail non-nuclear states. In some cases, the knowledge that the achievement of regional nuclear hegemony is impossible may even discourage a would-be expansionist power from making the effort. At the very least, it could cause such a power to configure its new arsenal purely for deterrence rather than design it to intimidate neighboring countries for political gain.

There are other steps the United States

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can take to limit some of the harmful effects of proliferation. One worrisome prospect is that many of the new nuclear states will lack the financial resources or the technical expertise to establish reliable command and control systems, or to guard their arsenals from theft, terrorism, or accidental or unauthorized launch. An equally serious danger is that some of those nuclear powers may fail to develop coherent strategic doctrines that communicate to adversaries the circumstances in which the aggrieved party might use nuclear weapons.

Washington can help minimize such problems by disseminating command and control technology and assisting in the creation of crisis management hotlines and other confidence-building measures among emerging nuclear powers. The United States can also encourage potential adversaries to engage in strategic dialogues to delineate the kinds of provocations that might cause them to contemplate using nuclear weapons and outline the doctrines that would govern their use. At the very least, such a dialogue would modestly reduce the chances of a nuclear conflict erupting because of miscalculation or misunderstanding.

A policy of adjusting to proliferation is not a panacea. It is, however, superior to the status quo plus policy—an ostrich-like response based on the assumption that proliferation can be prevented indefinitely and that all forms of proliferation are equally undesirable from the standpoint of U.S. security interests. It is also superior to the dangerous and provocative alternative of coercive nonproliferation. Because the United States cannot prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, a strategy of adjustment offers the most prudent method of defending the American people from its consequences.□

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Charles M. Sherover

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Pork in Israel

Steven Plaut

POLICY DISCUSSIONS in the American media and the State Department regarding Israel and the prospects for peace in the Middle East generally focus on Israel's settlements as *the* obstacle to peace and security. Indeed, it often seems as if the settlement issue is the single area of internal Israeli policy-making in which the Bush administration has any interest. In the negotiations over aid and loan guarantees, settlement policy has overshadowed all discussions, with little if any attention to other areas of Israeli public policy.

This fixation is unfortunate for many reasons, not least of which is that it draws attention away from other problematic aspects of Israeli public policy. Of these, there is one troublesome area that—unlike settlements—is truly a major obstacle to security for Israel and that may really make peace prospects more remote: the area of economic policy.

Israel's economic policy is first and foremost responsible for the economic inefficiency and stagnation of the country. But, in addition, there are political and strategic implications to having a weak economy. A stagnant economy may ultimately produce military weakness, and in Israel's case military weakness would quickly lead to instability and war.

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There are only two ways to finance the expansion of military power in a country. The first is to enlarge the slice of the GNP that goes to defense. Increased defense spending will then, of course, come at the expense of other uses for resources. The second method involves maintaining a constant proportion of GNP for defense, while concentrating on ensuring a substantial increase of the national product—in terms of the familiar old metaphor, a bigger slice of an unchanging pie or a constant slice of a growing pie.

Of the two, the second is the preferable method, at least in the long run. Indeed, it is the main method by which the United States has maintained its superpower status in the post-World War II era. In the pre-perestroika Soviet Union, military expenditure was financed largely by the first method, expanding at the expense of private and civilian consumption in a stagnant economy.

There is a limit beyond which the first method simply does not work. If the total economic pie is not growing, the slice for the military simply cannot continue to expand indefinitely. Long before the entire pie has been militarized, political constraints will halt the enlargement of the military's slice. In a zero-sum game, depressing civilian consumption (meaning people's standard of living) below certain limits will result in political and social unrest and popular opposition to the military.

Under the second method of financing

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defense, a growing pie can feed all mouths. The military may be strengthened at the same time as living standards are rising. The dynamics of the process are complex and sometimes surprising. For example, growth requires substantial capital investment, and in some circumstances, the best way to expand the power of the military in the long run will be to cut military expenses in the short run, in order to transfer resources to capital investment.

The reductions in military spending in Israel in recent years might have been used in this way to strengthen the country strategically in the long run, had they been used to finance growth. Unfortunately, they did not finance growth, but rather expansion in private consumption and the bloated public sector.

Stagnation: Consequences and Causes

ISRAEL'S PROBLEM—at once economic and strategic—is that its economy has grown very little over the past twenty years. The stagnation is continuing with no signs of relief. To be more precise, virtually all the economic growth that *has* occurred has been due to a growing population. Productivity, as measured by real output per worker or similar measures, has changed little since 1972, growing at an average of about 1 percent per year for two decades. Nineteen-ninety and 1991 were typical years: GNP grew for Israel, but it was due entirely to the immigration-fed rise in population. Output per worker actually fell in 1990 and 1991.

The lack of growth in Israeli productivity has placed limits and pressures on military expenditure, which in fact has been reduced continuously in real terms for several years. This is in sharp contrast with the economic facts of life in the Arab world. While economic policy in the Arab world is hardly the object of veneration, the Arabs are blessed with petrodollars, and these oil revenues have been feeding an ever-growing military machine. Ironically, the collapse of communism may have even accelerated the process, as the Arab countries have gone on a buying binge for military hardware among ex-Communist bloc countries.

The contrasting pictures of the Arab world, with constantly growing stocks of military hardware, and Israel, with a military suffering from economically imposed growth constraints, bodes ill. It implies geostrategic and political dangers. Arabs can read the clock as well as others, and can extrapolate the implications of growing Arab might relative to an economically stagnant Israel. If time is working in favor of Arab military might, there is less motivation to negotiate a settlement today. One view of the collapse of communism has been that the 1980s growth spurt in America convinced the Kremlin of the futility of its attempts to win the arms race. No such conflict-ending economic spurt has occurred in Israel.

The strategic implications of weak Israeli economic performance have been viewed with equanimity both within Israel and the United States. The quantitative growth of the Arab military vs. the Israeli has been belittled on grounds of the qualitative superiority of the Israeli Defense Forces. The problem with this view is that there are ample precedents of quantitative strength overwhelming and overpowering qualitative superiority in manpower and equipment. The American Civil War is one example that comes quickly to mind, when the economic power of the North tipped the scales and won the war, despite a variety of military weaknesses in Union forces and the South's superior military culture. Economic might and the quantitative advantages it confers were surely an important, and perhaps a decisive, factor in both World Wars.

Hence economic growth is important for Israel for strategic reasons as well as social ones. Outside the corridors of the State Department, it is now well understood that stability in the Arab-Israeli balance is derived from the credible deterrence capability of Israeli military power, whereas instability and wars derive from Arab perceptions of

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Israel's strategic weakness. Israel's economic stagnation thus creates dangerous political conditions, especially in the long run.

This being so, it is strange that, to date, American policy toward Israel, including aid and loan policy, has largely ignored Israel's internal economic policy. Among the reasons for this are the settlements fixation and a reluctance to "interfere" in internal Israeli affairs in all other respects.

This indifference to economic performance is somewhat surprising, given the shift in American policy with regard to foreign aid in general. Traditionally, American aid policy was based on grants and favors for countries of which America approved, either because they were very poor or because they were politically friendly and strategically important. Over the past decade or so, policy has shifted toward allotting aid as a reward for responsible economic policy. This shift is apparent not only in the allocation of direct U.S. aid, but also with respect to trade concessions. The new principle also guides much of aid granted through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Sometimes the new aid strategy is referred to as "conditionality," because aid to a country is conditioned on a set of "proper" economic policies. In some cases, the aid is restricted so that it must go to the private sectors in recipient countries and not to the public sectors.

This shift to "conditionality," however, has not been complete. The two main recipients of U.S. aid are Israel and Egypt, and in their cases it is still political considerations that are decisive. As an embattled democracy defending its existence against aggression, Israel is perhaps more deserving of aid than any other nation according to the earlier criterion. But neither Israel nor Egypt could hope to qualify on the basis of responsible economic policy.

In Israel, an irresponsible economic policy is the main cause of the stagnation that has lasted now for two decades. This is not to deny that Israel has lots of genuine difficulties to contend with, the main ones being the necessity of maintaining a large military and a dearth of natural resources. But neither of these can explain the stagnation.

While the Israeli military burden is quite heavy, part of it is offset by aid. The military burden net of aid is still large as a percentage of GNP, but it is not completely out of line with levels in some other Western countries which maintain large defense structures. (There is controversy as to how large it really is because of measurement difficulties.) The economic importance of abundant natural resources is now recognized as minimal, with many examples of countries whose economies continue to grow rapidly in spite of their absence—Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan come readily to mind. Actually, Israel is more than adequately blessed in the one "natural resource" that has clearly become the most important for economic development—"human capital," an educated and skilled labor force.

Politicism

THE ISRAELI economy has been stagnant for two decades because economic policy is designed to keep it stagnant. Economic policy in Israel is difficult to understand and describe because there are really no comparable sets of policies anywhere else. Outsiders frequently describe Israeli economics as "socialist," but this is highly misleading. Israel's economic policies are not socialist in either the old Soviet central-command structure sense or the Scandinavian social-democratic sense in which a relatively free market coexists with high taxes and a large welfare state. A Scandinavian-style cradle-to-grave welfare state is only a small part of Israel's economic problem.

Rather, Israeli economic policy might best be described as "politicism," with resources being allocated and prices determined through an extremely complex *political* process. This "politicism" might best be understood in terms of the "economic democracy" proposals that arise occasionally on the left, according to which voters and politicians are to be granted direct say in all corporate decisions.

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Indeed, Israel serves as a clear illustration of why such proposals for "economic democracy" cannot work.

The process involves the political interplay of competing special interest groups and competing agencies within the government sector. These engage in lobbying, negotiations, threats, exchanges of favors, bargaining, political deals, etc. The result determines allocation of resources, including land, water, and capital, as well as political "resources" such as production licenses, marketing permits, and construction contracts.

NOW PORK barrel politics is not unknown in other democratic countries, but the difference is one of degree. The number of markets and economic decisions that is subordinated to pork barrel politics in Israel is without precedent in the democratic world. This difference of degree reflects the nature of Israeli politics. In the Western world, the political realm is limited, with broad areas of life remaining outside its reach. People may live their lives while having few dealings with the political elite or political system, if they so choose. In totalitarian countries, by contrast, virtually everything in life is political, by definition.

Israel represents a unique hybrid, combining rigorous democracy with a system in which virtually everything is considered "political." There is no other place on earth where there are hospitals, sports teams, health insurance funds, synagogues, schools, farms, contractors, banks, labor unions, newspapers, and scout troops with distinct political party affiliations. Unlike the single-party totalitarian world, in Israel the politicization is through competing parties who run for election, and so is democratic. But it is a democratic system that is also extremely centralized, with little diffusion of power and few checks and balances.

The universal politicization and extreme centralization extend into the economy, where political negotiating to a large extent replaces market processes. Consider the price of eggs. It is set neither by the competitive interplay of supply and demand nor by central command. Rather, it is set in complex negotiations between the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture, organizations of growers, and other interest groups, which swap favors and trade off services within a negotiated agreement. One among the many parameters of the emerging equilibrium is the price of eggs. Others may be special subsidies, tax treatment, production licensing, water allotments, and political favors performed by the growers. Many other markets work in the same way.

The processes of negotiation are complex. They encompass not only commodities, but also the bulk of the labor force, for whom wages are established through agreements in trilateral negotiations among the unions, the employer's association, and the government. The work force is almost completely unionized and the *Histadrut* labor federation is an important player in the political game. The *Histadrut* is also itself a major employer and owner of capital, and has a clear Labor Party affiliation. Some unions and professional organizations have affiliations with other parties—the taxi drivers seem to be solidly *Likud*. Political negotiations also encompass the bulk of industry, all of agriculture, and many service sectors as well.

Among the factors upon which the negotiations focus are allotment of investment capital, much of which is controlled by the government; allotment of land and water, almost all of which is nationalized; special licenses; contracts; and protection against competition. Virtually all public savings, including the bulk of bank account savings and nearly all the savings in pension funds and insurance companies, are "invested" with the government. Much of the country's industrial investment then comes from funds "returned" to the private sector by the government, but subjected to the rules of the political game. Israel has been notoriously ineffectual in attracting large amounts of overseas investment, in spite of the great attractiveness of its talented labor force. The main reason is probably the inability of for-

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eigners to understand and play the unique Israeli political game.

Economic policy in Israel consists of pork barrel politics run amok. The politicization of the economy is open and visible, and every interest group participates. The inevitable result is economic inefficiency. There are many reasons for this. First, profit in Israel is the reward for the effective bargainer in the political process, not necessarily the efficient producer. Businesses make profits not by satisfying customers or through innovative ideas, but through effective lobbying and "rent-seeking."

Second, one of the most common favors granted interest groups is protection against competition. Whereas most countries have rigorous anti-trust policies and powerful enforcement agencies, economic policy in Israel is decidedly pro-trust. Most of the economy consists of sectors in which cartels and monopolies operate, created by or functioning with the blessings and enforcement of the government. It is difficult to find sectors in which unabridged competition operates.

The main job of the official for business constraints in the Ministry of Trade and Industry is to create monopolies and cartels. The inspector of insurance maintains the insurance company cartel. The Ministry of Agriculture suppresses competition in farming. Virtually all agriculture is subordinated to producer, wholesale, retail, and export cartels. These cartels control virtually all unprocessed food in Israel, including—ironically—milk and honey. Production, marketing, export quotas, and water and land allotments are distributed as patronage; they are never auctioned.

Third, prohibition and restriction of competition goes beyond domestic cartelization. Israeli commercial policy is the most protectionist in the democratic world. Israel has always had high tariff walls accompanied by even higher non-tariff barriers. These protect inefficient domestic producers. Among the rationalizations for this are the tired old "dumping" and "infant-industry" tunes heard in some other countries, even though some of the "infants" are now fifty years old. Harmful economic ideas found in other countries almost always find their way into Israel, whereas sensible economic policy rarely does.

That Israel has been able to maintain these enormous impediments to trade in spite of having signed many international trade liberalization agreements is itself a major political "accomplishment" for Israel's policymakers, but is also due to the smallness of the Israeli economy. Any other country would be subject to international trade sanctions for even a handful of the import restrictions and export manipulations that Israel maintains.

Protection and "Encouragement"

SOME OF these devices are quite imaginative. They include an "exchange-rate" insurance program that is really a gigantic export-subsidy, hidden and hard-to-understand taxes on imports, and import protectionism through the granting of monopolistic importing licenses. In addition, the main function of the Israel Standards Institute, whose *raison d'être* is supposed to be consumer protection, has been the imaginative designing of standards in order to prevent competition from imported goods. None of this has prevented Israel from achieving one-sided trade liberalization agreements, by which Israeli exports enter other countries freely while imports to Israel are restricted. The Israeli government is smugly self-congratulatory about such achievements, but the main victims are—as usual—Israeli consumers.

Protectionism reinforces the suppression of domestic competition and the inefficient allocation of resources. In a small country, competition depends on liberalized trade. In sectors whose size permits only a small number of domestic producers to operate efficiently, competition must be "supplied" by imports. European countries may have one or two car producers each, but their automobile markets are extremely competitive because of imports. Trade controls in Israel perpetuate

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the powers of domestic cartels and monopolies. The Israeli economy is more "open" than most, in the sense that a higher portion of its GNP is exchanged through imports and exports. Hence government policy regarding imports and exports has all the more impact on domestic resource allocation—and it is a harmful impact.

Commercial policy, like everything else, is dominated by politics. No two imports are taxed alike in Israel and no two factories enjoy the same degree of protection against imports. No two exporters receive the same subsidies and favors, and no two businesses pay the same taxes. No two farmers pay the same water or land prices. Everything is dominated by negotiations, bargaining, and politics.

"Encouragement" and the granting of government favors overshadows everything and is also the cause of inefficiency. The government has created a system where no business can survive unless it gets "encouragement." In the 1970s, businesses were required to pay taxes on nominal income that translated into real income taxes above 100 percent. Thus no business could survive without favors, including tax exemptions and subsidies. While the tax system has since been reformed, the basic logic of the "encouragement" system and the coerced dependence upon favors survives.

THE GRANTING of government favors acts like a gigantic populist satire, where there is not a single group in the country that does *not* receive them. With each addition to the cornucopia of favors granted, taxes and budgets must rise in order to pay for them, and the economy becomes a bit less efficient. As efficiency declines, the political urge to grant more favors grows, resulting in more inefficiency.

In addition, the government is, in and of itself, a most powerful economic player. It owns dozens of industries. Nationalized industries include most of the energy companies, much manufacturing, all utilities, all public broadcasting, all the universities and academic research institutions, 93 percent of the country's land, and virtually all of the country's water. At the moment, the government also holds most of the stock in four out of the country's five major banks, including the two largest.

Privatization in Israel has been largely an empty slogan, and when it does take place it is itself part and parcel of politicization. In the few cases where industries have been privatized, they have commonly been transferred as political patronage to politically connected businesses or businessmen at prices well below market levels. Government auctions of assets and tenders for contracts are frequently "tailored" to allow them to reward politically connected interests, and political quid pro quo is the name of the game. (A recent law was passed in an attempt to stem the abuses, but its effectiveness is dubious.) In a few cases, businesses were "privatized" and then continued to operate with complete subordination to government control and regulation, the privatization of the phone company, BEZEQ, being the prime example—as someone was quick to point out, a real case of "phoney privatization."

In spite of a rhetorical commitment to privatization on the part of all political parties, progress is pathetic. To give one example, the government has been "studying" how to sell off its holdings of bank shares since the financial crisis of 1983—that is, for more than eight years. By comparison, TREUHAND, the German agency for selling off government holdings of businesses in East Germany following unification, has been selling off companies at the rate of fifty per day.

Privatization and other reforms do not occur because the purpose of economic policy is to maximize political control, or at least political involvement, in every part of the economy. Politicization has been the overriding economic goal of every government Israel has known since independence, regardless of the party in power. Israel has no political tradition of public preference for small government and suspicion toward large government. Government is the solution of first resort for nearly everything.

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While Israel is small, its government is "large" in all senses. The existing regulation of industry makes the policies advocated by the Teddy Kennedy-wing of the Democratic Party look like Chicago-school monetarism. Taxation is high. In fact, regulation itself causes de facto taxation to be even higher, as many of the restrictions on competition and markets affect businesses and consumers like additional taxes. Building regulations and bureaucratic controls over construction resemble those in some of the worst corners of the Third World. The government's budget is enormous, and with rare exceptions is in deficit. The deficits and a propensity for monetary printing have produced periods of hyper-inflation, although since 1986 inflation has been "only" in the upper-teens and low-twenties. The Israeli government is also good at spending its chickens before they are hatched. The 1992 budget included the funding Israel hoped to obtain with U.S. loan guarantees; the money was "spent" and only afterward was it discovered that the guarantees were not forthcoming.

The military pressures and budget difficulties do not prevent the government from engaging regularly in multi-billion dollar boondoggles. In Israel, with its 4.5 million people and GNP per capita at only a fraction of America's, a billion dollars is a lot of money. To give a couple of yardsticks, the budget for importing military hardware and ammunition is about $1 billion a year, and the budget for public schools (not including universities) is about $1.5 billion. Consider, then, the multi-billion dollar populist giveaways that abound. In the early 1980s, the government spent between $5 and $7 billion on rescuing speculators in bank shares from their impending speculative losses, costing Israeli taxpayers about four times as much as the U.S. savings-and-loan bailout, in terms proportionate to GNP. Currently, the government is implementing a multi-billion dollar program of giving away subsidized mortgages to almost everyone. The government has allotted several billion dollars for bailing out farmers from their debts. And in spite of numerous warnings in the press, the next multi-billion-dollar giveaway will inevitably be the bailout of the actuarially insolvent pension funds operated by the *Histadrut*.

The picture is not completely bleak. There have been some forms of progress in the past six or seven years. As noted, inflation has come down from triple digits and stabilized at around 20 percent. Government controls of the capital market have been relaxed somewhat, although residual controls are still without precedent outside the communist world. The budget deficit was low for a while, but is now ominously growing again. Some reforms in agriculture were pushed through by the recent minister of agriculture. And there is talk about some import liberalization and even a bit of progress beyond talk. The bottom line, however, is that real growth in productivity has not occurred.

American Policy

WHERE DOES all this leave American aid policy? Curiously, the American administration has had little, if anything, to say about Israel's economic policies. It is curious because the administration has not hesitated to preach free markets and free trade to every other county in the world and to use aid as a carrot and stick to promote and reinforce responsible economic policies.

It is also curious because the reluctance to intervene in a country's internal affairs has never served as an obstacle to U.S. pressures on Israel regarding settlements. There are many countries in the world that are involved in border disputes of one sort or another, yet U.S. aid has not been used as a pressure tool to affect the location of construction and agriculture in those countries. To mention but one example, U.S. aid to India and Pakistan has never been conditional on their abstaining from building settlements in the disputed Kashmir territories. Now if applying pressure on Israel regarding settlements is considered fair game, why the sudden hesitation to speak out about economics? Especially when Israeli economics has such seri-

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ous implications for long-run Middle East stability? Why should the people of Israel be denied the benefits of such pressures on their government?

Part of the reluctance to link U.S. aid to economic reforms in Israel has been due to the role of aid in offsetting direct military costs resulting from Israel's strategic position. Israel has been the victim of forty-five years of Arab aggression, and democracies under siege deserve aid.

But it is possible to adopt an intermediate position that distinguishes between aid for political/strategic purposes and "aid" for the purposes of promoting development and trade. The former might include cash grants, especially military grants, while the latter might include loans and loan guarantees. It is irresponsible for a government to run up debts when its economy is not growing. The debts have to be repaid someday. The American administration could reasonably argue that aid is aid, but loans are business and require business-like, responsible behavior from the recipient. After all, this is the idea behind "conditionality" in all other aid programs.

Israel's own policy-makers have shown themselves unwilling or unable to produce serious economic reforms. The needs of growth and efficiency have always been subordinated to the political needs of the governing coalitions. Israel's politicians have invariably discovered other "national goals" that required attention more than growth and efficiency, be they equality, employment, immigrant absorption, or defense. The great irony is that growth would have made all these other "national goals" easier to achieve. And one would think that growth itself should be placed permanently at the top of the list of priorities because of the severe strategic dangers that result from its absence.

To the extent that there exist Israeli political leaders who are capable of seeing beyond the next election, they can use all the support they can get in weaning Israel from its anti-productive economic policies. A failure to reform the economy in a radical way will, in the short run, increase Israeli dependence and, in the long run, produce military weakness, strategic dangers, and threats to peace. American aid could serve to nudge the country in the direction of economic health and sanity.□

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Canadian Capers

Conrad Black

DISCERNING overseas visitors to Canada from Anthony Trollope to Malcolm Muggeridge, and prominent Americans from Benjamin Franklin to Edmund Wilson, have long inquired into the rationale of Canada as an entity independent of the United States. So have many Canadians.

Historically, Canada has been a congeries of regions and jurisdictions huddled along the famously unguarded frontier that originally demarcated British and American spheres of influence in North America after the War of 1812. From these prosaic origins Canada has distinguished itself from its neighbor—"an overwhelming contiguity," as Prime Minister Mackenzie King described the United States to General de Gaulle in 1944—in terms no more precise than as having a continuing British connection, a sizeable and sophisticated French presence, and a diffuse fear of the United States.

No state institutions, no overriding Canadian interest have ever existed to bring these different aspects together. Canada did not arise from any heroic revolution or particularly original statesmanship of its own.

The British connection is no longer a nation-building motive but a nostalgic heirloom. The French fact has become much more of a strain on federalism than a supplement to it. Nationalist Quebec's fear of assimilation has given way to a desire for self-assertion, with heavy autonomist or independentist overtones. Simple fear of the United States hardly constitutes a rationale for a country.

As these traditional pillars of its national sense of being have vibrated or crumbled, the Canadian academic, bureaucratic, and journalistic elites have produced the replacement myth that Canada's national identity consists of being a more "compassionate and caring" country than the United States. For which read more socialistic.

It is not clear to me that Canada has much to teach Americans about compassion. We Canadians have many virtues, but self-consciousness makes us a rather envious people, hobbled by a massive social reinsurance policy, a safety net that has become a hammock. This is not generosity. And while American society is comparatively garish and violent, it is not at all ungenerous. Americans are less prone than Canadians to confuse charity, naivety, and political cynicism.

Since Canada has never had any particular homogeneity or clear historical mission, it has had continuous difficulty rousing the heavy dough of its own nature to general enthusiasm for any cause except the World Wars, and the ephemeral political excitement that raised up,

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and later deserted, Prime Ministers Louis St. Laurent (1949), John Diefenbaker (1958), Pierre Trudeau (1968), and Brian Mulroney (1984). Every ten or fifteen years, Canada, like a shy and repressed suitor, prostrates itself at the feet of some improbable new political chieftain, before retreating almost at once into embarrassed but rancorous disillusionment.

The national personality, so little disposed to consensus yet yearning for inspiration or at least a reprieve from tedium, is faithfully reflected in a political system that has tended to one-party rule federally—until recently by the Liberal Party—and an opposition led in reality not by the forgettable sequence of unsuccessful federal opposition leaders, but by the premiers of Ontario, Quebec, and, sometimes, Alberta. This has helped to maintain an almost perpetual condition of acute jurisdictional strain, one that constantly calls the viability of the country's political institutions into question.

Historical Differences

BRITAIN CONFERRED virtual independence on Canada as four provinces voluntarily confederated in 1867, and the British and their English-Canadian protégés abandoned the misconceived official attempt benignly to assimilate French-Canadians. The result was a thicket of concurrent federal and provincial jurisdictions that has become steadily more complicated as the role of government generally has become more ambitious.

Property, civil rights, education, culture, almost all labor legislation and natural resources, and most welfare programs except unemployment insurance, are provincial prerogatives while direct taxation is a shared jurisdiction. Canada started out its autonomous life as probably the most decentralized advanced country in the world, except for Switzerland, and it remains so. It also began with, and retains, a sharp difference between English- and French-Canadian opinions on the political nature of the country. Contrary to widely cherished English-Canadian belief, the French-Canadians were never a conquered people in the sense of being occupied and subdued. Certainly, they were never conquered by the English-Canadians. The British defeated the French at the Battle of Quebec in 1759 and the French ceded their interests in North America to the British at the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763. This had almost nothing to do with English Canada, such as it then was (Halifax and a few other maritime settlements).

In anticipation of impending events in the thirteen colonies, the British conceded French-Canadians their language, the civil law, and the free practice of the Roman-Catholic religion (this more than fifty years before Catholic emancipation in Britain itself). They did so in exchange for New France's loyalty to Britain, rather than to the fractious colonists to the south. The French-Canadians accordingly sent Benjamin Franklin packing from Montreal and repulsed the then-loyal revolutionary Benedict Arnold at the gates of Quebec at the outset of the Revolutionary War.

French-Canadians were faithful to their pledge to the British crown, but when minor insurrections occurred in 1837 in favor of responsible government (elected legislatures) the ultimate response was Lord Durham's Report. This document began with the famous words "Canada is two nations warring in the bosom of a single state" and led to the establishment of the so-called United Province of Canada, avowedly designed to assimilate the French and emancipate them from the perceived handicap of their castaway minority status. This absurd and unworthy project of peacefully eliminating the French fact altogether immediately preceded the Confederation of Canada in 1867.

Opinion was far from unanimous in Quebec about joining Canada at all, but this option was unenthusiastically embraced as the evil least likely to lead to the dreaded assimilation in the so-called "Anglo-Saxon Sea" of North America.

Various guarantees of minority educational and religious rights, which were included in the Act of Confederation (British

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North America Act, 1867), were flagrantly violated in English Canada, as when Ontario reneged on aid to separate schools at the time of the First World War. English-French strains became particularly acute in the World Wars, with the war-time election of 1917 and a referendum on conscription in 1942, both of which revealed deep divisions.

Without any particular affection for France, the mother country which Quebeckers considered had abandoned them in the eighteenth century, French Canada sheltered fretfully in an English-speaking continent, hanging its culture, as the mayor of Montreal memorably explained to a revisiting General de Gaulle in 1967, "on the barn door." In these circumstances, it is little wonder that there have been abrasions between the English- and French-Canadians, with their different conceptions of their participation in Canada and not altogether flattering collective impressions of each other. Where Lord Durham wrote in 1840 of "two nations warring," the late separatist leader René Lévesque wrote of "two scorpions in the same bottle," while the distinguished Montreal author Hugh MacLennan wrote more gently, but hauntingly, of "two solitudes."

To the French, Canada was a compact of equals between two founding races, each autonomous in its own sphere, agreeing, but not indissolubly so, to collaborate in some matters, such as currency. To the English-Canadians, "Quebec is (or should be) a province like the others," as it was put in a controversial federalist truism of nearly forty years ago. Canada, to most of its English-speaking citizens, should be a country like others—that is, one with an adequately endowed central government—and Quebec should have essentially the same powers as the other nine provinces.

The English-Canadians historically looked upon their French-speaking compatriots as primitive, priest-ridden, naturally subordinate, and misbegotten. Many French-Canadians, in turn, long thought of English-Canadians not as a distinct people who had much in common with them, but as an excrescence of Greater Anglo-America. Both these caricatures have evolved, but it is still extremely rare to find a French Quebec nationalist who can conceive of the thought that there is such a person as an English-Canadian who thinks of Canada as he thinks of Quebec.

These are differences of historical perception and collective will that go well beyond any regional divisions that have existed in the United States since the Civil War. It has consequently proven extremely difficult for Canadian leaders to speak simultaneously for the interests of both their English- and French-speaking compatriots.

The Radicalization of Quebec

FOR MOST of its history, French Canada's nationalist leaders have been political conservatives whose attachment to existing political and social institutions provided a natural brake on their spirit of political adventure. With the secularization of education in Quebec in the 1960s and the premature death in 1968 of the province's last outstanding conservative nationalist leader, Premier Daniel Johnson, the nationalist option passed to the moderate left and overt separatists, led by René Lévesque.

Up to that time, Quebec's leading official spokesmen and media outlets had agitated for bilingualism to become reciprocal, instead of the French having to learn English for economic reasons, with virtually no reciprocity on the part of English-Canadians. The change that now followed is to be understood in terms of the interplay between demography, secularization, and politics.

Only 60,000 French-Canadians had been left behind by the retreating French in 1763, but French-Canadians maintained their demographic position by a legendarily prolific birthrate, the famous "revenge of the cradle." This was strenuously encouraged by the powerful Quebec Catholic Church, which provided almost all educational, medical, and social services to French Canada for two centuries. From the early 1960s on, Quebec aggressively outgrew the institution and attitudes that had served it well in the long era

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when the "national" objective was essentially mere cultural survival. The baby was literally thrown out with the bath water and the birthrate collapsed. As almost all immigration to Canada has been from people who believed they were assimilating to an English-speaking continent and not a French enclave, Quebec's and French Canada's percentage of the whole population has been in steady decline for nearly thirty years.

Not wishing, for obvious reasons, to inundate itself with French-speaking immigrants from the Maghreb, Vietnam, and Haiti, the only available hunting grounds, yet alarmed at its shrinking demographic position in Canada, Quebec has had recourse to monstrously illiberal measures. The government of Quebec, as the only French-speaking regime in North America above the municipal level, had long taken unto itself a mission of "national" self-preservation and to that end had applied the notion that collective rights must prevail over individual rights. (The "nation," in Quebec parlance, is more accurately a cultural than a jurisdictional expression, but Canadian political arrangements are so imprecise that they allow plenty of space for squabbling between Ottawa and Quebec in almost every field.) Acting on this dubious concept of collective rights and imperatives, over the last two decades successive Quebec governments have restricted access to the English language public school system, regulated menus and wine lists, and banned bilingual commercial signs under pain of heavy fines and physical removal by the colloquially described "language police." From the mid-1970s Quebec, invoking the ancient and by then completely implausible specter of "assimilation," has been officially hostile to bilingualism, though much of English Canada has officially embraced it. Quebec's political leadership sometimes deliberately confused lack of population growth with a professed menace to cultural vitality, despite French Quebec's flourishing and steadily strengthening culture.

The resulting sequence of obnoxious measures collided with the federal government's policy under Pierre Trudeau (1968–1979, 1980–1984) of promoting French and English minority rights throughout the country, to which English Canada had responded rather generously. Availability of public services in French, state-owned pan-Canadian French television and radio networks, and bilingual labelling throughout the country were generally supported despite their cost and inconvenience, and hundreds of thousands of English-speaking children in English language communities were voluntarily sent to schools with advanced or immersion French programs.

When Quebec followed Trudeau against Lévesque in the independence referendum of 1980 (by 60 percent to 40 percent, or about an even division of French Quebeckers), Trudeau eventually concerted a constitutionally amending formula with the nine premiers, ending the anachronistic recourse to the British Parliament for amendment. Trudeau also gained acceptance for a charter of rights, designed to transfer some of the ancient jurisdictional quarrels to judicial determination of individual rights. Trudeau's charter was only accepted on condition of retention of a "Notwithstanding" clause enabling any provincial legislature to override even a Supreme Court of Canada decision affecting matters of property and civil rights.

In its desperation to establish its relevance to all Canadians, from the 1950s on the federal government steadily conceded more of the concurrent taxing jurisdiction to the provinces (Quebec in particular), and promoted an increasingly complex system of equalization payments between the regions of the country. The constitutional changes of 1982 took this one step further and made Canada the only country in the history of the world to entrench regional economic equality as a constitutional *raison d'être*, as if geography could be repealed, with resources moved to people instead of the other way around.

Meech Lake and After

THE CONSTITUTIONAL changes of 1982 contained all the elements of the present crisis. The Mulroney government negotiated Quebec's adherence

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to a modified constitutional arrangement (the so-called Meech Lake Agreement, which recognized Quebec as a "distinct society"), effectively surrendered nominations of Supreme Court justices to the provinces, and provided a veto for all ten provinces (including Prince Edward Island, population 100,000) over certain key constitutional areas. English Canada continued dutifully to support a policy of conciliation, and Quebec continued to benefit from the transfer and equalization payment schemes to the extent of up to $8 billion annually.

In the midst of the Meech Lake ratification process, Quebec invoked the "Notwithstanding" clause to overturn decisions of three levels of federal courts invalidating Quebec's infamous ban on bilingual commercial signs and restored the ban, gutting its own charter of rights and the manifesto of the governing Quebec Liberal Party as it did so.

Though Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, a distinguished Irish-Quebec labor lawyer, is well qualified to conciliate French- and English-Canadians, he inexplicably failed to reassure English-Canadians that Quebec's sign laws and other oppressive language legislation were defensively motivated. He equally omitted to explain to French-Canadians that English Canada's failure (by a narrow margin and mainly because of a ludicrous filibuster on the part of a back-bench Indian chief in the Manitoba legislature) to ratify Meech Lake was a reaction to Quebec's repressive language legislation and not really a rejection of Quebec's legitimate aspiration for recognition as a "distinct society."

English Canada questioned the wisdom of its tolerant policy and fiscal largesse toward the proverbial French fact. Quebec contemplated the only circumstances in which its longest-serving premier, Maurice Duplessis (1936–1939, 1944–1959), believed secession could be possible—if Quebec were rejected by the English provinces. It was like a failed rendezvous: one party (English Canada) had arrived at the suggested meeting point of bicultural cooperation after the other party (Quebec) had left it.

Quebec has conducted a debate for more than a century and a half between the nationalists and those more influenced by the bourgeois spirit of avarice and material self-interest. French-Canadians are not impressionable Latin Americans swayed by demagogues and plundered by juntas. They are the astute descendants of Norman and Breton peasants who have always known how to protect their interests, play upon their English-speaking compatriots' pan-Canadian ambitions, and stop just short of the rupture of a profitable association. Enflamed and violent central European irredentism finds almost no echo in Canada where, at worst, what the French have suffered is a very gentle English hegemony, and political violence has claimed fewer than ten lives in this century.

HISTORICALLY, the Quebec bourgeoisie has soberly prevailed over the flagwavers. (Duplessis, himself an adept and histrionic Quebec nationalist when it suited him, said the nationalists were "a ten pound fish on a five pound line.") There is not necessarily any reason to expect this historic pattern to change. The current premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa (1970–1976, 1985 to the present), has shown astonishing virtuosity but few convictions in his long career. He claims to be a federalist, but does not qualify by any easily recognizable definition. In 1975 he said in Paris that his goal was "an entirely French, uniquely sovereign Quebec in a Canadian common market." While not a galvanizing or flamboyant leader, he is an astute economist and judge of Quebec political opinion and has recently been making the most anti-separatist noises of his whole public life. Some of what he lacks as a natural leader he makes up for as a reliable barometer, and his current posture may be a good omen for federalists.

The latest federal attempt at accommodating Quebec, an all-party committee of both houses of parliament, has produced a modified Meech Lake proposal with some not altogether successful attempts at colorful patriotic writing. In its usual manner, Quebec

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has declared this effort to be insufficient, without being too specific about what would be sufficient, leaving Ottawa in its accustomed role of negotiating with itself.

The impasse is aggravated by the fact that all three traditional federal parties—Progressive Conservatives, Liberals, and New Democrats—have made what amounts to a Faustian bargain with Quebec, and all are demonstrably prepared to concede almost anything in order to maintain at least the facade of a federal country. The post-Trudeau federal constitutional policy has bordered on a jurisdictional version of the permanent pre-emptive concession.

Quebec is obviously not particularly eager to leave Canada. Only the most overwrought nationalist would deny that it profits from its association with the rest of Canada or that there is some desirability in having an official French status throughout the country. The theory that English Canada is actually exploiting or oppressing Quebec is simply preposterous.

THE PRESENT problem stems from the widespread conviction in Quebec that it can eat its cake and still have it on the table, that it can have, as a prominent Quebec night-club entertainer has been claiming for twenty years, "an independent Quebec in a strong Canada." This painless version of independence retailed to Quebeckers up to now has naturally attracted many adherents. If it were made clear to Quebec in a firm but unantagonistic way that it must choose between permanent settlement based on a slightly more centralizing Meech Lake arrangement and a separation that would mean a reversion of northern Quebec to Canada, full assumption of Quebec's per capita share of the federal public debt (over $100 billion), uncertain trade arrangements with the rest of North America, and the right of any Quebec county that voted to remain in Canada to do so, separatist support would sharply deteriorate.

An additional complication is presented by Canada's native peoples. The present federal budget envisions an annual expenditure of over $12,000 for every designated native man, woman, and child in the country; much of this represents the monetization of traditional guilt and shame for past behavior. But another ingredient in English Canada's burgeoning solicitude for the native people is undoubtedly the havoc they wreak in Quebec, and particularly with Quebec's external reputation. New York's recent cancellation of a long-term purchase of Hydro Quebec's electricity, which followed fierce agitation by native peoples' groups and which imperils a massive northern hydro-electric project, highlights the problem. Many English-Canadians consider the ever-rising demands of the native peoples somewhat reminiscent of the incessant escalation of Quebec's demands on Canada, and are distinctly consolable at Quebec's present discomfiture.

The Free Trade Agreement with the United States facilitates the movement of Canadian manufacturing jobs to the relatively low-cost and strike-free American states. French-Canadian intellectuals, who ignored the concerns of their English-Canadian *bien pensant* allies who feared an American inundation of English Canada's cultural industries and institutions, supported the agreement. This ruptured the long-standing sympathy between the English- and French-Canadian academic and literary communities. English-Canadian intellectuals were horrified and incredulous at the inability of their French-Canadian analogues to appreciate the distinction between English-Canadian and American intellectual tastes and trends. (The Quebeckers are to be excused; those distinctions are subtle, regional rather than national, and much less obvious than the corresponding differences between the cultural traditions of New England, the old South, the Great Plains, and California.)

In an un-Canadian stroke of bad luck, the passage of the Free Trade Agreement and the collapse of Meech Lake were followed in 1990 by the aberrant election of a far-left government in Ontario. In an Allende-like scenario (the winners gained only 37 percent of the vote), this rich, compla-

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cent jurisdiction, petulantly tired of its traditional leading parties and mindlessly elevated a party dedicated to the destruction of the private sector through a usurpation of the equity-holder's interest in favor of unionized employees, and an onerous program of higher taxes and minute regulations. Private sector investment in Ontario has since evaporated, an event of some significance since Ontario provides almost half of Canada's GNP and almost three-quarters of the equalization payments that go to pacify Canada's less advantaged regions, Quebec historically foremost among them. The stick of Ontario's socialist government and the carrot of newly eased movement of secondary industry to the United States under the Free Trade Agreement will sharply reduce Ontario's ability to grease all the squeaking wheels in the Canadian confederation. This will doubtless reduce Quebec's enthusiasm for the confederal arrangements, as Quebec is Canada's noisiest squeaking wheel.

With English-Canadians being as conciliatory to their French-speaking countrymen as they are, and French-Canadians being as canny as they are, it is unlikely that Quebec will actually secede. It is both one of the great strengths and regular frustrations of Canada that it has a distinctive, almost indefinable political methodology that eases it over and helps it muddle through problems. In dealing with earlier threats of Quebec independence, as on other tense occasions, Canada surmounted its problems by a providential combination of interminable good-faith consultation and astute political maneuver, a judicious balance of change and continuity, concessions and firmness. Eventually, by some ineluctable but colorless national genius of patient endurance, crises pass without a volcanic eruption. There is in Canada a natural political talent for compromise, and not only French Canada but the whole country has made a vocation of survival.

This talent is now being put to its severest test. Though the freakish regime in Ontario is almost certainly a one-term phenomenon, Canada's *raison d'être* as an autonomous country, a concept which has been researched with the ardor reserved in medieval times for investigations of alleged apparitions of the Holy Virgin, will remain uncertain. A Canada even more decentralized than it has been, with top tax rates 15 to 20 percent higher than the United States, a cost of living almost 30 percent higher, and a standard of living almost 20 percent lower, could perhaps persevere for a while.

Ultimately, unless English- and French-Canadians believe that they are fortunate to have each other to share a country with, the absence of a rigorous or durable rationale for the country will dissolve the threadbare bonds that still tenuously link the regions.

The Southern Option

EVENTUALLY, and probably soon, Canada will have to make a success of a bicultural country based on mutual respect, and not on linguistic coercion and bank-breaking quantities of inter-regional *Danegeld*. Otherwise it will have to face up to the fact that the post-Cold War task of ensuring that North American, English-speaking, capitalist liberal democracy remains—without jingoism or arrogance—the world's leading political influence, could be best achieved in one country and not two.

These are geopolitical questions far removed from the thoughts of most Canadians. But Canada's natural and human wealth, together with its geographical position, make it an area so strategic that the world will be more than passingly curious to see if concern for universal public-sector medicare, strict gun control, and a few other public policy and folkloric distinctions (which could be accommodated in a fuller embrace with the United States anyway) will suffice to prevent a continentalist political process from succeeding as a sequel to the economic foundation of free trade. It would, of course, have to be a fusion of sorts, as English-Canadians would certainly not accept so humbling a denouement as mere annexation. At a minimum, Canada would have to retain some

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control of immigration to prevent an unbearable influx of America's inner-city welfare cases, seeking to take advantage of Canada's extravagant social programs.

Such a union would have a good deal more strategic importance than the reunification of Germany, as English-Canadians are more numerous and sophisticated, and occupy a larger, richer, and more strategic land mass than the benighted East Germans. Ironically, Canada would exercise more political influence in the world in taking such a step and operating within the American political system than it has enjoyed as a founding member of the British Commonwealth, the United Nations, NATO, and as a G–7 country. This would not, however, be Canada's first choice, and I suspect that Quebec will stop short of taking its nationalist threats all the way to independence, that Ontario's mindless flirtation with flat-earth socialism will be short-lived, and that the entity of Canada will just muddle through once again. It will continue to be a more seemly, tranquil, and peaceable place than the United States, as well as a more envious, derivative, and mediocre one. And it will continue to lose many of its most talented and exceptional people to the United States.

IN THE END, Quebec's desire not to be subsumed into the "English sea" of North America will probably, but barely, be perceived as better served by resisting Canada's incorporation into the United States. Quebec's subtle pursuit of virtual sovereignty, combined with all the benefits of continuing participation in Canada, is balanced by a preference for the continuation of a highly decentralized Canada as a comfortable, civilized, and unwitting *cordon sanitaire* between French Quebec and the United States. In the past, English-Canadians have preserved this fragile balance, but present circumstances are challenging their patience.

The western world is not under military and political threat from Communists; North America is under economic threat from Asia and, to a slight degree, Europe. Most English-Canadians have a far greater affinity for Americans (who have rarely really considered Canadians as foreigners) than for their French-speaking countrymen. And even the glacial unflappability of English Canada has been severely challenged by the outrages of Quebec's language laws and fiscal demands.

The "caring and compassionate" rationale for Canada's national purpose has been exposed as delusional, sanctimonious, and an unsuccessful defiance of elemental fiscal arithmetic. (Public sector borrowing, like tax levels, is at intolerable levels at almost every echelon of government and throughout the country.) A federal government, led by personalities untainted by the failed constitutional policies of the last thirty-five years, could still show Quebec that the rest of Canada has constitutional options preferable to clinging to a federal state reduced by Quebec's jurisdictional privations to a risible transparency. If such a regime were to emerge in Ottawa it could still probably persuade Quebec (and the other regions) to choose constructive federalism over a realistically rugged version of Quebec's secession and federal disintegration.

If this does not happen, any further sliding down the slippery constitutional slope of the last ten years will indeed lead to "renewed federalism," but with Washington, not Quebec. This would be far from a pitiable or even undesirable fate if it were negotiated intelligently, but it is not now the preferred option of most Canadians. At best, if such a momentous course is to be adopted, it should be as a lucid, conscious, determination of the national interest, and not because the other options expire unseen, or are frittered away. Whether deliberately or by misadventure, this is the choice Canada will make in the next few years.□

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Not a Bad Spring

Malcolm Rutherford

BRITAIN HAS just been through the most introverted general election campaign in the country's postwar history. Foreign affairs were scarcely mentioned, not even Britain's relations with the European Community. There was no single dominating domestic issue either. Those who canvassed on the doorsteps reported that people spoke mainly of parochial matters, sometimes as mundane as the direction of local bus routes and the provision of parking places.

Hindsight has it that the election was really about lower taxes under the Conservatives and a redistribution of wealth, financed by higher taxes on the better off, under Labour. The evidence seemed nothing like as clear-cut at the time. There was, however, a lot of underlying talk, which perhaps the commentators underestimated, about who would make the better prime minister: Mr. John Major, the Conservative incumbent, or Mr. Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Labour Party. Mr. Major was generally reckoned to be a decent man who had made it to the top without going to university and without money. Mr. Kinnock, likewise, had no innate advantages of wealth or background, but he was once a firebrand of the left whose conversion to the middle ground of politics was seen (however unfairly) as dubious. Mr. Major is quintessentially English; Mr. Kinnock has never quite lost his Welshness.

A third candidate was Mr. Paddy Ashdown of the Liberal Democrats. Mr. Ashdown's popularity ratings rose as the campaign went on and may have been helped by newspaper revelations that he had had an extra-marital affair with one of his (female) former secretaries. But since the Liberal Democrats were not bidding to form a government, and wanted only to have a say in reforming the political system, his personal standing did not greatly help his party. In the end, the choice came down to whether the country preferred Mr. Kinnock or Mr. Major. An interesting footnote is that Ashdown, Kinnock, and Major are roughly the same age—just one side or the other of fifty.

The result of the election surprised most commentators, and confounded all of those who had based their predictions on the findings of the opinion polls. Throughout the campaign, the polls pointed regularly to a hung Parliament where neither Labour nor the Conservatives would have an overall majority and the balance would be held by the Liberal Democrats and the other smaller parties, the seventeen MPs from Ulster, and a few Scottish and Welsh Nationalists. The only question seemed to be whether, in such a situation, Labour or the Conservatives would hold the larger number of seats. More often than not, the polls suggested Labour.

Yet the polls were wrong. The Conser-

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vatives won the election, if not handsomely, at least comfortably. In a Parliament of 651 seats, they now have a majority of 21 compared to the 100 they achieved in the previous general election in 1987. Provided that they do not quarrel too much among themselves, that should be enough to keep them in power until they call the next election, the latest possible date being spring 1997.

THE CONSERVATIVES may even be secure well beyond that date, for political geography is in their favor. In the next year or two the constituency boundaries will be redrawn. That cannot fail to mean more MPs—after the next election—from suburban and rural constituencies, and fewer from the inner cities where the population is declining. A rough rule of thumb is that inner cities vote Labour; suburbs vote Conservative, and occasionally Liberal Democrat in order to give the Conservatives a shock.

There is another Conservative asset. The party's share of the vote in the general election this year was under 43 per cent, almost the same as in the previous elections in 1987 and 1983, and only slightly below what Mrs. Thatcher had achieved when she first became prime minister in 1979. It is nothing like an overall majority of the votes cast, but so long as the opposition parties continue to fight each other as much as they fight the Conservatives, and the British electoral system remains unchanged, the Conservatives have the advantage. Mr. Major's party has every interest in keeping the system intact.

In theory, the opposition parties can respond by getting together and forming one single group called (for example) the Democrats, but there is no sign of that happening. In the aftermath of the election, the immediate political news was not about what the Conservatives would do with their fourth successive victory, but rather about how the Labour Party would respond to its fourth successive defeat. Mr. Kinnock resigned as leader, having spend nine years modernizing his army. By the time of the 1992 election, Labour was firmly pro-Europe, pro-NATO, opposed to unilateral disarmament, and no longer advocating any extension of state ownership of industry or commerce. Yet it still won only 35 percent of the vote.

It is unlikely that any successor to Mr. Kinnock will seek to move the party back to the left, but it may be wondered whether it has sufficient of a core vote ever again to win a general election. The trade unions generally stayed quiet during the election campaign in the expectation of a Labour victory. On the news of the defeat, however, union leaders busily engaged in helping to pick the new party leader. That was not entirely their fault—Labour Party rules give the unions a 40 percent say in the leadership ballot, just as the party relies heavily on the unions for the bulk of its finance. Some union leaders think that this is an embarrassing anachronism; on the other hand, not much is being done to change it.

From Mr. Ashdown not much has been heard. He campaigned for the electoral system of first-past-the-post to be replaced by one of proportional representation. His party won 18 percent of the vote, but obtained only 20 seats, and lost most of its by-election gains in the previous Parliament. On the face of it, this disparity between the share of the votes and the winning of seats seems manifestly unfair, but the British seem to be getting used to it. In the past the Liberals have won nearly 20 percent of the vote and had even fewer seats. The great attempt at political realignment took place in the 1980s when a number of prominent MPs, including Dr. David Owen and Mrs. Shirley Williams, left the Labour Party to form the Social Democrats. In alliance with the Liberals they won over 25 percent of the vote in 1983, but only 23 seats between them. After a similar experience in 1987, the alliance broke up in a flood of mutual recriminations. The Liberal Democrats are what is left of the old Liberals and the old alliance, and one is tempted to think that political realignment in Britain is now a dead duck. The alliance failed to take the opportunity to hit the Labour Party when it

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was down and nearly out in the early 1980s, and the Labour Party partially revived. The Conservatives are the beneficiaries. Even those who complain, like the *Guardian* newspaper, that Britain has become subject, like Japan, to one-party rule, do not seem to say so with a great deal of passion. That is the way it is.

Now that the election is out of the way, the prospects for the country look suddenly much better than a few months ago. Britain was the first of the major economies to enter into recession; it is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that it will be one of the first to come out. The City of London and industry now have political stability, defined as a Conservative government likely to last, which is what they said they wanted. The City, incidentally, made a much better forecast of the election result than the opinion polls; so did the book-makers. In the last few days of the campaign, money poured into the stock market and City men bet heavily on a Conservative victory.

There has also been a curious reversal of political fortunes in Europe. As recently as last December, Mr. Major's government seemed the odd man out in the European Community. In the negotiations for the Treaty of Maastricht, Britain refused to give a 100 percent commitment either to economic and monetary union or to the "social chapter," which covers such matters as conditions of employment and working hours throughout the EC. Six months, however, is a long time in politics. In the interim, President Mitterrand of France has looked increasingly like a man whose hold on power has become tenuous. Chancellor Kohl has run into all sorts of trouble in Germany, and in April Italy found itself not only without a prime minister but also without a president. Britain, by contrast, looked like an island of tranquility.

Thus Mr. Major may now be the most secure head of government in Europe. If he wants to be slightly wounding, he can say that he has become so by resisting the proportional representation that has led to political instabilities elsewhere. Moreover, he must be one of the few political leaders anywhere to have fought an election during a severe recession and while still disinflating the economy—and won. The prize for that could be large.

Yet we should not get carried away. Mr. Major and his party have seen off the opposition, but precisely because the election was so introverted, some of the underlying problems facing the country were overlooked. It was said during the campaign that if Labour won, public expenditure would be in danger of getting out of hand. It was noted less often that even under Mr. Major government borrowing had already begun sharply to rise. One of the main tenets of Thatcherism was to keep public spending firmly under control. Once Thatcher was voted out of office by Conservative MPs in 1990, however, some of the discipline departed. In the budget just before the election, Mr. Norman Lamont, the chancellor of the exchequer, forecast a public sector borrowing requirement for 1992/93 of 4 1/2 percent of gross domestic product. In the last few years of Mrs. Thatcher's premiership, the exchequer had been making net debt repayments.

THERE IS further constraint. Just before she lost the leadership, Mrs. Thatcher agreed against her own instincts to take sterling into the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System. She had always said that she would do so "when the time was ripe." It is arguable that the time in autumn 1990 was manifestly wrong. The British economy was already in recession and the pound joined the ERM at the existing rate against the deutschemark—that is, without a devaluation. At first, British interest rates came down in a series of small steps from 15 percent to 10.5 percent. Yet because German interest rates are also high, it has proved difficult for Britain to come down any further despite a reduction in inflation to around 4 percent: hence the widespread saying that British economic policy is now made in Frankfurt, the seat of the German central bank.

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The exchange rate question was not much discussed in front of the electorate, partly because there is a British tradition to keep quiet about it in public and partly because the Labour Party had become just as orthodox as the Government about adherence to the ERM. But it was, and remains, a potent issue in the background, as indeed does the whole subject of Britain's relations with the European Community.

Future battles about the place of Britain in Europe will be fought largely within the Conservative Party. Mr. Major said in one of his first speeches as prime minister, delivered in Bad Godesberg, that the heart of Europe is where Britain belongs. Subsequent words and actions suggest that it is not a very integrated Europe that he has in mind. In the run-up to the Maastricht summit meeting, the British fought hard—and successfully—to have the word "federal" removed from the draft treaty. That may have been a Pyrrhic victory, however, since the Treaty of Maastricht, like the Treaty of Rome before it, is about increasing European integration whether the f-word is used or not. There is also a genuine semantic difficulty. To continental Europeans, "federal" tends to imply a fairly loose association; to the British it is the thin end of the wedge that will lead to a loss of national sovereignty.

THE MAASTRICHT Treaty has still to be ratified by member states. In Britain this spring, the hope among Mr. Major's party is that continental enthusiasm for a more integrated Europe will begin to wane. If it does, Mr. Major will have landed on his feet as the man who resisted the Franco-German drive to ever-closer union. If it does not, the debate about Britain and Europe—the longest running saga of British post-war politics—will break out again with renewed fury.

Mrs. Thatcher will be watching closely from her new seat in the House of Lords. She is one of the arch anti-federalists and, as on the control of public expenditure, she sees herself as the keeper of the party's conscience. No doubt her influence will decline as time goes by; at present she remains a force to be reckoned with.

Some other questions were touched on only by intellectuals and mavericks during the election campaign. Yet even British intellectuals are not always wrong: the thinking classes may be right in identifying the lack of constitutional reform as one of the weaknesses of the Thatcher years. The great paradox of Mrs. Thatcher as prime minister was that while she sought to decentralize power, she ended up by centralizing it. As the local authorities resisted her calls for reform, and in particular objected to limits on spending, more and more power was taken into central government's hands. Indeed one of the principal reasons for her overthrow by a rebellious party was her abolition of the domestic rates—a tax on property—and their replacement by a community charge, or "poll tax," which fell on all citizens beyond the age of eighteen, whether property-owners or not. Mr. Major promptly abolished the poll tax, but it remains to be seen whether a satisfactory way can be found of combining local taxation and local autonomy.

To add to the paradox, while power was seeping away from the local authorities to Westminster, at the national level it was moving from Westminster to Brussels. This question was never debated in the election campaign, but it is the underlying frustration of British politics. Scotland illustrates the problem in an extreme, but perhaps soluble, form. According to repeated opinion polls, about 75 percent of the Scottish electorate want some form of devolution, which would mean their own Parliament or Assembly with tax-raising powers to go with it. Mr. Major has been adamantly opposed so far, but might yield. Scotland has a population of about five million and a sense of national identity. Limited devolution there might work; on the other hand, it might lead to a demand for complete independence. That is a risk that may have to be taken. Yet the devolution of power in England is far harder to devise, for the English do not fall into

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easily identifiable regions; everything overlaps, and in any devolved system the South East—the area in and around London, accounting for one-fifth of the English—would tend to be dominant. British governments have approached these questions before; there has never been agreement on the answer.

ALL THOSE may seem local issues: they are what politics is about. Mr. Major has said that he wants to preside over a country "at ease with itself." If economic growth resumes as it should, he may do well for a while. The relief of emerging from a recession will be palpable. In the second half of 1992, Britain will have the presidency of the European Community. There could be no better opportunity for the prime minister to show off his country's stability and maturity to his continental partners.

Do not overlook, however, the capacity of even governments with a secure majority to run into local difficulties. The Thatcher governments of 1983 and 1987 got into terrible messes, and in the end survived largely because the opposition was divided. Britain is a very lucky country, and the Conservatives a very lucky party. North Sea oil and gas turned up in the nick of time to help tide the economy through the 1980s and 1990s. Britain is one of the few constitutional monarchies and one of the even fewer nuclear powers; it is the only country to combine the two. Anomalies persist. The people are extraordinarily passive. They have learned to deal with the IRA, which now strikes where it will, and to put up with the deficiencies of the London underground railway. One of the first studies of the election campaign suggested that racial prejudice was directed more at the Welsh than at the immigrant communities. We are a very introverted country, but one should be wary of euphoria. The trouble with luck is that it runs out. Nevertheless, it has not been a bad spring.□

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Books

Chinese Puzzles

Arthur Waldron

John Byron and Robert Pack, *The Claws of the Dragon: Kang Sheng—The Evil Genius Behind Mao—and His Legacy of Terror in People's China* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). 560 pp., $27.50.

Harrison E. Salisbury, *The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992). 544 pp., $24.95.

Ross Terrill, *China in Our Time: The Epic Saga of the People's Republic from the Communist Victory to Tiananmen Square and Beyond* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). 347 pp.

FOR THE fourth time this century, it seems, the future of China is up for grabs, and once again the perennial questions are being asked. The most basic of these concern culture and its effect on political form: How limited is China by the vast legacy of her dynastic past? Are pluralism and democracy possible in China? Or are these effectively ruled out by the nature of the Chinese culture and state?

Today, few but scholars are familiar with the circumstances when these questions were posed for the first and second times: in 1911, when the Qing (Ch'ing) monarchy tottered and was replaced by a nominal republic, and in 1926, when Chiang Kai-shek's revolutionary Nationalists began driving back the armies of the Peking government. In each of these cases many Chinese spoke clearly of the more democratic regime they wanted and expected. That they were disappointed, however, scarcely surprised more detached observers, for then, as now, the assumption was widespread that democracy was inherently unsuited to China.

The third case, when the Communists took power in 1949, still largely frames our thinking. For until very recently Chinese communism was believed to be the answer to these age-old questions: a culturally appropriate amalgam in which sinified Marxism took the place of Confucianism, a Communist leader and party substituted for emperor and scholar-officials, and the imperatives of modernization replaced the quest for timeless harmony. To be sure, it was not fully democratic, as that word was understood in the West, but it was right for China: highly participatory and run in the interest of the people.

Now, with the collapse of communism elsewhere, the verdict of 1949 in China is in grave doubt. In assessing the implications we face a problem. So thoroughly have the assumptions about China that flowed from 1949 been accepted, and so much have other initiatives and potentialities in Chinese history been forgotten, that we are at a loss to imagine realistically what that country may become.

This deficiency of imagination persists in spite of the fact that as the communist grip on China has weakened, accurate knowledge of the country's recent history has greatly increased. Thus it is inconceivable that *The Claws of the Dragon* could have been written even a dozen years ago. The book is a mi-

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nutely detailed biography of Kang Sheng, a Soviet-trained security specialist who, until his death in 1975, was a key figure in Peking politics, although always in the background. John Byron, who has written it in collaboration with free-lance writer Robert Pack, is a Western diplomat with sinological training and long experience in Peking. For his story he has relied above all on indirect access to the Peking establishment, through a variety of secret inner-party documents that he managed to obtain during his service in the Chinese capital and a host of interviews with Chinese having firsthand knowledge of Kang, all painstakingly evaluated and counterchecked against other available evidence. The result is perhaps the best account yet available in English of the inner workings of Chinese communism.

Kang is well chosen as subject, both for his dramatic qualities and his political importance. As a man, he seems the oriental villain direct from central casting: an opium addict whose *ménage à trois* included his wife and sister-in-law (who eventually either committed suicide or was killed by Kang); a debased connoisseur of Chinese culture whose tastes ran to porcelain, calligraphy, and pornography; and above all, a consummate courtier and political intriguer whose devious manipulations of Mao Tse-tung brought Kang close to supreme power and China to the brink of disaster.

Byron and Pack present all this in a style sometimes reminiscent of an airport-shop spy novel: little of Kang's debauchery is left to the imagination, and the tortures at which he excelled are described in exact physiological detail. But this sensationalism in presentation should not distract the reader from either the book's deeper purposes or its quite remarkable and well-sustained claims. For Byron and Pack present an implicit theory of Chinese politics, a theory that is at odds with much which has hitherto been taken for granted.

We are accustomed, in analyzing Chinese communism (or any other system), to looking at ideologies, institutions, interest groups, mechanisms of consultation and consensus formation, and so on—the full menu worked out by academic students of politics and society. The reader will seek such categories in vain in *The Claws of the Dragon*. The account is entirely devoted to personalities and their rivalries, intrigues, and plots, from the early years in Moscow and Shanghai in the 1920s and 1930s to the twilight of the present—a vast web of what many historians would consider ultimately insignificant detail, for which the authors nevertheless make very major claims.

For when Byron and Pack describe Kang Sheng as "the evil genius behind Mao" they really mean it. For them the devil is in the details: Their thesis is that Kang Sheng played a genuinely decisive role, not just in the late chairman's personal affairs (for example in introducing him to the actress Jiang Qing who became his wife in 1938) but in major affairs of state as well. As they tell it, Kang had directing influence on the main events of Chinese history from the 1950s to the 1970s—the Hundred Flowers movement, the Great Leap Forward, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Cultural Revolution—and he was preparing to intervene in the brewing succession struggle when cancer claimed him in 1975.

THE FIRST part of the book takes Kang from his privileged childhood in Shandong into the Communist Party. The authors establish a few key themes that will recur: his knowledge of the Guomindang connections of some figures who would later join the communists, and the suspicion that at one point he might have betrayed the party; his possible sexual relationship with Jiang Qing and his familiarity with her past (we learn of a photograph, taken in Shanghai in the 1930s and showing her naked on the lap of the gangster Huang Jinrong, that figured as a possible blackmail tool until it was evidently removed from the files and destroyed in 1973); his role in the struggle between the Moscow-backed Communists of Wang Ming (whom he backed initially) and Mao (to whose side he shifted).

Extraordinary historical detective work

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has gone into the detailed reconstruction of the underground struggle between Communist and Nationalist security organizations, and how Kang used his unusual skills to advance himself. When victory came, those skills became less valuable, as China's needs turned toward economic and political institution building. For reasons that have puzzled everyone, Kang withdrew from public life at the time of victory, living as an "invalid" in a special hospital for cadres until 1955, when a looming Eighth Party Congress (the first since 1945) stimulated him once again to activity.

Most of the rest of the book documents Kang's attempt to return to power, using some vehicle other than his internal-security skills. Initially he tried foreign policy. Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin and liberal initiatives in Eastern Europe profoundly disquieted the Chinese who, after all, had signed up for full Stalinism less than a decade earlier. How to respond to these unwelcome developments was much discussed in Peking, with most of the leaders favoring a simple hard line. Mao, however, was early inclined toward a pre-emptive liberalization, perhaps (although this is not certain) having in mind the possibility of trapping his adversaries once they spoke out. Kang quickly caught on, winning Mao's favor through his advocacy of the Hundred Flowers Movement, and liquidating many of his own enemies in the "anti-rightist" campaign that followed.

Kang understood too Mao's fear of being sidelined by the technocrats and bureaucrats who increasingly dominated China in the 1950s. Anticipating—or mirroring—Mao's attitude to the things scientific that he did not understand, Kang declared "there is nothing special about making reactors, cyclotrons, or rockets. . . . just act recklessly and it will be all right." He divined as well Mao's dislike of the incremental and his fascination with utopian revolution. Joining the chairman's entourage on his journeys to the beauty spots of southern China, Kang began suggesting possibilities for a "great leap," at least in the area of education and culture for which he had some responsibility, and even used the phrase "cultural revolution." All of this fed into Mao's own determination to launch a Great Leap Forward in economics, and Kang's power and influence rose accordingly.

The Great Leap, however, with its backyard steel furnaces and large-scale communal agriculture, ended in chaos and starvation. Someone had to be blamed, and a high drama was played out at the Lushan Plenum in 1959, when General Peng Dehuai, who had commanded Chinese troops in Korea, indirectly put the blame on Mao. Kang helped to rescue the chairman, planting the view that Peng was the cat's-paw of an anti-Mao conspiracy headquartered in the Kremlin.

All of this led naturally into the Sino-Soviet dispute, which Byron and Pack portray not as the inevitable consequence of conflicting geopolitical agendas, but rather as the contingent product of Kang's need for a threat with which to manipulate Mao. As the only Soviet specialist trusted by Mao, Kang played a key role in drafting polemical documents of the dispute. In his role as go-between, he fanned the flames whenever compromise threatened.

NOT ONLY was Kang the choreographer of the Sino-Soviet dispute, according to Byron and Pack he was "Godfather of the Cultural Revolution." He used the debate over Liu Zhidan, an early revolutionary whose reputation Mao envied, as a dress rehearsal, and detonated the struggle itself by inflaming Mao's suspicions of an innocuous play about a Ming dynasty official called "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office." He cleverly undermined the strong group of officials who wanted to abort the project, and then sat back as students run amok pulled down his rivals. As they ransacked homes, he also enriched his huge private art collection.

But Kang overplayed his hand. When Chen Zaidao, military commander in Wuhan, defied orders from the center to support pro-Mao Red Guards and instead crushed them—and was then arrested himself and

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taken to Peking on July 24, 1967—Kang took it as his cue to attempt to take control of the military. Red Guards a million strong marched through Tiananmen the following day—they were clearly intended to intimidate the military—while Kang and Jiang Qing told their leader that Mao had authorized attacks "to drag out the handful of counterrevolutionaries and capitalist roaders in the army." The army, however, resisted, and Mao disowned the orders given in his name. Kang's political trajectory had reached its apogee.

Thereafter the story is one of slow decline, as his well-prepared stratagems no longer quite succeed. At the very end we see him preparing a final double-cross: having realized that Jiang Qing and her associates were doomed, he tried to send word to Mao of incriminating secrets he had kept in reserve since the 1930s—but his go-betweens failed to deliver the message, and he dies, repeating in his delirium, "I did not betray the Party."

The Claws of the Dragon is a virtuoso performance, as true a tour as we are likely to receive of the hidden paths of power in People's China. But its authors intend it as more, as a paradigm of Chinese politics: merciless, contingent, and ultimately contentless, beyond the short-term personal interests of the players. They draw some parallels with Chinese tradition. Mao Tse-tung, they tell us, was "a peasant leader who established a fourteenth-century regime in the twentieth century; even his mausoleum, the contemporary version of an imperial tomb, recalls the dynasties of old." Kang owed his success to his ability to channel the "dark forces" of Chinese society within that political context. And their brief concluding prophecy is pessimistic: "As long as Mao retains his place in the Chinese pantheon, the spirit of Kang Sheng, Mao's evil genius and hatchet man, will not likely be exorcised. Although the vocabulary of the Confucian bureaucrat has given way to the jargon of the Party cadre, the values of the old China remain intact."

THIS PARALLEL between the politics of dynastic China and those of the People's Republic is a relatively minor theme in *The Claws of the Dragon*. In *The New Emperors*, it is the major thesis. Harrison Salisbury's latest book covers much of the same ground as Byron and Pack's, and while it cannot be compared with theirs in terms of factual command or analytical acuity, it is of great interest nonetheless. The "new emperors" of the title are Mao Tse-tung and Deng Xiaoping. The book's contention is that the imperial form of rule is virtually a given of Chinese culture; that it has shaped the People's Republic from its beginnings through the Tiananmen massacre (which can be explained, if not excused, on the basis of imperial norms); and that it is unlikely to be replaced by anything more pluralistic for at least a century.

The parallel between the People's Republic and the dynastic past is not a new one, and Salisbury acknowledges his debt to, among others, the late John Fairbank, "who understood the role of China's emperors long before this writer came on the scene." But Salisbury's account is nonetheless remarkable in the amount of detail it provides. It gives new accounts of some of the most important incidents of the history of the People's Republic. It has several chapters on the Korean War, which describe how Mao was taken by surprise—"blindsided," as it were, by Stalin. It delves deeply into the conflict between Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping in the period following the Great Leap Forward. It provides a road map of the factional struggles of the Cultural Revolution, and a new narration, from the Chinese side, of the Nixon diplomacy, one which greatly diminishes Mao's role while strengthening that of Zhou Enlai. Some, but not all, of this ground is covered by Byron and Pack, but the two accounts are by no means at one.

By far the most sensational parts of Salisbury's book deal with Mao Tse-tung's private life. Under Salisbury's investigation, the "Study of Chrysanthemum Fragrance," where Mao lived in the Peking

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palace compound called Zhongnanhai, seems at last to be yielding up its secrets. We learn that the chairman slept naked almost until the end of his life, favored toothpowder over toothpaste, suffered chronic constipation, and was addicted to sleeping pills. As for his sexual habits, Salisbury's account would sizzle in a supermarket tabloid. The chairman was uncomfortable with the sorts of beautiful and sophisticated ladies who would have formed the upper ranks of the imperial concubinage, preferring "harem girls, peasants, and pickups," in ones, twos, and more, so that sometimes his quarters were off limits for days at a time. Equally sensational is Salisbury's revelation of Mao's addiction to narcotics which he believes may account for some of his more erratic behavior and bizarre ideas.

ON MATTERS of more consequence, Salisbury is equally interesting. Take, for instance, his description of Nixon's meeting with Mao. In 1972, Mao was looked after day to day by Zhang Yufeng, a former railway stewardess with whom he had become infatuated, and whom his chief bodyguard had brought to Peking (while generously paying off her husband). After lunch on the afternoon of February 21, Mao (who had his lucid and not-so-lucid moments) decided he didn't want to take his nap but rather to have Richard Nixon come to visit him. The devoted Zhang had to hustle, getting the chairman bathed, shaved, and stuffed into an oversized suit specially tailored just in case. Meanwhile, Nixon and Kissinger waited in uncertainty at the Diaoyutai State Guest House, until Zhou Enlai brought the good tidings. Then the president of the United States was ushered into the chairman's presence.

While such vignettes are absorbing, there is a problem in assessing Salisbury's reliability. Clearly some of what he writes is true. The acknowledgments make clear that he enjoys formidable entrée in official China: he has interviewed dozens of senior officials and retired leaders (though Deng Xiaoping eluded him) and has also benefited from the assistance of well-informed Chinese advisers, who have helped him find sources, translated documents (Salisbury knows no Chinese), and generally guided the development of the text.

But in spite of such high-powered assistance, the text is riddled with errors. Many of these are linguistic and may seem minor: lapses in transliteration, for example, such as making Kang Sheng's hometown Zhucheng into Zucheng, and the seasonal sticky-rice delicacy called *zongzi* into *zhongzi*. Others may have a linguistic origin but affect fact: thus according to Salisbury, the play attacked at the start of the Cultural Revolution, "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office," deals with events in the Jiaqing period of the Qing, when (as specialists know and standard English-language reference books make clear) it is set in the Jiajing period of the Ming.

These mistakes can help us understand both the book's origin, and its interest. It has clearly been produced by listening to people talk, and not just any people, but Chinese officials who have an interest in what it will say. The errors in language are the tip-off, for making zh into z (as from Zhucheng to Zucheng) is very common among Chinese not from the capital region itself, as is overcorrection (making zongzi into zhongzi). That these errors have made it uncorrected to the printed page suggests just how closely Salisbury has stuck to the notes of his conversations, and how little (bibliography notwithstanding) he has used written materials.

Rather than being a work critically based on a variety of sources, like *Claws of the Dragon*, then, Salisbury's book is a recounting of the version of the recent Chinese past current today in semi-official Peking—something, it should be noted, that is not without interest. It reflects the often self-serving purposes of those now in power. Their account not so subtly builds up and justifies themselves, while diminishing their predecessors.

Thus Mao—rather than the Communist Party or system—takes the rap for many of

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the worst mistakes of the 1950s and 1960s, while his successor Deng Xiaoping and his patron Zhou Enlai come across heroically, as they wrest the tiller from the erratic helmsman's hands, and steer China away from the rocks. The impression is strengthened by an imbalance in the biographies. We learn all the dirt about Mao, while Deng and Zhou come across as nearly pristine—this despite the fact that both were also up to their ears in vicious intraparty conflict, and that Deng presides over a China in which official corruption, vice, and crime have reached unprecedented levels. In dealing with Mao's death and Deng's victory, by a hair, in the succession struggle, the tone is resolutely upbeat.

What, then, of the Tiananmen massacre to which Salisbury devotes four chapters? The fact that Deng himself ordered it, fully knowing that it would involve "shedding some blood," must detract from the rather sympathetic image of the "little emperor" that those in Peking are at pains to convey these days. And unlike other disasters, it cannot be blamed on Mao, who had been dead for a dozen years when it took place. How, then, does a semi-official Chinese deal with it?

Communism itself is not blamed, this in spite of the partial parallels offered by Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and other examples. Nor is Deng himself really blamed: had he been younger, and more flexible, Salisbury has been told, he probably would have found a compromise. No, ultimate blame it turns out belongs not to the system, or to the personalities involved, but to Chinese culture.

A Peking professor has told Salisbury about one of the greatest of the Chinese classics, the *Zizhi tongjian* or Comprehensive Mirror for Aid of Government (whose title he characteristically massacres as the *Cu Chi Tang Qian*), a treatise on history and the nature of government by the eleventh-century scholar Sima Guang. It is said to teach that an emperor can tolerate no challenge, and thus by implication to condone all sorts of coercive actions (in fact its argument is far more complex). Salisbury notes that many Chinese leaders have studied this text (which in itself would be less unusual even than learning that American presidents read the Bible). But the interpretation Salisbury has been given is that the crushing of the Tiananmen demonstrations was done in accord with the Mirror, by an aging emperor Deng, who, sadly, was every day hardening more and more into the mold of traditional Chinese autocrat.

Salisbury's description of the massacre is useful, particularly his portrayal of the leadership's state of mind, baffled and threatened by the unprecedented popular revolution against their revolution. But the concluding pages of his work, which stress the autocratic, imperial thread in Chinese culture, lead one to wonder whether the past that serves as backdrop to *The Claws of the Dragon* and as interpretative key to *The New Emperors* is the whole Chinese past. An abiding concern of the Chinese classics to which Salisbury makes repeated reference was the concept of the *Tianming* or Mandate of Heaven, which was won not by political guile, or unflinching use of force, but rather (in theory) morally, through superior virtue. After reading these two books, with their implicit and explicit statements about the imperial past one asks: Did not emperorship have a moral foundation? And, come to think of it, didn't communism?

THE IMPORTANCE of this moral problem comes through clearly in *China in Our Time*, Ross Terrill's eleventh book on China in more than twenty-three years. This is appropriate, Terrill's personal interest in China having begun as a moral quest. Believing in socialism and Christianity, and with the passport of his native Australia to procure him the visas then denied to Americans, Terrill went to China as a student in the 1960s, and on returning wrote books which combined fine writing with utterly uncritical description that makes strange reading today.

These books, however, made his reputation and for a time enjoyed great influence. They were widely excerpted and commented

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on, and were among those chosen for study by the small White House group planning Nixon's visit. Indeed at one time, we learn here, Terrill regularly discussed China policy with Henry Kissinger.

But those heady days are long gone. China has changed from moral paradise glimpsed distantly to killing field viewed live on CNN, and in the interval Terrill has reconsidered his views, a process to which he here alludes repeatedly. No one who knew him in his uncritical days will be entirely satisfied with the sometimes positive glosses he puts on his recantation, but it must be admitted that he shows himself more honest in his introspection than many others have been. More importantly, his qualities as acute observer and graceful writer are undiminished. No humane person, furthermore, could disagree with his broad judgments today. His new book provides a very good sense of where China is now, and even some sense of where it may be going.

TERRILL DEVOTES most of his pages to a historical survey of the People's Republic, which is certainly competent and clear—more solid and better judged than Salisbury's, though not to be compared in terms of general mastery to Byron and Pack. But for the most part this survey has a routine quality about it, and he really hits his stride only toward the end. His concluding chapters, which deal with Tiananmen, are absolutely wonderful, vividly capturing the drama of the events, and somehow eliciting fresh outrage as they are read. They are perhaps the best short account we have. The voices of ordinary people, deafeningly absent in Salisbury, are heard here on nearly every page.

Much of what Terrill picks up supports the general approach taken both by Salisbury and by Byron and Pack, which uses the language of the imperial past to frame the present. But Terrill gives us a new and significant twist. The dead were still being gathered when an old man tells him "that a dynasty had run its course, the dynasty of the Communist party dating from 1949." Later he notes on bus windscreens black and yellow paper strips "with the characters *Wei min tong che* ('Run buses for the people')," an unexceptionable sentiment, he tells us, "except for the explosive fact that the character for people was not *ren min*, the Communist term, but simply *min*, the traditional Chinese word for people."

Terrill interprets this as meaning that the bus drivers were "telling the government they still possessed a mind and will of their own." In fact, far more is going on. Why did the old man say that the massacre was ending a dynasty, when one could argue that in fact it was saving it, as was surely Deng's intention and has been the short-term result? And why would bus drivers choose a word redolent of the hierarchical social arrangements of dynastic China to name their passengers? The answer, I believe, is because this language of traditional China expressed certain moral truths far more clearly than the modern language of communism.

It is easy, and partially correct, to describe the Tiananmen protesters as Salisbury does: the vanguard of a new youth, formed by Western ideas and strengthened by international communications media about which the elderly leadership has no clue. But to do so misses the deeper point on which Terrill has stumbled. Much of what the young protesters did would have been entirely comprehensible to a Ming literatus: the long documents they compiled spelling out grievances; the kneeling at the Great Hall of the People, hoping Prime Minister Li Peng would meet them (he did not); the willingness to die (through hunger strike) to make their grievances clear. Did not Hai Rui, the upright Ming official already mentioned, who remonstrated the Jiajing emperor, bid farewell to his family and prepare his coffin before leaving for the imperial audience?

In other words, the demonstrations at Tiananmen were not primarily a matter of the late twentieth-century international culture unexpectedly challenging the tradition-encrusted People's Republic. The real chal-

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lenge—and this is why ordinary people understood it all so well—came from the Chinese tradition of moral rule, which has pervaded culture and society for millennia, and which, coming to life in the actions of students hardly aware of it, survived decades of communist rule and retains its power today.

The essential understanding of emperorship in the Confucian classics—in the dynastic histories and the *Zizhi tongjian*, and in the minds of ordinary Chinese as well—is founded not on physical but on moral power. The ideal ruler is a man of virtue; his moral influence alone causes all under heaven to move in an orderly way even while he stays within the palace, just as, in the Confucian formulation, the North Star remains fixed while all the others circle it.

Tiananmen saw a spontaneous revival and rearticulation, at both elite and mass levels, of this understanding of legitimacy. The idea implicit in the behavior of the tens of thousands of demonstrators was that if they, the people, behaved like virtuous subjects in a Confucian state, their masters would behave like virtuous Confucian rulers. They were saying: "We want the old moral order back; we want to be *min* again—and we want you to behave like virtuous rulers or *jun*."

The problem was that for all the superficial trappings and similarities, Deng and earlier Mao were *not* emperors; they were simply dictators, of the twentieth-century, one-dimensional sort, having only a power axis and destined, it seems, for the same fate as the other twentieth-century dictators, who were so stunningly powerful, but to whom, appearances notwithstanding, the future never belonged.

To put it another way, for all its appeal as master image to chroniclers of Chinese communism, the Forbidden City is not the only ancient monument in Peking, and one can imagine history written in terms of some other setting: the Temple of Heaven, for instance, where the emperor acknowledged his fealty to a higher power (can one imagine Mao or Deng doing that?); or the Confucian Temple, where honor was paid to moral precepts binding on all; or for the period beginning in this century, the public squares where *min* tried to form themselves into crowds of citizens; or even (and this one is almost always overlooked) the early twentieth-century legislative assembly buildings, which embodied in bricks and mortar (even if government did not in practice) new expressions of the ancient idea of legitimacy. There are, in other words, moral dimensions to the traditional Chinese monarchy and thought about government in general which have been lost in their communist incarnation, and whose restoration within the context of a modern governmental system is the most pressing task currently facing China.

THIS IS WHERE the culturally distinct Chinese case begins to fit into the general pattern of the present historical moment. The collapse of communism left a vacuum of legitimacy—a moral vacuum—throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Many of the former communist states had autocratic traditions comparable to China's. Yet so far that tradition is at bay—menacing, certainly, but perhaps surprisingly, not dominant. Instead, democratic assemblies, green, chaotic, and unwieldy, have emerged—because only they could fill the vacuum of legitimacy.

The books reviewed here take us to the edge of China's future, but not into it. One of these days, if I may close with a prediction, a post-communist China will reconstitute itself politically. How? Through some sort of national assembly. There is in fact a Chinese tradition of consultative and deliberative assemblies, of the sometimes rubber-stamp parliaments for which, let us note, every regime this century has felt the need. In the years ahead this tradition will reassert itself, for in the minds of ordinary Chinese, some sort of popular representation has taken on the role of legitimator. Deng Xiaoping could probably have resolved the whole 1989 crisis simply by announcing his intention genuinely to con-

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sult the people; some day soon one of his successors will in fact do just that. When he does, what emerges will be, if not fully democratic, at least far more pluralistic Chinese politics than we have yet seen. But they will build on those basic moral categories outlined above. We have learned in recent decades that traditional Confucian values can undergird spectacular economic development. Why can they not do the same politically?□

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How Important Was Reagan?

Nathan Glazer

William Ker Muir, Jr., *The Bully Pulpit: The Presidential Leadership of Ronald Reagan* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992). 265 pp., $22.95.

Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1990* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991). 514 pp., $25.00.

WHEN ONE considers what will be the final or consensus judgment of the presidency of Ronald Reagan, one cannot help thinking of Zhou Enlai's reputed comment on whether the French Revolution was a success: "It is too early to tell."

Regarding some aspects of Reaganism, I think it is clear it is too early to tell. This seems true of the effect and impact of his economic policies. Robert Bartley's *The Seven Fat Years* insists they were a resounding success, but perhaps we will have to see how, and when, and if we emerge from the current deep recession to give a more balanced judgment. The matter is deeply disputed among economists. Many things that we used to consider terrible problems (the trade deficit, the budget deficit) are presented in a more benign light by Bartley and some professional economists. Other matters for which commentators and politicians routinely attribute responsibility to tax policies or to the failure of government to act in social policy, such as the redistribution of income toward high-income earners, may owe more to deep underlying technological, economic, and social changes over which government does not have much control. In the wake of the Los Angeles explosion, we will also hear a good deal about whether Reagan's urban policies contributed to it. I do not plan to debate these issues: I do not know how to judge the competing views of various schools of economists.

But it is hardly premature to come to conclusions in one other area of presidential action: foreign policy. As is the nature of the case when we deal with history, which is never repeated and never subject to experiment and test, our conclusions can never be certain, and must always allow for much doubt. In time, it is possible that the fears which have emerged over certain consequences of the Soviet Union's total defeat in the Cold War and its break-up—the control of the remaining nuclear arms, the upsurge of ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—may well modify our judgment, but it can hardly be doubted that the United States won. And we welcome that outcome not only because of patriotism and national loyalty, but because key values for human freedom and development rode on that victory: the values of popular self-government, of freedom of expression, of human dignity and human rights, of dependable and fair-minded law, and many others. Whatever the troubles that have followed the collapse of the

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Soviet Union, no one can again argue with any credibility that the victory of those values is insignificant, or that they mean nothing to the peoples of totalitarian and authoritarian states, or that the differences between those countries in which these values reign with solid institutional support and those in which they were at best falsely proclaimed were illusory.

But what was Reagan's role in this victory? On this question—again, which is not one that can be finally decided—we have two remarkably interesting books which tell us a great deal about the president. They tell us things, indeed, that most of us do not know. Oberdorfer's book deals exclusively with Soviet-American relations over a period of seven years, which began with the deep distrust and the danger of nuclear holocaust that had characterized those relations for forty years, and ended with the two powers agreeing to destroy a good part of their nuclear weapons and to cooperate as partners in dealing with dangerous international conflicts. Muir's book, by contrast, deals with what we might call Reagan's "philosophy," and how it was expressed and communicated.

There are some who will not give President Reagan much credit for the outcome of the Cold War. They would say it was owing to luck, his skillful advisers, and the internal weakness of the Soviet Union; rather more will not credit President Reagan with a philosophy or any large, guiding ideas. After all, as Muir writes, a widespread prevailing view of Ronald Reagan was that he was lazy, ignorant, and mean-spirited. This is the indictment one would draw from three well-regarded books on Reagan and his presidency—David Stockman's *Triumph of Politics*, Garry Wills' *Reagan's America*, and Lou Cannon's *Reagan*. The common view would be that Reagan propounded his prejudices—the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and an unmodulated insistence on a stronger military establishment and the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviet Union's collapse, it has been argued, had nothing to do with these passionately held and simple beliefs and the policies which implemented them.

But a more complex picture of Reagan emerges from both books. If Reagan's ideas were simple, they were held with deep conviction, were communicated to the American people and to our foreign antagonists with skill and perseverance, and, in the end, had a powerful effect on shaping events. Not that the same picture emerges in both books; indeed, there are some contradictions between them. But in both, the Stockman-Wills-Cannon picture is quite undermined. One of the books, Muir's *The Bully Pulpit*, is clearly by a partisan; many of us will not recognize or be convinced by its portrait of Reagan as a teacher of the nation, recalling it to fundamental truths and values. The other is by someone who does not appear to have any predilection to favor Reagan (Oberdorfer is a reporter for the *Washington Post*).

THE REAGAN that emerges in Oberdorfer's account is in part familiar to us from various exposés: there is at least one reference to him pondering Armageddon, at another point astrology determines the date for the signing of an important treaty. But the larger picture is of a man with a few key ideas who fostered the eventual agreements with the Soviet Union and indeed could have brought them about earlier. It is also a picture of a man whose ideas were in contradiction with those of his chief advisers. While, compared to them, he was simpler, and uninvolved in the complexities that have bedeviled negotiations around the dread nuclear arms, Reagan expressed a simple human horror of what nuclear arms could do and a deep commitment to the notion that one could come to agreements even with those with whom we differed so absolutely because all human beings had as their overriding desire the avoidance of such horrors.

These simple but clear and deeply held views were again and again enmeshed in the complications of the advisers and the experts. Quite early in Oberdorfer's account we learn of Reagan's desire to respond positively to an Independence Day message from General Secretary Andropov in 1983, a message

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which, to Reagan's advisers, simply expressed standard Soviet boilerplate in its hope that the nuclear threat could be eliminated:

> Reagan decided to draft his own reply. This was not a new venture for the President, who had sent a letter to General Secretary Brezhnev in April 1981, while recuperating from the attempt to assassinate him. The President liked to write letters and hoped in this way to establish a direct connection with Soviet leaders. In the letter to Andropov, as with the Brezhnev letter, Reagan put his own ideas on paper in longhand. . . . Reagan's draft of his July 11 letter to Andropov reflected his strong antipathy to nuclear weapons. If it had been sent as Reagan originally wrote it, it would have been a historic document that first established his goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, a goal that the President, almost alone in his administration, ardently sought. . . . Reagan handed his draft to [National Security Advisor William] Clark the next morning, and the national security advisor in turn consulted some of the foreign policy experts on the White House staff. As was true with few exceptions during the course of the administration, the experts were horrified by the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons. . . . Reagan accepted his staff's advice and took out the references to reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons. . . .

Even so, "The letter was received with surprise and confusion in Moscow, according to Kornienko [first deputy foreign minister], especially because the handwritten missive coincided with a standard diplomatic démarche from [Secretary of State George] Shultz giving no hint of potential movement in U.S. interaction with Moscow."

Although Reagan feared the use of nuclear weapons, he was able to appreciate, apparently more than his advisers did, that the Soviet leaders could equally fear them:

> In November 1983, the United States and NATO conducted an exercise in the use of nuclear weapons in war. The CIA station in London reported that the Soviet leaders had been truly alarmed that the United States was about to attack them. In 1984 there were further reports about Soviet leaders' fear of a U.S. nuclear attack. Reagan seemed uncharacteristically grave after reading the report and asked [National Security Advisor Robert] McFarlane, "Do you really suppose they believe that?" The national security aide said he did not think the highest Soviet leaders could put credence in a completely nonexistent U.S. intention to attack.

A footnote reports a later National Intelligence estimate conclusion "that the war scare was part of a Soviet campaign to intimidate the United States and its allies." But further in the footnote we read that six years later the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board decided that it was possible that Soviet leaders had been truly afraid that the United States was planning a nuclear strike. Regardless of the conflicting views of our multifarious intelligence agencies, Reagan did write in his diary of his surprise to learn of Soviet fears that the United States might launch a first strike. For this reason, as Reagan later recalled, "I was even more anxious to get a top Soviet leader in a room alone and try to convince him we had no designs on the Soviet Union and the Russians had nothing to fear from us." As we have learned, it was not hard to have a more sensible view of affairs than our bloated intelligence agencies. It is a credit to Reagan's ordinary human responses that he could appreciate that Soviet leaders might truly fear us, and want to do something about it.

GORBACHEV WAS a man of rather different mettle from his predecessors (not that Oberdorfer gives any reason to doubt their commitment to efforts to come to agreements to reduce the risks of nuclear war), yet the president's advisers, even the most intelligent and best of them, were not more forthcoming to Gorbachev's increasingly urgent efforts to propose reductions in nuclear arms—all linked, it is true, to our abandoning the Strategic Defense Initiative, to which Reagan was totally committed.

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But his commitment, it is clear from Oberdorfer's account, was not because he thought it would help us win a nuclear war; it was because of his horror of nuclear weapons and his hope that a real defense against them could be created. Perhaps that hope was simple and misguided: it seems so to me, but we should recognize its root was not desire to win a nuclear exchange but to make it less likely.

We see this in Reagan's first meeting with Gorbachev. At that meeting, we are told, "The President tossed out most of the officially supplied remarks [from the National Security Council and the State Department] and wrote his own more personal ones." The issue for Gorbachev was to prevent SDI, but Reagan believed "SDI could help get rid of nuclear weapons, and [Reagan] was prepared to share the technologies and answers with the Soviet Union." Gorbachev asked why he should believe the president. "[Gorbachev] may have been aware that many U.S. officials were scornful of Reagan's insistence that the United States should or would share expensive and highly classified Star Wars techniques with the USSR." At the same meeting: "Despite almost unanimous advice from his advisors not to broach the subject first [one wonders why], Reagan raised the point that Gorbachev had never visited the United States and asked, 'Why don't we have the next summit meeting next year in the United States?' 'I accept,' said Gorbachev without hesitation."

The pattern of caution and suspicion on the part of the experts, a willingness to treat the Soviet leader as human, with human concerns, on the part of the president, characterizes all the exchanges with Gorbachev. For example, in January 1986, Gorbachev proposed eliminating all nuclear weapons worldwide by the year 2000. The top officials who gathered to prepare an answer from Reagan's office (Shultz, Nitze, Poindexter) "found Reagan eager to endorse Gorbachev's proposal. . . . Reagan's comment was startling: 'Why wait until the year 2000?'. . . [N]early every one in official Washington—except Reagan—thought [Gorbachev's idea] was outlandish." In response, even Caspar Weinberger was ready to move; he proposed an idea of Fred Iklé's—a plan to eliminate all ballistic missiles. But when the experts worked this one over, they decided that

> a clear-cut plan to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles would have been shocking to the public and military community and might have been rejected out of hand. . . . As reworked by the arms-control experts, Weinberger's bold idea of banning all ballistic missiles was watered down and complicated so that only the germ of the proposal survived.

Of course the peak of Reagan's "imprudence," from the point of view of arms-control experts, came at the summit in Reykjavik in 1986. Reagan and Gorbachev bargained seriously about eliminating all nuclear weapons. The negotiations broke down because of Reagan's commitment to SDI:

> Profound relief that [the summit] did not succeed would be the predominant emotion among astonished military strategists and leaders of Western European nations. . . . Former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger wrote that "Reykjavik represented a near disaster from which we were fortunate to escape." Former President Richard Nixon wrote, "No summit since Yalta has threatened Western interests as much as the two days at Reykjavik."

If this view of Reagan conflicts with the common picture of him as a fierce opponent of Soviet totalitarianism, uncompromisingly suspicious of its good faith, trusting only in overwhelming arms to protect American interests against its expansionism, one will find the picture of Reagan as teacher and philosopher of freedom in *The Bully Pulpit* even more surprising. Walter Ker Muir has undertaken an enterprise for which I can think of no parallel in recent decades: He has taken all the utterances of the president—the millions of words in speeches to thousands of audiences, the press conferences, the interviews—and found in them a common aim or mission, and

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no modest one either: it is to teach and guide the American people to a coherent and distinctive view of man, government, and society. The president is presented as deeply committed to this view, which he has thought through and developed over decades. This view is deeply rooted in American history. Again and again, before or after outlining the president's philosophy on one or another topic, we are reminded of Alexis de Tocqueville's similar views. (There are more references to Tocqueville in the index than to any other figure.)

If one is to present the philosophy and ideas of Ronald Reagan through his speeches and formal statements, one must immediately confront the question: Who wrote them? While we may be surprised that Reagan drafted his personal letters to Soviet leaders in his own handwriting and words, we would not expect that he wrote the thousands of speeches in the large volumes of the public papers of the president. In one typical month, we are told, the president made formal remarks on twenty-six occasions. So, what was the relationship between Reagan and his speechwriters? To what extent did they pursue his agenda, or some other? How did he interact with them? Did he edit their speeches, how much, and in what direction?

THIS MAY be the most detailed study yet of the speechwriters for the president. Part of the work for the book consisted of long interviews with the six persons in the Speechwriting Department (that was its formal name) during 1984 and 1985, a period described as one of great stability and productivity. Their backgrounds were various—a writer and producer at CBS, another writer for CBS, a Yale graduate who had written for the *National Review* and had served as press secretary for Senator James Buckley, one veteran supporter of the president from Southern California who had been a newspaperman and press secretary, a career military officer, a graduate of the Dartmouth conservative movement. But in their minds they were truly alter egos of the president, defending his views against the specialists in foreign and domestic and economic policy—not on the basis of any superior knowledge and expertise (their only common expertise was in language) but on the basis of the fact that they felt closer to the president and felt they could properly represent his views.

Muir gives a rather surprising and, I believe, unique view of the forces operating on the presidency, one which gives the speechwriters a role equal to that of his chief foreign policy and domestic policy advisers. Of course we are well aware of the common political science view of the president as being at the focus of various conflicting forces. But it is not often that speechwriters become one of these forces. As Muir describes the posture of the various forces:

> The chief of staff urged the president to address the concerns of the political community—what the president called "the beltway crowd"; he wanted the president to speak the language of economics and law. The State Department and the President's advisor on national security affairs pressed the president to use public forums to communicate to the leaders of foreign nations; they wanted him to speak the language of diplomacy and force.

Whereas the Speechwriting Department "found ways to encourage the president to speak, not about politics or diplomacy, but about the intellectual and spiritual needs of the American people. . . . 'Room must be given to dealing with the issues which really lurk in people's hearts,'" according to one of the speechwriters.

The president let the competing interests fight the matter out, but, according to Muir, "his known predilection for the speechwriters' perspective tilted the likely outcome in their favor." The other interests, political and foreign policy, "knew that the burden fell on them to dissuade the president from following his philosophical inclinations." The speechwriters knew "they were the true favorites of the president." How much faith we can put in this picture I do not know—what

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is intriguing is the role played by an (almost) anonymous group of publicists.

The speechwriters were not chosen for expertise but for commitment to the president's large vision. We are given intriguing details of how they worked. Consider a speech to the National League of Cities on the president's urban policy, assigned to the ex-military officer. He knows nothing in particular about urban policy. He calls up government urban experts, each of whom tells him about this or that detail of policy. He is not happy with this:

> If that were our policy, to give out money to the cities, then the Democrats would always outbid us. That could not be our urban policy. . . . The more I thought about it, the more convinced I was that we needed a better, more comprehensive definition. . . . I came up with an outline, and since no one had ever defined it that way, it stood as the Reagan "urban policy." But it was a definition under which the Republicans could do better that the Democrats.

He asked, what makes people want to live in cities, corporations to locate there? He does think of New Federalism and better transit, but concludes "it's safe streets, less crime, less drugs, better schools, and improvement of all education. It's a feeling of neighborhood, with all the traditional values of neighbor helping neighbor. . . . "

Could anything be more Reaganesque? One can be sure the president delivered the speech with feeling.

In his effort to define the president's philosophy and approach, Muir comes out with some formulations that will undoubtedly surprise many readers (as they surprised me). He begins with the two great values that "vie to dominate the American mind": freedom and equality. Clearly the president, like Tocqueville, was on the side of freedom when these two great values come into contention. What is surprising is Muir's argument that Reagan defined the good society as a "partnership," in sharp contrast with the formulation of that presidential champion of equality, President Lyndon Johnson, who in a famous speech compared life to a "footrace" in which blacks had been hobbled. The footrace metaphor was not challenged by Nixon, Ford, or Carter. What could be wrong with this metaphor, and why is the partnership metaphor, to Muir, superior? The problem with the footrace comparison is that it tells us there must be winners and losers, and there must be very many losers and very few winners. It depicts society as a war of all against all, a "zero-sum game," a virtual civil war. It depicts the competition as isolating and cutthroat, evoking a narrow individualism. It suggests that if, after the hobbles are removed, the once-encumbered do not succeed equally, the fault is in society, and that government would have to take a hand to redress the injustice. It may remind one of the powerful line, "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win." And so on. The unoffending footrace becomes by the end a shabby and dangerous metaphor.

BUT WAS REAGAN really enthusiastic about partnership? Well, he did often refer to voluntary action, to helping the less fortunate, and many of his vivid anecdotes dealt with just such matters. But was not Reagan a defender of economic freedom, of the market place? Reagan's market place to Muir was not "an arena where the remorseless and the greedy exploited the needy and decent. If society was a partnership, then the marketplace. . .could be seen as an enabler of countless acts of voluntary cooperation between supplier and customer." And then we have yet another reference to Tocqueville with his approval of the American pattern of achieving common ends through voluntary group action rather than through government.

Well, that is part of the story, certainly not all of it. There are aspects of the marketplace that do not disappear with a new metaphor. One may be similarly doubtful about Reagan's effort, according to Muir, to ground his philosophy in religion, which is expounded at length.

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The Bully Pulpit is a tour-de-force, if not a completely convincing tour-de-force. It certainly suggests that we need more serious consideration of the president—any president—and his speechwriters, who, as we saw in the case of the speech to the National Council of Cities, can create an urban policy even in its absence.

I HAVE suggested the two views of Reagan in *The Turn* and *The Bully Pulpit*, while they both raise Reagan in our estimation, are not fully concordant with each other. In the area of foreign policy, the speechwriters had, it would seem, to contend most sharply with the president's advisers and with the Department of State. As we saw, Reagan also contended with them. The speechwriters presented another side of Reagan, the Reagan of the "evil empire," of the abhorrence of communism and the booster of Americanism in one of its versions, as the celebrator of freedom and the market. The Reagan who wanted to get rid of nuclear weapons, who was willing to act impulsively and naively, as his advisers thought, to achieve that goal, came into contention with the other Reagan, the earlier Reagan, espoused enthusiastically by the speechwriters.

On one occasion the two books intersect in a surprising way. In 1988, at a meeting between Gorbachev and Shultz, Gorbachev protested the tone of recent Reagan speeches, especially one to the World Affairs Council of Springfield, Massachusetts:

> The full text of these and other Reagan speeches, most of which were reported at modest length or less in the U.S. press, were routinely. . .propelled by the latest electronic means to the desks of Politburo members only a few hours after they were made. . . . Shultz had not seen the Springfield speech, which had not been considered a significant U.S. policy declaration until Gorbachev brought it up. A copy had been sent to the State Department for review a few hours before it was delivered. . . .The speech draft was read by lower-level diplomats, who considered it a rather typical product of the presidential speechwriting team, which was among the most conservative groups in the White House.

The main problem it seemed, was that, on the eve of the Moscow summit, it "extolled the virtues of speaking bluntly about the moral superiority of the West, ridiculing the warnings by unidentified 'experts' that 'this kind of candor was dangerous, that it would lead to a worsening of Soviet-American relations.' " It exulted too much about the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. It was insulting to Gorbachev, and could undermine him in Moscow.

While Gorbachev was offended, the incident did not derail the negotiations. Yet it does give us another picture of the speechwriting team. They were "the most conservative group" in the White House. They were the most consistent. While what they said intersected with policy, and sometimes in the absence of anything else became policy, they were relatively irresponsible: they were free to interpret the president as he had often presented himself, they were the people who wanted "Reagan to be Reagan," and who made it possible for him, in the absence of the strongest resistance from the other forces within the administration, to be Reagan.

One comes to no final conclusion—there was more to Reagan than his detractors made out. There were achievements to his administration. And these achievements were not disconnected from the man himself.□

Nathan Glazer is co-editor of The Public Interest.

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Thank You Mr. Cropsey

WILL THE real Seth Cropsey please stand up? The stated thesis of our friend and former colleague's recent *National Interest* article ("Barking Up a Fallen Tree," Spring 1992) is that "low-intensity conflict is dead." Yet throughout the article Mr. Cropsey identifies low-intensity conflict (LIC) concerns of continuing importance: the need to "enforce" non-proliferation policy; humanitarian assistance and foreign internal defense in the former Soviet Union; and security assistance programs in moderate Arab states. In other recent publications Cropsey has advocated such LIC activities as military counterproliferation operations, subversion of the Saddam Hussein regime, LIC operations to keep sea lanes open, and retaliating against terrorists.

Despite rhetorical flourishes, then, Cropsey clearly is not making the case that LIC is "dead" or even seriously ill. Instead, he argues that, with the end of the Cold War, there will be certain changes in the types of LIC challenges confronting the United States in the coming decades. Cropsey is really arguing that the importance of particular LIC activities waxes and wanes depending on geopolitical circumstances, but that "political-military confrontations between contending states or groups below conventional war" (the government's official definition of LIC) remain an important security concern despite the end of the Cold War. We agree.

Cropsey also argues that bureaucratic and political considerations negate the requirement for this office's LIC responsibilities. Here again, Cropsey not only overstates his case but actually helps substantiate the opposite conclusion. He explains repeatedly why LICs are "beyond the traditional skills" of some forces and demand the "integration of military and nonmilitary tools." He also spells out why LIC requires extensive interagency cooperation and "the shrewd management of non-military instrument(s)." In other words, Cropsey highlights the unique aspects of LIC that require the special attention provided by our office.

Eventually Cropsey makes it clear that his real concern is not whether LIC is important, or whether it requires special attention, but whether it detracts from our office's ability to oversee special operations capabilities. Resource issues related to special operations forces receive constant attention from almost half of our organizational structure, and are further supported by portions of the almost 600 personnel on the Special Operations Command staff, as well as the Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center. Relieving the relatively small number of personnel specifically charged with LIC responsibilities in our office would not substantially increase attention to the needs of Special Operations Forces.

Moreover, LIC is not a distraction from special operations. The contrary is true, as once again Cropsey helps demonstrate. As he emphasizes, Special Operations Forces provide decision-makers with a significantly broader array of options for responding to LIC challenges. Hence, the LIC responsibilities of our office *complement* rather than compete with our special operations mission.□

Chris Lamb, Director, Policy Planning
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)
Washington, DC

Seth Cropsey Responds:

LIC MAY NOT be dead. But it will take much more than the finely-drawn distinctions crafted by my friend and former colleague Chris Lamb to convince Americans that their interest in brushfire wars persists. A clearer demonstration of interest is that of the bureaucratic entity responsible for LIC in arguing that it still has to work to do.□

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All That Jazz

Irving Kristol

RECENTLY, I WAS asked to participate in a conference on the topic, "Does the Spread of American Popular Culture Advance American Interests?" My answer, in brief, is: "Well, yes—and on the other hand, no."

I'll begin with an anecdote. Back in the early 1970s, I was a "citizen member" of a USIA inspection team sent to Yugoslavia for three weeks to evaluate USIA activities there. In the course of that visit, I had a long talk with the USIA chap in charge of promoting American programs on Yugoslav radio. He was well prepared, with statistics and charts showing the steady progress being made by American programs on Yugoslav radio, despite considerable hostility by the Yugoslav authorities.

"What kinds of programs in particular are the most popular?" I asked. "Oh, rock music programs, by far," he answered. "So," I said, "you are using American popular music to subvert the Yugoslav Communist regime." He looked at me blankly, clearly not having the faintest idea of what I was talking about. But that, in truth, was exactly what he was doing. The Yugoslav authorities I spoke to, in contrast, knew that this was what he was doing. But the popularity of this American music, along with the concurrent wave of popularity of blue jeans, was such that the authorities felt unable to withstand it. And so the Yugoslav regime was subverted, with the results, good and bad, we are now familiar with.

Let me generalize bravely from this experience—as well as from my own cultural biases. American popular music, like American popular culture generally, has a wonderfully corrosive effect on all totalitarian and strongly authoritarian regimes. The spirit of this culture is profoundly individualist, almost anarchic in fact, and crosses the grain of all collectivist societies. The spirit of this culture is also profoundly hedonistic, placing the emphasis on individual appetites and desires as self-defined, and therefore hostile to any authoritative, political definition of "needs" that takes priority over individually defined appetites and desires. Such an authoritative definition of "needs" by a government elite is at the heart of a planned economy, so American popular culture is very much aligned in favor of a market economy, whose distinctive feature is the sovereignty of "wants" over "needs." It is the assumption of this sovereignty, in fact, that forms the basis of modern economic theory, which is individualistic, hedonistic, and thoroughly democratic in its refusal to differentiate among the various "wants," according legitimacy to some and not to others. In a century during which totalitarianism and collectivism have, at great human expense, been refuted in theory and ultimately rejected in practice, this propensity of American popular culture

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has obviously much to commend it. But is its destructive power matched by a constructive impulse? Many people, committed to something called a "democratic faith," regard this question as irrelevant. Give free play to this destructive element, they advise us, and somehow everything will work out well in the end. These people cannot believe that what is so very popular can be self-destructive to a democracy. That is the core of their democratic faith.

Well, I do not share that faith and I believe that it radically misconceives the nature of a democratic regime. In such a regime, properly understood, not only are the people self-governing but they are, supposedly, constantly being educated and disciplined to civilized self-government. This is accomplished in part by the complex political structure of the regime which, through such mechanisms as representation and the separation of powers, makes self-government an exercise in deliberation and prudence. It is also accomplished by what we call the "culture," which encompasses our religious institutions, our educational institutions, the media, and all of the various creative arts.

Traditionally, these institutions were never simply popular. Though they inevitably, yet gradually, changed in response to popular tastes and moods and beliefs, they always recognized standards, and these standards were not in and of themselves democratic. It is important to remember that there is nothing inherently democratic about the propensity for self-control and deferred gratification, both indispensable to the functioning of a constitutional polity and a market economy. The people have to be elevated above themselves, as it were, their characters have to be *formed* for such habits of thought and action to prevail over more spontaneous impulses. The populist spirit natural to a democracy has to be refined to become properly deferential to limited government, constitutional tradition, religious authority, and a sense of the public good.

A popular culture can participate in its own way in such refinement, as it once did, but the original energy flows from a "high culture" that sets the tone. Such a cultural "elitism" is essential to the proper workings of a democracy. But there is always the prospect of the democratic temper rebelling against such "elitism." We in the United States have been living through such a rebellion for almost a century now. That rebellion has been so successful that there really is very little by way of "high culture" in our country that one can point to. "High" and "popular" have merged, with popular predominating easily.

AMERICAN popular culture today is multi-dimensional. Much of it is perfectly good entertainment, and it is not surprising that this most democratic of nations should be so skilled at devising such entertainment. But there is a dynamic at work within this culture that can be viewed as a threat to this democracy. And it is this dynamic, as well as the culture, that we are exporting to the new democracies of Eastern Europe. This is especially the case with popular music. Both Plato and Confucius said (at more or less the same time) that he who controls the people's music controls the state. An exaggeration, of course. Still, when we witness the extraordinary popularity of rock music in all its forms and versions, one has reason to think that we may well be exporting a principle of instability into the cultural and political existence of these nations. We are not exporting a comparable "high" culture since we have none to export.

Inevitably, the elites in these countries, and in Western Europe as well, after first welcoming the "liberating" effects of our popular culture, soon show signs of what we call "anti-Americanism." We already see this in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia. It has long been evident in Western Europe.

A world power, if it is to maintain its position, needs to generate respect for its culture, not only for its military prowess. The Romans solved this problem by taking over and absorbing a richer, superior Greek

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culture. A hundred and fifty years ago, one might have hoped that the United States would take over and absorb a richer and superior European culture. Indeed, our educational system—and especially our system of higher education—had this as its premise. But the American democracy, as its populist and egalitarian drive accelerated, has been gradually discarding any affiliation to the high culture of Europe. Today, the desperate, losing battle in our universities to preserve a minimal "canon" representing that culture is living testimony to our cultural disaster.

Popular culture provides entertainment, sometimes quite wonderful entertainment. But while it may, at its worst, debase its consumers, it cannot ever elevate. That is not its mission. So I am not unambiguously happy that the United States today has been so successful in exporting its popular culture to the world at large. Indeed, I am not happy that the United States even *has* this popular culture to export.□

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

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